To the Winner, the Potatoes
- Luciano Barbarini Ferraz
- 13 hours ago
- 22 min read
Brazil's 2026 election and the succession crises threatening both the left and the right
As the fictional philosopher Quincas Borba explains in Machado de Assis’s Posthumous Memoirs of Brás Cubas, in a field with only enough potatoes to feed one of two tribes, the winning tribe shall eat every single one of them to survive while the loser starves. In recent years, in an almost intertextual manner, Brazilian politics has embodied the spirit of Quincas’s ironic “humanitistic” philosophical premise, revealing itself to be nothing less than an unforgiving and brutal struggle for political survival.
The upcoming 2026 Brazilian election will not be defined as a simple rematch between Bolsonarism and Lulism. With both sides remodeling their narratives, a new era of Brazilian politics is just around the corner, and whatever the outcome may be, it will define, for the following years, how the Brazilian left and the right will behave in order to consolidate and concentrate power. As of now, the stage is set to show whether the Bolsonarism trademark is a heritage that can live beyond Jair himself or if it’s a liability bound to be left behind. At the same time, Lula has been the left’s only name for decades, and with his inevitable aging, one wonders where the left can possibly go when Lula is no longer available. Still, the forces shaping these uncertainties did not emerge overnight.
Ever-Present Past
On August 31, 2016, Lula's protégée, President Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party (PT), was impeached. Her presidency was marred by controversies, unpopularity, and a series of widespread protests against the country's political and economic state. At around that moment, the whole nation took unprecedented interest in politics. Concurrently, in 2014, Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato), the largest anti-corruption investigation to date in Brazil, began. Although she was not personally implicated, the investigation served as the main fuel to the movement for Dilma's impeachment. Among the operation's targets was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the longtime Workers' Party leader and former Brazilian president. Lula was charged with corruption and money laundering, which resulted in his conviction and imprisonment in 2018.
With that, a new wave was born, and Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a fringe federal deputy, surfed it best. Bolsonaro was able to channel the frustrations and the anti-PT sentiment of the people who were tired of the same names, the same party, and the same scandals. His campaign strategy was based on evoking feelings of patriotism and revolt in the average person who had been disillusioned with politics.
On September 6th, 2018, while Jair Bolsonaro was in a presidential campaign rally, he was stabbed in the abdominal region. As he was rushed to the hospital, one thing became almost certain: if he were to survive, he would win that election. Sure enough, Bolsonaro survived and beat Workers' Party candidate Fernando Haddad with more than 55% of votes in the second round.
When Bolsonaro took office, he appointed then Federal Judge Sergio Moro who was responsible for convicting Lula, as Minister of Justice. Moro was the symbol of Operation Car Wash and his appointment was seen as unprecedented. In addition, Paulo Guedes, a Chicago-trained economist and long-time advocate of free-market reforms, was chosen as Minister of the Economy. By the end of 2019, the general sentiment among a large share of the population was that Brazil could be moving towards a promising direction. Until it wasn't.
On April 24, 2020, Bolsonaro fired the General Director of the Federal Police, Maurício Valeixo, without Moro's knowledge. Moro called a press conference and resigned on the spot, publicly accusing Bolsonaro of removing Valeixo in order to install someone who would feed him confidential information. The markets’ response was not kind, as investors feared this political instability would drag on to other branches of his administration. Bolsonaro, the man elected on an anti-corruption agenda was being accused of obstruction by the very judge who convicted Lula and paved the way for his presidency. The rupture with Moro was just the beginning of a very turbulent term. By this point, Lula had been released from prison, and, in 2021, his convictions had been annulled on procedural grounds by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba, where Moro had presided as judge, lacked jurisdiction to try him. Lula was not acquitted, but he was free, eligible, and planning a return to Brasília. The same wave that led Bolsonaro into power was beginning to recede.
Bolsonaro’s term would continue to receive a variety of assessments from all sides of the political spectrum. Specifically, among regular voters who did not subscribe to a single political party or specific ideology, Bolsonaro's rate of rejection grew. His controversial statements, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the constant reproval he received in media outlets, and his open fights with the Supreme Court all contributed to a growing aversion among this segment that usually sits in the centre.
