Time For Takaichi
- Keito Bortesi
- 8 hours ago
- 17 min read
How The LDP Remains Afloat Amid Japan’s Leadership Crisis
Japan’s political instability may have opened the door for Sanae Takaichi’s appointment as Prime Minister, but she must now find the key that locks it shut. Internal factional politics, the loss of a 26-year coalition partner, and potential shifts in foreign affairs are all factors to consider in Takaichi’s reign. By consolidating with both past and present strategies, both old and new partners, Japan’s new leader must confront this new age of change—however long she maintains her grip in office.
The LDP’s Fall - Church, Cash, and Corruption
To understand Takaichi’s path forward is to understand the shovel that dug it: the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) decline. The assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, followed by the slush funds scandal, was underscored by a general mishandling of economic concerns, leaving the public and parties alike dissatisfied with the status quo of LDP governance.
Church
In July of 2022, Abe—at the time, 2 years out of office—was giving a speech in the city of Nara when he was shot in the chest. While this was initially a national shock, it quickly turned into public scrutiny for the LDP as more information came to light. The shooter, Tetsuya Yamagami, had a mother who was a member of the Unification Church, a South Korean cult with close ties to Abe and the Abe family. Yamagami’s mother had donated over 100 million yen (≈ 562,800 Euros) starting from 1991, declaring bankruptcy in 2002 and plunging the family into poverty. News broke that many other members of the LDP were receiving large donations and prefectural campaign support from the Unification Church during the 2021 general election. According to the 2013 Japanese National Character Survey, 72.0% of Japanese people “do not have any personal religious faith”, and such secularism is often coupled with a “taboo” sentiment towards religions — even more so for cults.
This tank in public perception translated into weaker results for future political endeavors. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, the newly elected PM, Fumio Kishida, ordered all LDP members to terminate ties with the Unification Church. This decision was felt even years later in the infamous 2024 general election, which saw many LDP candidates in swing seats voted out, in part due to a lessened campaign support from the Unification Church. LDP politicians’ refusal to comment on or condemn the Unification Church, which had now cemented itself in the public sphere of knowledge, was certainly also a deciding factor among voters. This was the first modern blow to the LDP’s public perception, and acted as a catalyst for the party’s fall from grace.
Corruption
While PM Kishida may have delayed the political repercussions of Abe’s assassination, another scandal was impending the following year. In November 2023, it was revealed that an estimated 600 million yen (≈3.4 million Euros) were being misreported, stored in illegal slush funds and ultimately pocketed by LDP members. Initial reports of the scandal focused on the Abe and Shisuikai factions, though eventually five of six LDP factions were under investigation.
In January 2024, following months of speculation, Kishida announced what would set off a wave of internal reform: a decision to dissolve his own Kishida faction. Soon, many other factions followed suit. By June 2025, with the dissolution of the Abe faction, all but the Aso faction had been disbanded. Headed by former PM Taro Aso (2008-2009), the Aso faction now faced a newly barren landscape, conversely increasing their influence.
Unlike in most parties, LDP factions are not necessarily divided along political ideologies. Their inherent purpose is to provide young members with the resources and mentorship necessary to navigate political ranks. Particularly during the recent presidential election, whomever candidate managed to gain Aso’s support gained also a hefty network of his 43 faction members; Takaichi had gained both. Days before the second runoff, Aso had announced to his faction that they should “vote for whichever candidate received the largest number of party member votes in the first round”. Given Takaichi’s substantial lead in this grouping, Aso’s implication to vote for her was loud and clear.
This is not to say that the slush fund scandal itself was a happy accident for Takaichi. Even today, the scandal is consistently a point of discussion highlighted by the opposition, as seen in a recent debate between Takaichi and Yoshihiko Noda, head of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). In particular, there is loud dissent from opposition parties regarding Takaichi’s appointment of 7 scandal-related LDP members to high-ranking positions.
Regardless, Takaichi’s victory marks a strange return to strong factional politics. This renewed dynamic between newer ranks and political veterans will undoubtedly steer how candidates will campaign themselves in future LDP elections.
Cash
Economic uncertainty has been the most consistent and pertinent factor for Japanese voters. According to a survey, almost 60% of voters considered the “economy and living costs” as their top concern — with a mere 14% considering national security or foreign policy — yet the LDP has failed to adequately address them in recent years.
PM Ishiba failed to deliver on promises of taming inflation, let alone parring wages to the inflation rate. His last-ditch solution of 20,000 yen handouts per household was widely regarded as inefficient, perceived as lackluster in its long-term sustainability. The cost of rice had skyrocketed, doubling over the course of a year, and frustration towards the LDP increasingly spread among voters. Perhaps it is this renewed problem that enabled the reintroduction of old methods: Abenomics.
“Abenomics”, championed by former PM Abe, was an economic strategy implemented to address the country’s decades-long deflation and stagnation. Formally employed from 2012 to 2020, it was guided by three key “arrows”: monetary easing, public spending, and structural reforms such as deregulation.
