A Wave or a Ripple?
- Dmitriy Genchev
- 1 hour ago
- 30 min read
The fate of Bulgaria’s political earthquake in the context of upcoming elections
On the 11th of December, 2025, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov carried out an extraordinary press briefing during which he announced the resignation of his government. Although the resignation of Prime Ministers has, in recent years, become a regular event across Europe, the context of his resignation was markedly different. Unlike the majority of other recently toppled European governments, which collapsed as a result of elite-level divisions either within multi-party coalitions or the governing party, the resignation of the Zhelyazkov government was the result of a sudden wave of popular mobilisation.
The protests, which took place starting on November 26th and ending with the largest protest in Bulgaria’s history on December 10th, were nothing short of politically remarkable. Beyond their scope, size and efficiency, the protests were unique in contemporary European politics due to their ability to compel an incumbent government to resign, even despite the continued support of participating parties, as well as the uninterrupted monopoly of the state on both its administrative and coercive functions. The unexpected and unprecedented success of Bulgarian anti-government protests temporarily attracted worldwide media attention, with comparisons being drawn with recent events outside of Europe, particularly the “Gen Z revolutions” in Nepal and Bangladesh.
Yet, it is difficult to categorise the resignation of the Zhelyazkov government as truly revolutionary. The constitutional order of Bulgaria was largely undisturbed, with functional institutions continuing to exercise core state functions. New legislative elections were scheduled for April 19th, 2026, with a caretaker government headed by Andrey Gyurov appointed by acting President Iliana Iotova to supervise them. Neither the resignation of President Rumen Radev in January, nor the increasingly contested legitimacy of acting General Prosecutor Borislav Sarafov, proved significant enough to disrupt the Bulgarian state. If anything, another irregular election signalled a return to normality for both institutional and political actors, who had adapted to operating under the stress of constant election campaigns, short-lived parliaments and caretaker governments during the tumult of the last 5 years.
Still, it is important to acknowledge that the upcoming elections will certainly contribute to a change in the political status quo, and may be the catalyst for a fundamental transformation of the Bulgarian governance model. The formation of a political party led by Rumen Radev, coupled with the emerging zeitgeist toward comprehensive reform, makes it difficult to conceptualise the current socio-political system surviving without either adaptation or transformation to these new realities. Bulgaria’s legacy of socio-political disruptions leads to the creation of new political actors, which in turn retrench or adapt institutional and economic systems to their own necessities, indicative of the difficulties involved in pursuing fundamental state reform.
A Stormy Transition
Despite the popular conception of Bulgaria’s contemporary political history as being monotonous and driven by personalist forces, Bulgaria has experienced high electoral volatility, with frequent changes often driven by structural economic and social factors. In fact, without an understanding of Bulgaria’s political history, specifically the evolving political landscape which has served as the grounds from which current political actors sprouted and grew, understanding the upcoming election may prove difficult.
To clearly delineate the changes in the Bulgarian political system, the concept of re-alignment theory can be used. While this concept has primarily been applied to understand political processes in the United States, a country whose constitutional and electoral characteristics differ substantially from those of Bulgaria, the general ideas embedded in this theory can be helpful toward providing a holistic overview of the political trends in Bulgarian politics after 1989. The specific idea behind the re-alignment theory is that certain elections serve as catalysts for voter re-alignment, shifting voters from one party to another, and thus leading to the emergence of a new political party system, wherein political party systems refer to a stable number of parties representing given voter coalitions. In most European states, the application of the re-alignment theory is difficult due to how proportional representation electoral systems lead to a multitude of parties and slower changes in electoral support. In fact, its application to Bulgaria serves to simplify what is a more complicated system. Yet, one element that does enhance the applicability of re-alignment to Bulgaria is the importance that elections have historically had as reflective of changes in voter attitudes.
Broadly, Bulgaria can be said to have had 4 political party systems. The first political party system can be said to have started with the fall of Communism after the deposition of long-time leader, Todor Zhivkov, on the 10th of November, 1989. The nature of the first system was in large part pre-determined by the nature of communist rule. Particularly, the Bulgarian Communist Party had a relatively high membership as a proportion of the population, and had deep institutional and social penetration, both through control over state functions, social institutions such as trade unions, and the secret police force known as State Security. Additionally, unlike other Eastern European states, opposition to communist rule in Bulgaria was fragmented along generational and ideological lines, and was relatively smaller. This meant that the successor of the Communist party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), governed during the first years of the transition to free market capitalism and democracy, unlike in other former socialist states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia where local communist leaders were deposed by anti-communist activists. The post-communist transition further contributed to the creation of an ideologically heterogeneous electoral coalition known as the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), which was united mainly by its opposition to the BSP. Finally, the Communist policy of forced “Bulgarisation” of the Bulgarian Turkish minority during the “Revival Process”, coupled with the deportation of 360,000 Bulgarian Turks in 1989, contributed to the alienation of Bulgarian Turkish voters from political parties predominantly led by ethnic Bulgarians. Instead, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), led by the intellectual Ahmed Dogan, came to be the primary political force representing Bulgarian Turkish voters.