This culminated in an extremely polarized and tight electoral race between Bolsonaro and Lula in 2022. A still very strong Bolsonarist base and a prevalent anti-PT movement faced Lula's strong left base and the growing newfound anti-Bolsonaro sentiment. With a vote count in the second round of 50.9% against 49.1%, Bolsonaro, from the Liberal Party (PL), became the first president since Brazil's reinstitution of the reelection system to lose a reelection bid. Following a devastating battle, anti-Bolsonaro sentiment prevailed, and Lula made an unparalleled comeback for his third term as President. However, governing Brazil for a third time would pose challenges. Lula was elected, but he did not possess the congressional leverage needed to push his agenda through with ease, as in that election, the PL elected 99 federal deputies while the PT secured 68 seats. Furthermore, after years of scandals and public scrutiny, Lula was no longer as popular with the masses as he had been in the previous decades, which was demonstrated by a consistently poor approval rating over the course of his third term.
Third Time’s The Charm
On January 8th, 2023, Bolsonarist protesters stormed the National Congress, the Presidential Palace, and the Supreme Court, in an unprecedented attack on Brazil's democratic institutions. This only deepened the already extremely high political tensions in the country and increased national division. Bolsonarists would argue that the events were a public manifestation that got out of hand, calling the people involved rioters who took it too far; highlighting that although reprehensible acts were committed, it would be an exaggeration to deem the protesters as terrorists or coup plotters. The left and a large part of the media were of the opposite view, calling for harsh punishment and insisting that it was clearly an attempted coup. In response, Supreme Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes spearheaded a sweeping prosecution against those involved in the invasion, targeting direct participants and those suspected of having facilitated or financed the act. Bolsonaro himself, while not directly charged for the events of January 8th, would become the subject of a broader investigation into an alleged coup. On September 11th, 2025, the Supreme Court convicted Bolsonaro on charges of attempted coup against the democratic rule of law, sentencing him to 27 years and three months in prison, effectively ending any prospect of a political comeback in time for the 2026 presidential elections.
Although the start of Lula's third term was anything but serene, the events of January 8th provided him and the left with precisely the narrative capital they had lacked for years, framing Bolsonarism as a threat to democracy. This narrative, once dismissed as cheap politics, was suddenly being materialized. And, with Brazil’s highest Court lending institutional weight to these claims, the PT started gaining the political and moral ground it had long been distant from. The left would continue to use this subject matter to level the playing field after years of not having an equally powerful card to play against the right’s longstanding anti-corruption case against Lula and the PT.
At the same time, the government still had to deal with the international fallout from Bolsonaro’s ongoing prosecution. On July 30th, 2025, Donald Trump’s White House announced strong tariffs on Brazilian goods, alongside the application of strong sanctions against members of Lula’s government and the Magnitsky Act directed at Supreme Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes. The move was largely attributed to Eduardo Bolsonaro’s activism in the United States. Eduardo, Jair Bolsonaro’s third son and federal deputy, had relocated there as part of a strategy to draw international attention to his father’s legal troubles, claiming that he was the target of illegal political persecution. Some would also argue that the measures promoted by the United States government served as a broader warning against Lula's continued alignment with the BRICS alliance and a series of public statements out of line with Washington.
Paradoxically, confronting Trump proved beneficial for the government. At a moment of political decline, Lula embraced a narrative of sovereignty and patriotism, the very same concepts once central to Bolsonarism. The irony was compounded by the fact that, at the same time, the PL was backing a constitutional amendment in Congress that was heavily criticized as an attempt to shield politicians and party leaders from criminal investigations. With that, the anti-corruption agenda had fallen into the left's lap, and patriotism into Lula's. Meanwhile, Lula was quoted as saying that Eduardo Bolsonaro was his administration’s number ten regarding his actions, a football reference meaning that Eduardo was Lula’s best player.
The Cursed Inheritance
In the 2022 elections, one figure, Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas, was undisputedly one of that year’s biggest winners. Tarcísio had worked in the previous PT administrations of Lula, Dilma, and Temer (Temer had been Dilma’s vice president and became president after her impeachment in 2016). Even though Tarcisio was present in previous governments, he only stepped into the spotlight in 2019, under Bolsonaro, when he became Minister of Infrastructure. In 2022, he ran for and won the São Paulo state governor election against PT’s Fernando Haddad, who had previously lost the presidency to Bolsonaro in 2018. Tarcísio had always been a well-liked figure among the right, and even in the center. His political image has been built around that of a technocrat who can solve pending problems, a moderate right-leaning engineer of sorts who could be called to get something fixed. Despite being from Rio, he was elected by São Paulo with a comfortable margin, which only further showcased his likability among the Bolsonarist segment of the population and among a part of the electorate even Bolsonaro struggled to relate to.
