A Fall From Grace
- Benjamin Amir
- Sep 26
- 12 min read
Syria's Alawites
A new beginning for Syria ?
The Alawites, a religious minority, live primarily in Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. Once influential under the Assad regime, Syria’s Alawite community now bears the burden of revenge killings driven by decades of sectarian tension. During March, Alawite militias clashed strongly with Syrian Government forces. In response, Syrian Government forces descended upon the coast with the stated goal of eliminating Alawite militias. In under a week, the attacks left around 1,500 people dead, forced Alawite refugees to flee into Lebanon, and left those who remained living in fear. What does this experience signify for the Ahmed al Shaara’s administration in its effort to unite Syria? Although the main concerns relate do Syrian domestic politics, nothing happens in a vacuum. Syria’s neighbors observe carefully whether the nation will rise from the ashes or collapse into violence once again. Will Ahmed al Shaara divide or unify Syria after 14 years of brutal civil war?
The Alawites
The Alawites, also referred to as the Nusayris, are named after their founder, Muhammad ibn Nusayr. While Alawism is sometimes regarded as an offshoot of Shia Islam, the scarcely known religion retains a more complex relationship with its position amongst other Muslim sects. Although Alawites do sometimes consider themselves as Muslims, other ethnic and religious groups do not. Therefore, it is critical to understand how their theological convictions compare to traditional Islamic theology and why many today still do not accept Alawites into the Muslim fold.
Alawism is a secretive religion whose beliefs and practices are known only by a select number of acolytes. According to existing knowledge, this sect exhibits substantial deviation from the foundational doctrines of Islam. Its unorthodox doctrine includes the transmigration of the soul, drinking alcohol as part of religious rituals, discouraging head coverings for women, and, perhaps most importantly, the sanctity of Ali. Nusayris believe in a triad of the Meaning, Veil, and Gate, which has manifested seven times, most recently through Muhammad (the Veil), Ali (the Meaning), and Salman al-Farsi (the Gate). Ali is regarded as a divine manifestation, and while Muhammad is considered a prophet and the Quran as one of the holy texts, their iconography and role in the religion are interpreted differently.
Alawites are forbidden from proselytizing, and only a few leaders understand the exact dogma of the religion. This secretive and unique approach to theology and the scriptures spreads beyond religious practices to become central in defining its political views. Notably, when discussing Alawite political identity, it is important to acknowledge the role of taqiyya, a practice of hiding religious beliefs to avoid persecution, possibly encouraging outward conformity to dominant Sunni practices. Due to Alawite religious and cultural practices, the question of which identity takes precedence: a wider Syrian identity, a Muslim identity, or even a communal Alawite identity. According to 14th-century Arab historian Ibn Kathir, when Muslims say “There is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet,” Alawites assert, “There is no deity but Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman.” Because of the fundamental secrecy and closed nature of the religion, in the past Alawites have been discriminated against by various groups.
Past Discrimination
Alawites have historically faced recurring episodes of oppression for their beliefs. The first Alawite communities fled from Iraq to Syria to escape discrimination and were periodically expelled from urban centres, including Aleppo and the Syrian mountains, during the Ottoman conquest. The Aleppo massacre of Alawites, while historically contested, remains central to the formation of Alawite communal identity. In the 14th century, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), arguably the most important Muslim scholar of the Mamluk dynasty, declared a fatwa against the Alawites. This reduced Alawite practices to heresy, not protected by the Dhimmi status that defended Christians and Jews, a status that allowed them to practice their religion undisturbed in return for Jiziya, a tax on non-muslims, and other conditions. Not only did the fatwa hurt Alawites in its era, but it has since been used as a justification for sectarianism by radical Sunnis. Alawites continued to be marginalized and harassed under the Mamluks, and later on under the Ottomans, who constructed mosques specifically in Alawite-majority areas in an attempt to impose Sunni religious norms on the population.
Rise to Power in Syria
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian territories came under the control of France. This originally proved to be a positive turn of events in Alawite history, which had previously been full of violence and discrimination. The French administration established political autonomy for both Druze and Alawites, granting them each an independent mandate territory. Importantly, this newfound autonomy was not a reflection of an innate Alawite desire for independence but rather a direct symptom of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy employed by the European power.
As pan-Arabism spread, and the autonomous Druze and Alawite states were pushed to unify into the territory of modern Syria, divisive forces increasingly grew inside the Alawite community. Many were apprehensive of future persecution at the hands of a Sunni majority, and, due to this, requested to join the Lebanese territories. Although opinions were divided over whether to join or remain separate from the Syrian territories, integrationist factions actively sought to bridge differences and address concerns. Significantly, a group of pragmatic Alawite religious representatives affirmed the Muslim identity of all Alawites, thereby consolidating their community within Islam. Whether this was a genuine reflection of their faith or an exercise of taqiyya remains unclear, but it was followed by an unprecedented decree by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Husayni, who in 1936, proclaimed all Alawites Muslims. With newfound confidence in being accepted in a multireligious Syrian state, the Alawite state officially became part of Syria in 1937.