The competition between the BSP and UDF, also known as the Reds against the Blues, defined Bulgarian politics throughout the 1990s. The conflict in part was ideological: the BSP, despite its denunciation of communism in 1990, was still deeply associated with the period of communist rule and advocated for a slower implementation of market reforms; meanwhile, the UDF was a proponent of rapid market liberalisation and a clear break from the country’s communist past.
Even more so, the two forces represented differing voter blocs, which were defined by their heterogeneous nature and the tendency of peripheral voters to switch between the two major forces. The BSP, for example, represented a mostly coherent voting bloc composed of middle-aged, ethnically Bulgarian citizens who typically lived in small and medium-sized towns, with a heavy reliance on local industry, which was put under increasing pressure due to market liberalisation. They could also rely on a network of former party officials who risked losing their employment or social status under a UDF government. The UDF, on the other hand, had a more varied voter coalition, which included disaffected younger voters, emerging small and medium-sized businesses, Bulgarian emigres, along with academics and intellectuals primarily concentrated in large urban centers.
The polarised nature of Bulgarian politics at this time reduced the possibility for new entrants, although small attempts to create an alternative to the BSP-UDF duopoly certainly did occur, such as in the form of the Bulgarian Business Block led by George Ganchev. This, in turn, enabled the role of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) as a power-broker within the Bulgarian parliament, as the only other political force with certain parliamentary representation. Benefitting from a stable voter base, the MRF leveraged its internal stability to gain greater influence within state institutions through offering informal support to either BSP-led or UDF-led governments. The influence of the MRF is in particular exemplified by its pivotal role in the formation of the Lyuben Berov government in 1992, following the collapse of the UDF-led Philip Dimitrov government due to internal splits.
The period further embedded deep divisions in Bulgarian society that, to some extent, define contemporary Bulgarian politics. Specifically, debates about the historical legacy of communism, Bulgaria’s relationship with Russia and the need for a clearing of the state all originate in the political discourse of the 1990s. The lack of “lustrations”—meaning the removal of former members of the Bulgarian Communist Party from the state administration—has remained a contentious topic, often brought up as exemplifying Bulgaria’s lack of a clear break with the Communist past.
The end of the first political party system was the result of the actions of two consecutive governments: the Zhan Videnov-led BSP government, which governed between 1994 and 1997, and the Ivan Kostov-led UDF government, which led the country between 1997 and 2001. The government of Zhan Videnov, in particular, marked the first time in post-1989 Bulgarian history that a government was removed after mass protests. The protests were caused by the outbreak of a severe economic crisis known as the “Videnov Winter” in 1996, which led to hyperinflation and shortages of basic goods. They also influenced a long-term distrust of leftist economic policies, which were commonly attributed to the crisis' outbreak even though its proximate causes remain disputed by academics. In January 1997, the Bulgarian parliament was stormed by protestors, leading to fears of an expansion of civil unrest if the BSP continued to govern the country.
Following Videnov’s resignation, the subsequent elections were won in a landslide victory by the Ivan Kostov-led UDF. Kostov implemented several free market reforms and austerity measures aimed at cutting the public deficit. While the measures were likely necessary in the inflationary economic environment, they were unpopular among Bulgarian voters. Additionally, Ivan Kostov’s increasingly authoritarian ruling style, as well as his attempt to centralise the UDF through the consolidation of the electoral coalition into a single political party, alienated political allies. Thus, the experience of the two governments representing opposing political visions left Bulgarian voters largely disaffected with the political status quo and ultimately led to the end of the first political party system in 2001.
This change was ushered in by the appearance of a new political force led by former Czar, Simeon II, now known as Simeon Sakskoburggotski. His party, known initially as the National Movement for Simeon II (NDSV), won the 2001 parliamentary elections in a landslide, relegating both the BSP and UDF to a secondary role. Simeon Sakskoburggostski’s victory, beyond being the first time a deposed European monarch was democratically elected as a country’s Prime Minister, set the precedent for the entrance of popular but not inherently political figures into politics.