After Bolsonaro’s arrest, Tarcísio’s name, therefore, naturally began to circulate as the movement’s possible choice to run nationally in 2026. Despite not having the kind of charisma possessed by Bolsonaro and Lula, he was perceived as loyal and aligned enough with Bolsonarism to engage the hardline base, while still moderate enough to reach the casual voter. He had the kind of background that allowed him to be sold as the technocratic candidate in contrast to Lula, and, institutionally, he had the dialogue with the Centrão, a loose bloc of parties defined by flexibility over ideology, oriented toward maintaining power and securing reelection, and with other branches of power that could bring stability to his administration and restore the right’s credibility in the eyes of voters. However, for Tarcísio to become a real option, four things had to be realized. First, he had to secure Centrão's support; second, the financial markets would have to back his candidacy; third, his possible reelection in São Paulo had to be guaranteed; and lastly, but most importantly, he needed the full support of the Bolsonaro family.
Tarcísio had the first three, but the fourth was the most important. He could count on the support of Ciro Nogueira and Gilberto Kassab, presidents of PP (Progressive Party) and PSD (Social Democrat Party), two of Brazil’s largest centrist parties, respectively. In addition, what became known as the “Tarcísio trade” was already circulating in Faria Lima (Brazil’s financial center). Markets believed in a Tarcísio candidacy and saw in him a solid option, generating high expectations in the financial sector for a market-friendly center-right administration. At the same time, Tarcísio was polling very well for a possible reelection in São Paulo, thus satisfying the third condition. As all the pieces were coming together for a Tarcisio presidency, the cold shower came when Bolsonaro himself announced he had other plans.
Somewhat on the sidelines of the dispute, Romeu Zema, governor of the state of Minas Gerais, announced his presidential pre-candidacy in mid-August 2025. Although Zema is highly popular in his state, even winning his 2022 reelection with more than 56% of the vote in the first round, he has yet to translate that regional popularity into a meaningful national presence. Zema is a member of Partido Novo, one of the few Brazilian parties that are openly economically liberal and socially conservative. However, in recent years, Novo has, in many ways, become an almost satellite party to the PL, supporting the Bolsonarist agenda and serving as a place where more flexible Bolsonarist figures can turn to.
Even without an endorsement from the PL, or any apparent chance of reaching the second round, Zema is still running. It is unclear if there is some broader agreement between the parties, whether Zema is meant to serve a larger purpose for the PL’s candidacy, whether he is trying to carve out a vice-presidential slot on a PL ticket, or if his official long-term candidacy won't be fulfilled at all. What is clear is that he is not perceived as a threat to Bolsonarism. In fact, as of now, he is still openly Bolsonarist and has no political interest in going against it.
Despite Tarcisio’s and Zema’s displayed loyalty and political competence, neither of them were considered to be the official successor of the brand. The political projection that once made joining Bolsonarism appealing has now become a double-edged sword. It is clear that aligning with Bolsonarism elevates one’s political relevance, but only to a certain extent. As the Bolsonaro family’s ownership over a share of the right-wing Brazilian electorate will not be voluntarily transferred to an outsider, anyone seeking to take over the leadership of the right will have to change strategy.
The Eldest Boy
On December 5, 2025, Flávio Bolsonaro, Jair’s eldest son, publicly announced his presidential pre-candidacy for the upcoming 2026 elections. Flávio, a senator for Rio de Janeiro, was handpicked by Jair himself as the right’s main name for 2026. With the announcement, Tarcísio was officially left to settle for reelection in São Paulo, making way for the former president’s son and, on top of that, having to give him public support. Flávio’s selection as the successor showed that the Bolsonaro family’s interests came before what was perceived as the broader right’s policy agenda. With a large part of the Bolsonarist camp not fully convinced of Flávio’s authority to carry the flame, the move was widely read as an attempt to shield the electorate and keep it under the direct control of the Bolsonaro surname.