As Alawites became involved in their new state, many sought military service as stable employment, due to their historical status as impoverished peasants and their past extensive recruitment into France’s Les Troupes Spéciales. By 1963, Alawites made up a large portion of the military and of the Ba’ath Party ranks, a secular pan-Arabist political organization. As Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite in the Ba'ath Party seized power in 1971 and established himself as president, a position constitutionally delegated to a Muslim and traditionally held by a Sunni Muslim, protests erupted against him. This resistance shattered the illusion of acceptance of Alawites in the grander Muslim identity. In power, the Assad dynasty assigned key positions of the government and military to loyalists, family members, and members of the Alawite sect. Hafez al-Assad kept consolidating his power, fighting through an insurgency in 1982 in Hama that culminated in a massacre of 10,000-25,000 civilians being killed. He was succeeded by his son Bashar, who remained in power until late 2024, when he was deposed by rebels after a civil war that lasted nearly 14 years.
Complicity in the Assad Dynasty?
Alawites have been seen as complicit in the Assad regime long before the civil war and have been, because of this, vehemently persecuted by extremist groups opposed to it, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1970s, its Syrian branch conducted various assassinations and episodes of targeted violence against supposed Alawite regime allies and official members. While originally beginning as a non-violent opposition group, by the 1960s, some extremist members split from the Brotherhood to form the Fighting Vanguard. The Fighting Vanguard directed various violent attacks, culminating in the 1979 Aleppo Artillery School massacre, during which 43 Alawite cadets were killed. It is important to understand that although the Muslim Brotherhood targeted regime members, assaults were also conducted against families, religious leaders, and many others who were simply associated with Assad's government. At the beginning of the civil war, approximately 80% officers in the army were Alawites, a representative percentage of the general Alawite presence in the Syrian Arab Army. Furthermore, Bashar al-Assad surrounded himself with family loyalists to ensure political consensus among allies and consequently not all Alawites necessarily benefited from his rule. However, to their extremist attackers, this reality did not matter.
The Attack Timeline
While low-scale retaliations had been consistent before, on March 6th 2025, tensions exploded when Alawite militias, consisting of former Assad supporters and many mercenaries, attacked Syrian government forces. While many of these Alawite militias were formerly aligned with the Assad regime, their refusal to give up their weapons is far more complicated. As Syria fragmented during the civil war, ethnic or tribal militias became protectors of the community, and historical sectarian violence against Alawites reinforced internal support for protection. This attachment to arms may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the Syrian Government cited Alawite attacks as the reason for its vicious descent on Alawite areas. Perhaps the most important reason is the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil war; many Alawites may not feel safe as a part of Syria ruled by an Islamist Sunni government, perceived as the same rebels who beheaded Alawite officers while calling for retribution. Therefore, it is no surprise that by the evening of March 6th, the government had mobilized its forces and descended upon the Alawite areas in the western part of the state, where both official government forces and irregular military were involved in mass killings. A Reuters investigation found that in the village of Al-Mukhtareyah, by the morning of March 7th, one quarter of the population was wiped out by mass executions of the adult male population. The village of Sonobar, another Alawite settlement, reported the same morning experiencing seemingly random retaliatory attacks. The militia accused of atrocities in these areas was part of the SNA, a Turkish-backed anti-Assad civil war faction recently rebranded as the 62nd Division of Syria’s army. Eyewitnesses confirmed that other troops took part in the attacks on Sonobar, some of whom could not speak Arabic, implying that some of the attackers may have belonged to foreign jihadist factions.
In the morning of March 8th, the attacks escalated. In the village of Al Rusafa, mass killings featured inhuman practices such as dragging out random men from their homes, and in verified videos, forcing them to bark before being executed. Some Sectarian messages were left on the walls: “Sunni men passed through here. We came to shed your blood.” In the town of Qurfays, reports of random killings and field executions of innocents persisted. Eyewitnesses also confirmed the beating of worshipers in Ahmed Qurfays, a revered Alawite shrine. The seemingly random killings continued all over the region, even after March 9th, when the Syrian government and international community had already been informed of the abuses taking place.
The Government’s Responsibility and Assigning Blame
When discussing the Syrian government's response to the Alawite militias, it is important to acknowledge that fully placing the blame on the Ahmed al-Shaara administration is difficult due to the astonishing number of armed civilians partaking in the violence. Furthermore, the nearly 14-year civil war led to numerous loosely aligned militias that have a limited chain of command and often do not directly respond to official orders. One of the only in-depth investigations into the Alawite massacres was conducted by Reuters, and it is difficult to verify specifics for other press channels and international institutions. The new Syrian Government’s forces previously fought not only Assad but also one another. Turkish-backed militias, formerly part of the opposition group SNA, were identified in the massacres and have since been integrated into the Syrian army. Specifically, Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza division were sanctioned by the EU, even though wider repercussions remain elusive. Reuters reports that HTS units, which form the foundations of the Syrian army, participated in attacks where atrocities committed have been confirmed. However, it is difficult to assign strict blame or to establish a clear chain of command. An NYT investigation identified at least some instances where government forces participated in the killings. The government, in response to international pressure, introduced a commission of inquiry, which reported that more than 1,400 people were killed in these episodes of sectarian violence, but concluded that the government did not order the attacks.