The period between 2001 and 2009 can be considered one of political instability and transition. The UDF and the BSP reacted differently to the victory of Simeon II, with the UDF largely splintering into smaller parties. The BSP, on the other hand, consolidated under the leadership of Sergei Stanishev and attempted to rebrand itself as a “third way” social-democratic party that embraced free market capitalism and supported Bulgaria’s membership in the EU. In 2005, Stanishev’s BSP decisively won the elections with 31% of the vote, though without a majority. They formed an uneasy tripartite government with Simeon Sakskoburggotski’s NDSV and the Turkish minority interest party, the MRF. The BSP’s victory can largely be attributed to the high and varied expectations placed upon Sakskoburggotski’s government, which ultimately proved difficult to fulfil. Matters were not helped by the allegations of corruption and abuse of power which were levelled against a number of government ministers, coupled with internal disorder within the party.
Importantly, the formation of the "Tripartite Coalition” in 2005 left a political vacuum. Stanishev’s coalition with the MRF, as well as his embrace of pro-Europeanism, alienated nationalist voters, who had been an important component of the BSP’s voter coalition since the fall of Communism. This enabled the emergence of radical nationalist parties, often of a personalist nature, which have since 2005 become a constant and unavoidable political force in the Bulgarian parliament. More importantly, the formation of the Stanishev government left traditionally anti-communist voters without a political representative. While in the 2005 elections the NDSV had attempted to present themselves as the primary ideological opponents of the BSP, their coalition with the BSP undermined that claim. Meanwhile, the remnants of the UDF’s electoral bloc remained too fragmented to pose a cogent political force. Therefore, an opening existed for the creation of a new center-right political party.
The Rise of Boyko Borisov
Few political figures can be considered more emblematic of modern Bulgarian politics than the leader of GERB, Boyko Borisov. Borisov, having taken advantage of the unpopularity of the Stanishev government, came to power after the decisive electoral victory of his political party—GERB—in 2009. Since 2009, his party has won 10 out of the last 12 parliamentary elections, with Borisov becoming the only politician to lead 3 governments after the fall of communism.
In many ways, Borisov’s rise to political dominance can be seen as almost accidental. Having worked in the firefighting department between 1982 and 1990, Borisov left the service after the end of Communist rule. Shortly thereafter, he began his own private security company, which provided its services to important personalities, including the deposed Czar Simeon Sakskoburggotski and the former leader of the BCP, Todor Zhivkov. Shortly after the formation of Sakskoburggotski’s government, Borisov was appointed as secretary of the Ministry of Interior. While nominally a technocratic position, the position gave Borisov substantial political visibility due to the continued openness of organised crime. This was utilised by Borisov, who developed an image of a competent crime fighter meant to end lawlessness.
In 2005, Boyko Borisov utilised his growing popularity to win the mayoral by-elections in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia as an independent. His election as Sofia mayor was followed by the foundation of the Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria party, more commonly known by its Bulgarian acronym GERB, in 2007. It can be debated to what extent the newly formed party was the result of an active effort by Borisov, or rather a political vehicle created by other figures to capitalise on Borisov’s growing popularity. Yet, certainly, the party achieved instant electoral victories in both the 2007 European elections and 2009 parliamentary elections, and paved the way for Borisov’s first government.
With a clearly center-right and pro-European political ideology, the victory of GERB in 2009 may appear as indicative of a return to the political system of the 1990s. Certainly, the competition between GERB and the BSP throughout the third political party system of the 2010s bears some resemblance to the one seen between UDF and the BSP. To some extent, both through marketing efforts and ministerial appointments mostly made during the first Borisov government, GERB have supported the narrative of themselves as the “natural successors” to the UDF. Meanwhile, the BSP largely sought to retain its coalition of voter blocs disaffected by the results of the transition to democratic capitalism.
However, the economic and political changes which had occurred in the 2000s, as well as GERB’s personalist character, created a markedly different political environment. In particular, two voter blocs emerged in the 2000s: the rising middle class and pensioners. Bulgaria experienced a high rate of economic growth during the early 2000s, largely fueled by an influx of foreign direct investments from Western European firms. This, in turn, led to the increasing formalisation of work, and the appearance of a class that was employed in emerging sectors such as finance, ICT services or retail. While large sections of Bulgaria’s economy were, and still are, informalised or based on the production of agricultural and manufactured goods, these developments meant that political actors now had to contend with a geographically concentrated, but politically influential group previously absent from politics. Simultaneously, the demographic trend toward an ageing population, exacerbated by the high rate of emigration, meant that pensioners composed an ever-increasing proportion of the population. Thus, appeasing pensioner interests became of core importance to the electoral strategies of all major political forces.
Both the middle class and pensioners were internally heterogeneous voter blocs which didn’t fit comfortably into any existing, wider voter coalitions. Yet, in the main, their political concerns were economic. The middle class, whose inherent economic interest was in an anti-inflationary macro-economic policy in order to ensure domestic cost competitiveness, supported a conservative fiscal economic policy and anti-corruption measures. Meanwhile, pensioners primarily demanded increased pensions, which, especially as the number of pensioners increased, implied an increase in state expenditures. Thus, to maintain the support of both voter blocs, political forces had to moderate between institutional constraints and populist electoral promises.