Many central figures of Bolsonarism found themselves in moments of public discomfort, including Congressman Nikolas Ferreira, today the most popular federal deputy in Brazil and by far one of the country's most recognizable politicians. Nikolas is a self-declared Bolsonarist, yet Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flavio’s brother, publicly charged him with not supporting Flávio strongly enough, exposing tensions that had, until then, remained mostly speculative. Flávio's response, however, was to call for unity within the movement, publicly dismissing his brother's stance in an attempt to preserve the cohesion within the right that remained ahead of the election. Still below the minimum age required to run for the presidency, Ferreira remains on the sidelines for now. But as the most popular figure within Bolsonarism, excluding Jair himself, and with a growing track record of subtle misalignment with the family's directives, he might become their greatest internal threat.
This is a broader symptom of Bolsonarism. Many of those who were later added to the movement saw in it an opportunity to rise politically and to benefit from the engagement that came with being associated with it. Now that Bolsonaro is in prison, and the family’s position has perhaps never been this exposed, support no longer comes naturally. With a lack of internal cohesion and organic loyalty, each actor tends to think about their own interests first, laying bare Bolsonarism's main weakness. The movement expanded quickly as an electoral vehicle, but it did not build the necessary team-mindset to preserve unity once its leader began to lose strength. Therefore, it is no surprise that signs of divergence from such figures are starting to show.
With Flávio consistently polling close to Lula, it became clear that a relevant share of the electorate was on board. However, Flávio could not rely on his father’s strategy. He has presented himself in a much more moderate way, publicly stating, for example, that he does not believe in the impeachment of Supreme Court justices, an idea long defended by Bolsonarists, while also defending amnesty for those imprisoned over the January 8 events. In addition, he has avoided leaning too heavily on the Bolsonaro surname in an attempt to reduce his rejection among more neutral voters. Flávio began his pre-campaign with a funk jingle, dance moves, and a populist appeal, even speaking about increasing welfare benefits, a style of politics more commonly associated with the left and with the Centrão. This made Flávio less a continuation of Bolsonarism’s original ethos than an adaptation designed to preserve the family’s control over the movement.
Under these circumstances, Flávio no longer appears as the Bolsonarist candidate. In terms of ideas and political posture, Romeu Zema and Ronaldo Caiado — governor of the state of Goiás and the PSD's chosen candidate in the absence of a Tarcísio candidacy — can in many ways resemble more of the original Bolsonarist spirit than Flávio himself. Caiado, notably, had already faced Lula in the 1989 presidential election and had adopted an openly hostile posture toward him. More recently, Caiado stated that his first act if elected president in 2026 would be to grant amnesty to Bolsonaro.
With a large part of the right-leaning electorate forced to choose between Zema and Caiado, bound to Bolsonaro's orbit, or to buy into the Bolsonaro family’s Centrão-style candidacy, a gap was created. In that gap lies an anti-system right-wing discourse waiting to be reclaimed by another group. Ironically, in trying to preserve its ownership of the right, the Bolsonaro family may end up accelerating the development of a new right-wing alternative that exists beyond Bolsonarism.
Felina
Amid the demonstrations calling for Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and the rise of Operation Car Wash, a recently formed political group started gaining prominence. MBL (Movimento Brasil Livre, or Free Brazil Movement) was created as a movement made up of young people with liberal-conservative ideas operating on the right, active during that moment of heated political energy in Brazil. But with most of the right’s efforts eventually being directed toward Bolsonaro, the MBL lost, at the time, any realistic hope of protagonism in national politics. Even early on, they were not fully riding Bolsonaro’s wave, despite having supported him in 2018.
Over the course of Bolsonaro’s term, whether driven by principle or political calculation, MBL gradually distanced itself from the possibility of being labeled Bolsonarist. They constantly attacked Bolsonaro's appointment choices, his affiliation with the PL, his rupture with Moro, and what they interpreted as the burial of Operation Car Wash. By 2022, MBL was one of the only right-wing organizations to publicly declare that it would not support Bolsonaro in that year's elections, not even in a second round against Lula. Many saw this as a self-inflicted wound, and MBL was heavily attacked by the right and gradually became antagonized to a level almost comparable to the PT by Bolsonarists.
Yet by refusing to yield to Bolsonaro at the peak of his political power, the MBL gained the political independence that much of the Brazilian right had given up. The choice that, in the short term, isolated the movement and made it a target of hostility for Bolsonarists, in the long term, freed the movement from owing loyalty to a name, a party, or a specific agenda, thus giving them the chance to build their own project. For a young right-wing movement thinking beyond one election cycle, this kind of autonomy is essential.