The Fallout
Since the attacks, many minorities feel more apprehensive about trusting the transitional government. While Alawite militias have greatly reduced their raids, the Alawite people still reel from the massacres. The Supreme Alawite Council has rejected the Syrian Commission of Inquiry and its findings, accusing the government of diverting blame. The Kurdish-led SDF, a US and Europe-backed militia, has taken a pro-integration stance while remaining firm on its demands, resulting in stalled negotiations with the Government. The Syrian Government aims to establish a unified, centralized state with an absolute monopoly on violence. The SDF, on the contrary, seeks an integration that preserves its military and administrative autonomy within a unified Syrian state. Recent developments, including a spout of violence against the Druze minority in the South, which left over 800 dead in a week, is unlikely to aid al Shaara’s aim. With two minorities already violated by official state actors, the Kurdish-led SDF may be less willing to give up their arms to integrate into a unified Syrian entity. The SDF is surrounded by Turkey to the north, and the Syrian government to the south. If the SDF and Ahmed al Shaara do not reach an agreement, the threat of invasion from both Turkey and the Syrian Government looms. Due to the controversial invasions of both Suwayda and the Alawite coast, the Shaara may be hesitant in war with the SDF.
The broader international community has been subdued in condemning the coastal attacks. The EU, one of Syria’s largest foreign backers, has been largely supportive of the Al-Shaara administration, giving it diplomatic backing and enhancing its legitimacy after the attacks. Since the massacres, the EU has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, except for those placed on security grounds, but has also sanctioned some militias blamed for the massacres, as the 62nd division, mentioned above. Notably, several leading European countries, such as the UK and France, have strongly and personally supported Ahmed al-Shaara, Syria’s leader, even as violence was happening. Even after the massacres took place, Macron invited Al-Shaara to a state visit, while the UK’s Deputy Prime Minister Lammy met with Syrian officials and gave them his government’s support. The US administration has largely remained supportive of the Syrian government, taking actions very similar to the EU regarding the removal of sanctions and expanding potential avenues for economic cooperation and aid. The US aims to integrate Syria into the American sphere of influence; therefore, it is unlikely to think that they will take any substantive punitive action. The EU’s goal is similarly concerned with stabilizing Syria; a prediction strengthened by the lack of retaliatory action against the Syrian Government following the massacres. The recent Druze clashes have not affected European support for the Syrian state, and thus, barring major developments, Europe will stay on track.
On the contrary, Israel remains cautious. While the nation is likely one of the reasons the Assad regime fell in the time frame it did, due to its war with a major Assad ally, Hezbollah, it has taken a sceptical stance towards Syria’s new leaders. It conducted mass strikes across Syria targeting strategic military targets, and Israeli officials have been critical of al-Shaara’s Islamist past, doubting his intentions to build a nonradical society. The seizure of a buffer zone across the Israeli-Syrian border and verbal attacks furtherly enhanced the already hawkish Israeli position, with Syria being viewed dually as a new Turkish proxy and also a possible new front for radical Sunni Islam. Concerning Syrian minorities, Israel has positioned itself as the protector of the Druze minority, while only verbally supporting the Alawites. Israeli Druze, a powerful and well-represented minority in the Israeli state, have pushed the government into action during the July clashes. Axios reports that Israeli and Syrian negotiations are ongoing under US pressure. Israel looks to protect the Syrian Druze, keep South Syria demilitarized, and maintain an air corridor to Iran. A careful reconciliation looks to be the future of Israeli policy towards Syria, but the agreement may collapse if clashes renew between Syria’s Druze and the government.
Looking forward
While a fragile ceasefire maintains Druze control over most of Sweida, violence seems intent on returning. On the Alawite front, sectarian violence has remained low intensity but consistent. A series of kidnappings targeting Alawite women has raised concerns about continuing sectarian violence, further highlighting the limited actions taken by the government to prevent them. The Alawite massacres, while brutal, have suppressed any large-scale resistance. Publicly, Al-Shaara’s allies continue to offer strong support to all the minorities, even as dialogue with the Druze is tense. The government is intent on integrating all factions into a united Syria, and it may resort to force. Israel’s air support was critical in preventing a government takeover of Sweida, and Israel may not intervene again. The massacres on the coast have left deep scars within the Alawite community, and many fear it will continue to hinder integration efforts for years to come. Even if the al-Shaara administration succeeds in integrating all factions and minorities into a unified state, will it be out of choice or fear?
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