Additionally, this third political party system was marked by a broad rise in Bulgarian nationalism. Unlike in the 2000s, where the rise in nationalism was primarily satiated by the emergence of a new political party, ATAKA, in the 2010s the rise in nationalist rhetoric was observed more broadly. This social phenomenon can be understood primarily within the context of Bulgaria’s entrance into the European Union and the previously mentioned economic growth of the 2000s. A characteristic of economic growth in Bulgaria during the 2000s was its tendency toward geographic localisation. Western European firms looked to invest in locations with an existing infrastructure to support their operations, thus inherently favouring urban centers at the expense of smaller towns and rural areas. This served as a catalyst for nationalist feelings among voters who felt excluded from economic growth. Yet, it would be reductive to categorise the rise of nationalism as entirely economic. Entrance into the EU and NATO, in particular, created social fears of increased Western influences undermining Bulgaria’s culture and value system. These concerns were enhanced by the emigration of young Bulgarians to the West and falling birth rates, leading to an existential fear of Bulgaria’s physical disappearance. Finally, the political influence of the MRF led to concerns about Turkish influence. Due to their role as power-brokers throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the MRF had built up a network of influence in state institutions, becoming synonymous with a brand of backdoor politics focused on influence peddling. The control that the MRF exercised over Turkish-majority municipalities, both due to genuine support as well as clientelist networks, inflamed anti-Turkish nationalist sentiments.
GERB’s leading role during the third political party system can be attributed to their ability to adapt to these new socio-economic dynamics. During all three Borisov-led governments, Bulgaria adhered to a strict fiscal policy, maintaining a balanced budget between 2015 and 2019. This was primarily achieved through moderating welfare spending and conservative forecasting of economic growth. Government expenditure was mainly invested in capital projects, often co-funded with the European Union, specifically those related to infrastructure. These policies allowed GERB to maintain support with urban middle-class voters while similarly attempting to redistribute economic gains to economically peripheral regions. Yet, it would also be erroneous to argue that GERB entirely excluded pensioners and other similar voter blocs dependent on social welfare. Through measures such as holiday bonuses, which served as a one-time bonus to pensioners typically provided during festivities, Borisov-led governments indicated symbolic support for pensioners.
GERB further integrated a sense of popular nationalism into its political behaviour. The party's leadership, in particular Boyko Borisov, often used colloquial language to create a sense of affinity with the population. Additionally, Borisov’s public patronage of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, an institution deeply associated with Bulgarian nationhood, gave credence to GERB’s positioning as a defender of “traditional Bulgarian values”. Finally, the vocal criticism expressed by GERB toward the MRF contributed to the notion of GERB as the primary fighter against the MRF’s influence in the state.
Beyond allowing GERB to maintain a formidable voter coalition, their political flexibility enabled them to form variable coalitions throughout changing Bulgarian parliaments. Between 2014 and 2017, for example, GERB governed together with the center-right Reformist Bloc and center-left Alternative for Bulgarian Revival. On the other hand, the third Borisov government between 2017 and 2021 was backed by nationalist parties. Ultimately, GERB, unlike the UDF, was a less ideologically constrained party, instead maintaining its voter coalition by promising stability and economic growth. This, in turn, made them particularly attuned to a political party system in which ideological grievances were increasingly sidelined.
Still, GERB’s leadership of Bulgaria in this period was far from unquestioned. In 2013, protests initially triggered by high energy prices, but which quickly came to express broader anti-government sentiments, forced the resignation of the first Borisov government. After the subsequent elections, neither GERB nor the BSP possessed a clear majority. Ultimately, a coalition government led by Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski was formed between the BSP and MRF, with tacit support from the far-right ATAKA party.
The Oresharski government proved to be deeply unpopular with middle-class voters, who viewed it as an unprincipled coalition meant to grant control over state resources to the two parties. Mass anti-government protests broke out in the summer of 2013 after the government attempted to appoint Delyan Peevski, an MRF MP and businessman, as head of the State Agency for National Security. While GERB’s role in the protests was limited, they benefited from the decrease in support for the BSP and swiftly returned to power in 2014.
A resurgent challenge to Borisov’s rule came in 2017. Korneliya Ninova, the new Chairwoman of the BSP, oversaw a rebranding of the party. Specifically, she attempted to appeal to middle-class voters through a greater emphasis on anti-corruption in the BSP’s program and internal changes to remove established, but often unpopular, politicians. Furthermore, the BSP looked to attract apolitical figures with a good standing in society to appeal to voters with reservations about the BSP’s communist history.