Until then, the MBL was only a movement, and as a movement, there was only so much it could strive for. In 2025, however, they managed to found the Partido Missão (Mission Party), and with it they gained the agency to participate in future elections under their own label, without having to depend on agreements beyond their control. This was an absolutely necessary step, especially given that they had already been blocked from running in major elections by external decisions. With the party assembled, Renan Santos, president of Missão, was chosen as the movement’s presidential pre-candidate for 2026. Despite never having run for office before, in recent polls, Renan is in third place; ahead of Zema and Caiado, though still behind Flávio and Lula.
Throughout the years, the MBL’s rhetoric has been built around pointing out the hypocrisies on both sides of the spectrum rather than relying on a predictable right-wing discourse. This narrative has evoked anger and passion, especially among Gen Z voters. In terms of proposals, the movement has also moved away from the American-style language of liberty and conservatism that was once central to its foundation. Adopting a more unorthodox and pragmatic stance, the movement departed from the traditional tenets of the Brazilian right, openly supported the death penalty, the application of a special law targeting members of organized crime, and showed sympathy toward state-led industrialization models like those seen in China.
Since Renan cannot realistically compete with Lula’s and Flávio’s voter engagement for this upcoming election cycle, Missão’s strategy is not directed toward an immediate presidential bid. It is aimed at electing as many legislators as possible across Brazil, building a solid caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, and projecting the movement out of its core bubble by making the party and its members nationally known, showcasing that Missão exists as a right-wing option beyond conventional Bolsonarism.
Without a strong candidate outside the Bolsonaro family, such as Tarcísio, a movement like MBL, with the institutional capacity to criticize both sides, benefits from this configuration. From the moment Bolsonarism began to be perceived as having caved to the system, the anti-establishment gap it once filled in 2018 started to reappear. Of course, with the first round of the election only taking place in October, it is still uncertain whether the MBL’s strategy will begin to show the results it expects. Nonetheless, a movement that was often treated as politically dead in the past is now threatening to become a thorn in Bolsonarism’s side. And, with the political terrain arranged as it is, there is a real opportunity to consolidate new voters.
Stranglehold
After multiple failed attempts at electing other leftist figures in important executive positions across Brazil, it has become clear that Lula's ability to win elections is unmatched. As Bolsonarism finds itself at a stage where reinvention is necessary, the left finds itself under Lula's and PT's stranglehold. Although Dilma Rousseff was elected in 2010 and 2014, she was marketed as a direct continuation of Lula's administration, given that Brazil prohibits three consecutive presidential terms. So, the left never truly won a presidential election in Brazil outside of Lula's shadow. The one time it tried, running Fernando Haddad in 2018 on a different strategy and with Lula behind bars, it lost decisively to Bolsonaro.
Nevertheless, what the PT has, and what Bolsonarism conspicuously lacks, is the internal cohesion necessary for a political group to win and hold power over multiple election cycles. When Lula was imprisoned during Operation Car Wash, the left was deeply unpopular but remarkably united. That unity and alignment were what made Lula’s return to Brasília possible. Within Bolsonarism, by contrast, loyalty was shown to be conditional and inherently suspect. Still, what makes the PT so hegemonic today may become its greatest challenge tomorrow.
For all its efficiency in concentrating power around Lula, it has failed to produce a natural competitive heir. The systematic dismissal of Marina Silva and Ciro Gomes, credible center-left alternatives outside the PT orbit, the consecutive defeats of Fernando Haddad — first for the presidency, then for the governorship of São Paulo — and the underwhelming performance of Guilherme Boulos, a promising figure who never managed to convert his political capital into an executive office, converge on the same conclusion. The Brazilian left is stuck. And, after years of disciplined long-term planning, the PT project has reached its limit.
Across its various governments, the PT strategically deploys identity politics for electoral mobilization while its socialist rhetoric serves its more hardcore base, and its actions in government serve the party's own interests. But as the generations shift, a new left has started to emerge, primarily online, embracing more “radical” ideas and leaving behind the populist unionist discourse on which the PT was founded. Yet this new left still has to prove its capacity to mobilize mass voters or project the kind of institutional seriousness that would earn it a seat at the table. Guilherme Boulos illustrates this dynamic well; Boulos is a leading figure of PSOL, a left-wing party representative of this newer generation. Boulos has recently joined the Lula administration as a minister, and persistent rumors that he may leave PSOL and join the PT have since emerged. Though denied by him so far, they reveal the underlying logic of the Brazilian left: there is a ceiling no politician can break through outside the PT.
With no defined successor and no figure displaying the vigor and capacity worthy of inheriting Lula's place, the left, much like Bolsonarism, will need to reinvent itself in the coming years. A PT victory in 2026 may buy it four more years for an efficient post-Lula transition, but it is far from resolving a structural problem. Years of concentrating power around one figure while undermining leftist alternatives outside the PT will eventually show their consequences. Learning from the Bolsonarist example, the PT must structure a solid succession plan in order to avoid the risk of internal fractures and implosions that could spiral into a crisis within the party itself and across the whole Brazilian left.
To the Winner, the Potatoes
With the 2026 Brazilian elections around the corner, and leaving aside any major unforeseen development, after an extremely competitive second round, either Lula of the Workers' Party or Flávio Bolsonaro of the PL will become president.
With a Flavian victory and a Lulist loss, the Bolsonaro family will have proven that the brand can, in fact, be inherited, and they will spare no effort to keep it under their umbrella. This means keeping a close eye on various fronts, from a new right emerging from the MBL to the inevitable power grabs of outsider Bolsonarist figures, and from internal figures within the PL itself — perhaps, we may even witness in the future the rise of “Nikolism".
Flavio’s victory would keep, at least for the next four years, the Brazilian right orbiting around the family, while the individual plans of its current allies would remain indefinitely postponed. Adding to that, a moderate Flávio administration would have to rely on institutional dialogue to govern with stability, setting aside his father's combative discourse in exchange for governability and calmer political waters in Brasília; given that whenever Jair Bolsonaro attempted to challenge the system, he was ultimately absorbed by it.
Should Lula prevail, the left would gain some breathing room to assess its options and consolidate around a credible candidate for 2030. But if the PT wants to remain in control of the Brazilian left, old habits will have to go. Times are changing, and the party will need to learn how to speak to a new generation. As seen in 2018, without Lula and without a powerful anti-Bolsonaro narrative, the PT was decisively beaten. With Bolsonarism becoming less tied to Jair himself, one of the PT's most reliable weapons may be losing its strength. Regardless of who Lula's successor ends up being, the PT will have to build a platform that resonates with a young leftist electorate concerned with current issues and leave the anti-Bolsonarism narrative aside.
For the Bolsonaro family, Flávio's defeat would be anything but ideal, though not the end of the world. The brand would still mobilize, but it would no longer be enough to win elections on its own. In this scenario, they would need to prove to the right-wing electorate that they are not merely a continuation of Jair but a political force with something real to offer the country. With that, we could see Bolsonarist figures breaking with the family for good, a faster rise of the right not tied to Bolsonarism, and a growing realization that if a second consecutive defeat to PT under the Bolsonaro surname were to happen, maybe the family is no longer the best option to face the left.
In Brazilian politics, as in Humanitism, conflict is neither righteous nor personal. It is simply the logic of survival in an eternal struggle without moral resolution. Stories repeat, arcs resurface, and individuals are, ultimately, instruments of a vicious cycle. Regardless of the election's outcome and all of its implications for the future Brazilian political landscape, the logic of the game will remain the same. To quote Machado de Assis, through the absurd philosophy presented by the character Quincas Borba, one principle will always apply: to the defeated, hate or compassion; to the winner, the potatoes.