However, despite the victory of BSP-backed candidate Rumen Radev in the 2016 presidential election, GERB managed to successfully defeat the BSP in the 2017 legislative elections. Still, the closeness of the race exposed the fragility of GERB’s voter coalition, setting the groundwork for the emergence of new political forces.
Toward Political Timelessness
By 2019, despite continuing to hold a stable parliamentary majority, GERB’s dominance over Bulgarian politics became increasingly tenuous. Ever since 2013, urban middle-class voters, who had been a key voter bloc within GERB’s voter coalition, grew increasingly disillusioned with GERB’s governance. Ironically, their disillusionment was largely driven by elements integral to both GERB’s functioning and success. In particular, Borisov’s personalist rule over GERB as well as his strongman style, which had prevented factional fragmentation and enabled support from disaffected voters, were increasingly viewed with suspicion by middle-class voters. Specifically, as allegations of personal corruption grew, coupled with accusations about the use of wiretapping against political opponents, voters increasingly grew concerned with the health of Bulgarian democracy.
As GERB’s voter coalition eroded, its reliance on other voter blocs, specifically the clientelist networks generated through GERB’s control over the allocation of public resources, increased. This, in turn, served to further alienate the middle-class voter bloc, as exemplified by the increasing abstention rate in the 2019 local elections.
In 2020, Bulgaria experienced a wave of anti-government protests. The protests initially broke out after the building of the Presidency was raided by the Prosecutor’s Office, due to allegations of abuse of power by two advisors to President Rumen Radev. The move against Radev, who was a long-time critic of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, was perceived as an attempt to silence institutional critics of the incumbent government.
Yet, the protests expressed a more systemic disenchantment with Bulgaria’s status quo, which transcended the alleged authoritarianism or corruption of the Borisov government. Specifically, many Bulgarians perceived the country's General Prosecutor, Ivan Geshev, as politically controlled by the government. As such, faith in the rule of law and the judicial system more broadly was severely undermined. Additionally, protestors criticised the role of the MRF in the state, with allegations of continued influence over key state institutions. The party's former leader, Ahmed Dogan, who continued to hold the title of honorary chairman and exercised de facto control, was one of the protests’ main targets.
Although the Borisov government survived the protests, it faced a number of political forces either affiliated with or formed during the 2020 summer protests in the April 2021 parliamentary election. The elections proved pivotal in ending the third political party system, with both GERB and the BSP suffering serious electoral losses. Meanwhile, new parties such as There is Such a People and Democratic Bulgaria entered parliament for the first time.
The increased fragmentation of Bulgarian politics produced a cycle of irregular elections. Cooperation between protest parties and those perceived as the “establishment” was stifled by fears of losing voters in the next elections, especially as the possibility of government formation grew more difficult due to the number of parties in parliament. Additionally, the increased appetite of voters for new political projects, often based around emerging personalities, contributed to the constant emergence of new political actors. A particular political party of note is We Continue the Change (PP), founded by two members of the Radev-appointed Yanev caretaker cabinet in September of 2021. Just two months later, its victory at the 2021 November parliamentary elections led to the formation of Bulgaria’s first non-GERB government since 2014. However, this government survived for less than a year after internal disagreements between coalition members, particularly on foreign and economic policy.
With a lack of regular governments, the role of the President, already elevated by the 2020 protests, increased. Radev is often considered to have been the de facto leader of Bulgaria between 2022-2023, due to his unilateral role as President in the appointment of caretaker cabinets. This development served to give Radev greater political visibility and established him as a provider of stability at a time of political crisis. Simultaneously, this increased attention also exposed Radev to greater personal criticism and created new antagonisms with former allies.
Additionally, the political crisis led to voter exhaustion, which contributed to declining voter turnout. While voter participation in elections had declined throughout the 2010s, turnout figures hit record lows during this five-year political crisis. In turn, this increased the role that voter mobilisation played during election campaigns, leading to increased polarisation as parties aimed their political messaging toward convinced supporters rather than undecided voters. Additionally, it magnified the impact that clientelistic frameworks had on electoral results. While both vote buying and coerced voting had occurred in most Bulgarian elections, their relative impact increased in the context of lower turnout. Ultimately, voter exhaustion enabled the entrance of previously fringe political forces into parliament through low-cost campaigning methods, such as targeted social media advertising.
Ever since the collapse of the reformist Petkov government in the summer of 2022, two regular governments have been formed. After the 2023 parliamentary elections, a government was formed with the support of GERB and PP-DB, the latter an electoral coalition between We Continue the Change (PP) and Democratic Bulgaria. The government, led by PP’s Nikolai Denkov, was composed entirely of PP-DB figures, and operated based on the informal power-sharing promise that, after 9 months, Deputy PM Mariya Gabriel from GERB would take Denkov’s place. The primary aims of the government included amending the constitution to reduce the President’s power in the appointment of caretaker cabinets, as well as ensuring Bulgaria remained strongly embedded within the EU and NATO.
Despite attempts to justify the government as reformist, it proved deeply unpopular among PP-DB’s voters. Specifically, the cooperation of PP-DB with MRF politician Delyan Peevski during the process of constitutional amendments alienated voters who had previously supported PP-DB for their anti-corruption stance. These feelings were exasperated by the ultimately failed rotation to a GERB government, which resulted in several key PP-DB policies—such as security service reform—being sidelined.
The resumption of the political crisis after the end of the Denkov government was marked by continued political fragmentation, this time within the MRF. In the summer of 2025, an open conflict emerged internally between the party's recently elected leader, Delyan Peevski, and honorary chairman Ahmed Dogan. Although Dogan’s control over the party had previously been challenged, none had either the financial resources or organisational reach that Peevski had built up. Beyond representing an organisational struggle, the conflict represented an ideological conflict over the MRF’s identity. Peevski and his allies wished to expand the voter coalition behind the MRF to include disaffected voters across ethnic lines; on the other hand, Dogan represented an older generation which perceived the MRF as the primary political representatives of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority.
The split inside the MRF, beyond leading to an even more fragmented parliament during the October 2024 parliamentary elections, arguably enabled the creation of a new government. The marginalisation of Peevski’s MRF due to his alleged connection to corruption normalised GERB and Dogan’s new party, the Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (ARF). This paved the way for the formation of the Zhelyazkov government in January, 2025, overcoming the cleavages created by the prolonged political crisis.
Calm Before the Storm
Despite the ideologically heterogeneous coalition behind the Zhelyazkov government—which included historical enemies GERB, the BSP, There is Such a People (ITN), and Dogan’s ARF—it signalled a return to stable governance. All the supporting parties, except ITN, were institutionalised political actors with governance experience. Additionally, they faced the prospect of the continued erosion of their voter coalitions if the political crisis persisted. The BSP in particular had faced disastrous losses ever since the April 2021 elections, barely receiving 7% in 2024. Thus, the governing coalition could unite around the necessity of political stabilisation.
The fractures which did emerge were largely dealt with through informal compromises and parliamentary maneuvering. Particularly, as conflicts with the ARF over the distribution of positions within the civil service intensified, the governing parties increasingly looked to cooperate with Peevski’s MRF. These disagreements eventually came to a head when the ARF formally withdrew their support, though the government managed to maintain their parliamentary majority through informal arrangements with the MRF. While this decision to align with the MRF guaranteed a stable majority, it undermined the credibility of party leaders, as prior to the government’s formation all of them had promised to exclude Peevski’s party from future governments.
Despite constant rumours of inevitable ruptures, the governing parties demonstrated great coordination in their political behaviour. This is exemplified in their ability to defeat three votes of no confidence presented by the opposition, as well as renew state regulators, which had been deadlocked ever since the start of the political crisis. Despite this, certain events during the government's tenure served to build up social frustration.
The elections which had preceded the Zhelyazkov government were mired in controversy due to allegations of large-scale vote buying and even election fraud, leading a number of political parties to call for the full annulment of the preceding elections. Following a Constitutional Court-ordered recount, a partial annulment of the election results took place, enabling the minor party Velichie to enter parliament. Beyond reducing the government's majority, the redistribution of seats further undermined the legitimacy of the parliament and the government. Considering the decline in voter participation more generally, it worked to exacerbate the breakdown of the relationship between state and citizen, lowering popular tolerance for government decisions that are perceived as going against individual interests.
Growing discontent was not helped by the perceived authoritarian actions of the government. During the summer of 2025, a number of PP-DB figures were investigated and detained in law enforcement operations. Notably, the mayor of Varna, Blagomir Kotsev, was detained for almost 5 months under suspicion of public procurement fraud. The actions, undertaken by the Commission Against Corruption and the Prosecutor’s Office, were widely perceived as politically motivated. Specifically, PP-DB claimed that both institutions were personally controlled by Delyan Peevski. While Peevski has denied those claims, his belligerent attitude has provoked social outrage. Additionally, denial by the governing parties of Peevski’s support for the government has been a cause of social ridicule and has acted to further sow distrust toward established political forces.
Finally, a perception of the breakdown of social and economic systems pervaded the country. Throughout the summer, forest fires, along with allegations of police corruption, undermined trust in the ability of the Ministry of Interior to guarantee citizens’ security. Meanwhile, the effects of acute water scarcity, coupled with economic anxieties surrounding the introduction of the Euro, turned into a trigger for popular mobilisation in economically underdeveloped regions.