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Kim Kataguiri diz que não vai ser candidato à prefeitura de SP: 'Fui desistido e sabotado pelo partido' [Kim Kataguiri says he will not run for São Paulo mayor: 'I was abandoned and sabotaged by the party']. (2024, August 1). G1. https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/eleicoes/2024/noticia/2024/08/01/kim-kataguiri-diz-que-nao-vai-ser-candidato-a-prefeitura-de-sp-fui-desistido-e-sabotado-pelo-partido.ghtml
Klein, S. (2025, December 5). Flávio Bolsonaro confirma candidatura à presidência: 'Missão dada pelo meu pai' [Flávio Bolsonaro confirms presidential candidacy: 'Mission given by my father']. CBN. https://cbn.globo.com/politica/noticia/2025/12/05/flavio-bolsonaro-confirma-candidatura-a-presidencia-missao-dada-pelo-meu-pai.ghtml
Lima, W. (2025, October 6). Tarcísio lidera cenários para reeleição em SP, aponta pesquisa [Tarcísio leads reelection scenarios in SP, poll shows]. Correio Braziliense. https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/politica/2025/10/7263878-tarcisio-lidera-cenarios-para-reeleicao-em-sp-aponta-pesquisa.html
Maia, L. (2025, October 21). Desejo da Faria Lima é ter um Tarcísio em 2026, diz Breia da Nord [Faria Lima's wish is to have a Tarcísio in 2026, says Nord's Breia]. Valor Investe. https://valorinveste.globo.com/mercados/brasil-e-politica/noticia/2025/10/21/desejo-da-faria-lima-e-ter-um-tarcisio-em-2026-diz-breia-da-nord.ghtml
Molfese, L. (2025, March 3). 57% desaprovam o governo Lula, 37% aprovam [57% disapprove of Lula's government, 37% approve]. CNN Brasil. https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/poderdata-57-desaprovam-governo-lula-37-aprovam/
Neuman, S. (2018, September 7). Brazil's presidential front-runner is seriously wounded in attack at campaign rally. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2018/09/07/645445886/brazils-presidential-frontrunner-is-seriously-wounded-in-attack-at-campaign-rall
Otoboni, J., & Freire, D. (2020, March 7). Relembre todas as 79 fases da operação Lava Jato, que chegou ao fim[Remember all 79 phases of Operation Car Wash, which has now ended]. CNN Brasil. https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/seis-anos-da-lava-jato-relembre-todas-as-fases-da-operacao/
PSD tem posição clara para 2026: se Tarcísio for candidato, vamos apoiá-lo, diz Gilberto Kassab [PSD has a clear position for 2026: if Tarcísio runs, we will support him, says Gilberto Kassab]. (2025, December 11). UOL. https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2025/12/11/psd-tem-posicao-clara-para-2026-se-tarcisio-for-candidato-vamos-apoia-lo-diz-gilberto-kassab.htm
Rahal, M. (2025, October 13). Ciro Nogueira manda recado sobre 2026 e volta a defender Tarcísio [Ciro Nogueira sends message about 2026 and again defends Tarcísio]. Veja. https://veja.abril.com.br/coluna/marcela-rahal/ciro-nogueira-manda-recado-sobre-2026-e-volta-a-defender-tarcisio/
Richter, A. (2025, November 4). TSE aprova por unanimidade criação do Partido Missão [TSE unanimously approves the creation of Partido Missão]. Agência Brasil. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2025-11/tse-aprova-por-unanimidade-criacao-do-partido-missao
Rodrigues, B. (2025, March 18). Por que Eduardo Bolsonaro pediu licença da Câmara [Why Eduardo Bolsonaro requested a leave of absence from the Chamber]. CNN Brasil. https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/blogs/basilia-rodrigues/politica/por-que-eduardo-bolsonaro-pediu-licenca-da-camara/
Romeu Zema se lança pré-candidato à presidência pelo Partido Novo em evento em SP [Romeu Zema announces presidential pre-candidacy for Partido Novo at São Paulo event]. (2025, August 16). G1. https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2025/08/16/romeu-zema-se-lanca-pre-candidato-a-presidencia-pelo-partido-novo-em-evento-em-sp.ghtml
Ronaldo Caiado é oficializado pré-candidato do PSD e cita anistia a Bolsonaro como 1º ato na Presidência [Ronaldo Caiado is officially named PSD's pre-candidate and cites amnesty for Bolsonaro as his first act as president]. (2026, March 30). G1. https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2026/03/30/psd-oficializa-ronaldo-caiado-como-pre-candidato-a-presidencia.ghtml
Saliba, E. (2016, August 31). Brazil senate impeaches president Dilma Rousseff amid historic trial. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/brazil-senate-impeaches-president-dilma-rousseff-n640701
STF confirma anulação de condenação do ex-presidente Lula na Lava Jato [STF confirms annulment of former president Lula's convictions in Car Wash operation]. (2021, April 15). Portal Supremo Tribunal Federal. https://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=464261&ori
The White House. (2025, July 30). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump addresses threats to the United States from the government of Brazil. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-from-the-government-of-brazil/
Xavier, L. (2022, October 2). Nikolas Ferreira é o deputado mais votado do país, com 1,47 milhão de votos [Nikolas Ferreira is the most voted deputy in the country, with 1.47 million votes]. Agência Câmara Notícias. https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/911272-nikolas-ferreira-e-o-deputado-mais-votado-do-pais-com-147-milhao-de-votos/
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