Yet, social and political differences prevented the formation of a national protest movement. Protests, when organised, rarely managed to transcend narrow political or local interests, which in itself reflects the differences in voter priorities. This specifically came to define both protest campaigns of the summer of 2025—the anti-Euro protests organised by Revival—and the protests in support of Blagomir Kotsev. The anti-Euro protests in particular proved divisive as they often alienated urban middle-class voters due to their inherently Eurosceptic themes, thus losing the participation of one of the historically most active voter blocs. Meanwhile, the protests in support of Kotsev managed to attract inter-partisan support in Varna, yet their ability to expand nationally was constrained by Kotsev’s political affiliation with PP-DB. Ultimately, to be successful, a protest campaign required a universalised trigger which would express the economic and political concerns of different voter blocs.
The ultimate catalyst for mass protests was the proposed budget for 2026. Opposition to the budget synthesised the frustration of rural and semi-urban residents about persistent infrastructural decline with urban middle-class concerns of an increase in their tax burden. In fact, this dichotomy is evident in the two primary themes of the initial anti-budget protest of November 26th: a lack of wage increases for young healthcare workers, coupled with rate hikes for contributions to both health and social insurance funds. Crucially, this meant that the protest was endorsed by business associations, trade unions, NGOs and the entirety of the parliamentary opposition.
The intensity of the protest was aided by the uncoordinated government response. On the one hand, government ministers consistently acknowledged protester demands and promised concessions. On the other hand, pro-government politicians undertook actions which undermined the sincerity of said concessions. For example, following the first protest on November 26th, the government promised to “rework” the budget, attempting to sidestep demands for its withdrawal. While the decision made political sense within the context of a coalition government, it served to show government receptiveness to external pressure while simultaneously increasing anti-government sentiments. As PP’s leader, Assen Vassilev, put it during the second week of protests, the government's actions were always “one protest delayed”.
Following the protests on December 1st, which ended up attracting up to 100,000 people in Sofia, the pro-government response fractured in a similar manner. The ministers, including Zhelyazkov, emphasised their respect for the protesters’ demands and promptly withdrew the state budget, while categorising the protest as purely socio-economic. Meanwhile, a number of politicians attempted to frame the protest as violent, funded by oligarchs or led by the children of urban elites divorced from daily realities. These themes were particularly amplified by the MRF’s Peevski, who attempted to organise counter-protests on the 9th of December.
As counter-productive as the actions of pro-government figures were, it was likely that protests would have taken on an anti-government character in spite of government concessions. From the outset, anti-government slogans and symbols, specifically those directed against Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski, were prevalent among protestors. Simply put, the protests represented an explosion of simmering social, economic and political resentments that had previously been abated.
In fact, the protests expanded to areas which had not experienced them for decades. Unlike previous protests, such as those in the summer of 2020, it was more difficult to frame the 2025 protests as a purely Sofia phenomenon. This was likely a key factor behind the protests’ unprecedented effectiveness, bringing down a government in less than a month.
The speed of the protests also prevented the development of independent protest parties, and instead led to a contest over the protests’ political expression. PP-DB, as the organiser of the protests in Sofia, presented itself as the main force behind the protests. Certainly, this narrative found acceptance in certain social groups, as evidenced by the polling surge experienced by PP-DB in the protests' immediate aftermath. However, PP-DB’s claim was contested by other opposition parties, who emphasised their own role in mobilising support, especially in less populated areas.
Regardless, the protests have had significant political repercussions, even beyond being the catalyst for new legislative elections. Social media discourse has led younger Bulgarians to become increasingly interested in politics, while the success of the protests has challenged the traditional notion that civil society actions are useless. This has the potential to increase voter turnout, challenging parties to expand their messaging toward non-base voters. In light of this, protesters’ demands have come to shape the political discourse. Particularly, most major parties except the BSP have promised not to change the current taxation system, and keep the debt-to-GDP proportion under 40%. Some reformist parties have gone further, arguing for the reduction of the state administration and the greater proliferation of e-governance.
A Political Earthquake
The resignation of the Zhelyazkov government on December 11th marked the end of Bulgaria’s largest protests since 1997. Attempts were made to extend the protest, specifically against acting General Prosecutor Borislav Sarafov. His legitimacy was increasingly contested after a law passed in January 2025 had forbidden any one person from being acting General Prosecutor for more than 6 months. However, social energy became focused on the upcoming elections, making it difficult to replicate the successful mobilisation of the preceding weeks.
The Zhelyazkov government stayed in an acting capacity for the following 2 months, with the constitutionally mandated government formation process taking place. However, with all parliamentary groups declaring their support for new elections, their attention turned to preparing for the upcoming struggle. Specifically, the composition of the incoming caretaker cabinet and who would appoint it remained a mystery, with speculation about Radev’s official entrance into electoral politics growing ever stronger.
Claims about President Radev’s electoral ambitions had emerged as early as 2020, when he openly endorsed the ongoing protests against the Borisov government. In turn, GERB accused Radev of using his caretaker cabinets as the foundation for future political projects. It must be acknowledged that a number of political parties formed after 2021 do trace their origin in Radev’s caretaker cabinets, the most successful of those being We Continue the Change. Yet, Radev has consistently denied his ambitions to form his own political party.
Throughout 2025, Radev was one of the main critics of the Zhelyazkov government. Moreover, in May, he surprisingly proposed a referendum on Bulgaria’s ascension into the Eurozone, previously championed by the far-right Revival. It was therefore unsurprising that Radev openly endorsed the anti-government protests in December. However, his increased media activity suggested an attempt to increase his visibility. This was coupled with increasing allegations levelled by political parties about Radev’s active effort to build up a network of local activists.
On the 19th of January, following the confirmation of snap legislative elections, Radev declared his intention to resign and shortly after confirmed his plans to participate in the upcoming elections. Radev’s new political party, unveiled on the 4th of March, was called Progressive Bulgaria. The name, coupled with Radev’s messaging that he had entered politics to “dismantle the oligarchic model”, can be seen as an attempt to attract younger voters, who had played an important role in the preceding protests. Simultaneously, Radev has continued to softly express Russophile and Eurosceptic views, recognising the role that older nationalist voters had as part of his voter coalition.
Progressive Bulgaria has thus far polled at 30%, holding a strong lead over GERB who currently have been projected to receive around 20%. Their emergence will certainly reduce the parliament's fragmentation, threatening the continued parliamentary presence of the BSP and anti-establishment protest parties. However, it remains to be seen whether Radev will emerge as the victor in the upcoming elections. While his party has evidently benefitted from the high approval rating customarily associated with the Presidency, Radev and his team lack experience in parliamentary politics. In particular, the election campaign will require Radev to take positions on foreign and economic policy, which may variably alienate voters. Additionally, accusations of corruption against Radev and his advisors, for example, in relation to the gas deal with the Turkish company Botash signed by the Radev-appointed Donev government in 2023, are likely to gain greater attention during the election campaign.
Radev was succeeded by Vice President Iliana Iotova, who became Bulgaria’s first female President on the 23rd of January. Her ascension proved controversial, with her previous role as Radev’s running mate and her task of picking the incoming caretaker Prime Minister raising questions about a possible conflict of interest. The severity of this conflict was somewhat mitigated due to the constitutional amendments made by the Denkov government, which limited the President’s choice to 9 civil servants, although it raised new questions about political responsibility for the cabinet's composition. Iotova further attempted to improve relations with major parties by holding consultations about the future composition of the caretaker government, though it turned into a platform for election campaigning, undermining their purpose.
Iotova ultimately chose the vice-governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, Andrey Gyurov, as caretaker Prime Minister. A former member of PP, his appointment was widely considered a tacit endorsement of reformist political forces. The Gyurov cabinet's subsequent actions, including an expanded campaign against vote buying, have come to reinforce this notion. However, Gyurov and his cabinet have faced criticism from various political forces. The MRF, in particular, has accused the government of targeting its voters. Meanwhile, nationalist political parties have been critical of Gyurov’s decision to sign a political cooperation agreement with Ukraine, as well as the decision to allow US aircraft participating in the Iran War to park in Sofia’s civilian airport.
The criticisms of the Gyurov government illustrate the ways in which political forces have adapted their messaging to the new political reality. Despite the importance of both anti-corruption and judicial reform topics to voters, economic and security concerns prove equally significant. In particular, with geopolitical escalations and economic anxiety about price increases, parties have looked to present themselves as delivering internal stability. Specifically, formerly governing parties such as GERB have focused their campaign on “bread and butter” issues in order to deflect voter concerns about the need for governance reform.
Whatever parliament is elected will likely be dominated by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria party. However, it remains to be seen in what direction the party decides to go. While it has been widely suggested that Radev will look to form a coalition government with the reformist PP-DB, their differences on foreign policy topics, along with personal antagonism, may make co-governance impossible. Meanwhile, a coalition between GERB and Progressive Bulgaria would represent a serious political compromise by Radev, almost inevitably leading to serious electoral losses. In this environment, if a broadly reformist government is not formed, a new cycle of elections is likely, the outcome of which would be impossible to predict.
Ultimately, as Bulgarians head to the polls, the country remains divided as ever about its direction. It remains to be seen if the latest wave of protests will wither away or ripple through time, determining Bulgaria’s governance for decades to come.
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