Now, Abenomics sees a possible return with the election of Abe’s protege, Takaichi. Even before concrete plans outlined in her first policy speech, Takaichi had been preparing a stimulus package worth more than 13.9 trillion yen (≈77.8 million Euros). However, “Abenomics” was crafted as a remedy to deflation, and with Japan experiencing an inflationary crisis, its impact risks being outdated and ineffective.
Ishiba Passes the Torch
The 2025 LDP electoral cycle was kick-started in September by the resignation of then LDP leader and PM Shigeru Ishiba. His time in office—a year and 21 days—was decidedly limited from the beginning; the disappointing results of the 2024 snap election meant Ishiba would be leading a minority government, marking an end to the LDP’s approximate 70 year rule
Indeed, Ishiba's quick hand-off to Takaichi may instead mark the return of 1990s-2000s Japanese politics, during which Japan was governed by six different Prime Ministers from numerous parties over the span of seven years. If this frequent rotation of leadership were to continue under a minority government, Takaichi would have severe policy gridlock, creating an unhealthy lack of long-term planning and perceptions of unreliability in the eyes of foreign countries. In fact, we already see how internal instability is furthered by external turmoil from across the Pacific. Ishiba had even cited this as a reason for the timing of his resignation, stating his belief that it was “precisely the appropriate time” given “a conclusion has been reached… concerning the US tariff measures”.
The LDP’s Internal Election
While the first round of the LDP’s internal election consisted of five candidates, it was clear that the true competition lay between two contenders: Sanae Takaichi and Shinjiro Koizumi.
It is worth noting that Takaichi, a former Internal Affairs Minister under Kishida’s premiership, is not a newcomer to the LDP’s ranks. Former PM Abe was dubbed Takaichi’s “mentor” given the proximity of their relationship. She had already run for Prime Minister two other times in 2021 and 2024. In fact, 2024 saw her garner the most votes in the first round, only losing to Ishiba in the runoff.
Shinjiro Koizumi, son of former PM Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), was the agricultural minister under Ishiba’s premiership. Contrary to Takaichi’s conservatism, Koizumi is markedly more progressive. He has voted in favor of same sex marriage in the past, and made national headlines when he announced paternity leave, a rare move for male politicians in Japan. Furthermore, he recently filmed himself surfing near the coast of Fukushima to quell public fears over how the 2011 Fukushima disaster may have contaminated drinking water.
These differing opinions clearly translated into differences in the make-up of their electorates; Koizumi was clearly preferred among National Diet (parliament) members in the first round, scoring 80 votes against Takaichi’s 64. However, in the runoff round between the two, Takaichi was a surprising favorite among the local prefectural chapters of the LDP, with 36 prefectural votes against Koizumi’s mere 11.
On a positive note, this may represent Takaichi’s magnetism not only in Tokyo but across the entire country, in the LDP’s prefectural branches; her renowned conservatism has been noted as potentially instrumental in shifting young voters away from the grasps of Sanseito, a far-right populist party known for COVID-19 misinformation and a “Japanese First” ideology — a strong opposition to immigration and gender equality policies. While small in absolute measures, Sanseito had recorded the biggest proportional increase in the July 2025 House of Councilors elections, going from 1 to 14 seats out of the 248 total.
Retrospectively, concerns should be raised on how Takaichi — despite being popular across her party’s local offices — can ensure approval from parliamentary members of the National Diet. Despite loud dissent from opposition parties, Takaichi has appointed 7 scandal-related LDP members to high-ranking positions as senior or parliamentary vice ministers. She has also regularly and publicly visited the Yasukuni shrine that commemorates Japanese war criminals, a point of controversy in both China and South Korea. Sensing potential animosity during her campaign, she remained vague on whether she would continue visiting as Prime Minister. Such neutrality repainted herself as a moderate rather than an extremist “China hawk”, reassuring skeptics in the Diet and neighboring country alike.
Last Second Scatter - Coalition Collaborator Or Captor?
On the 4th of October 2025, following the results of the LDP election, many news outlets published variations of the following headline: “Sanae Takaichi Elected as Japan’s First Female Prime Minister”. Yet, not even a week later, a destabilizing decision risked Takaichi not even becoming Prime Minister: the LDP’s 26-year coalition partner, Komeito, had announced their decision to depart, citing the LDP’s poor handling of the slush funds scandal. With the LDP holding 196 seats out of the necessary 233 majority, Takaichi’s win was no longer a sure bet.
In the LDP’s scramble to find a new partner, other parties took this opportunity to reconcile and unite. CDP head Yoshihiko Noda emphasized this “once-in-a-decade chance for a change in government”, and proposed the idea of uniting behind Yuichiro Tamaki, head of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). In the following days, Tamaki had accepted the proposal and expressed his willingness to step up. However, Komeito had instead announced their plan to nominate their own party head, Tetsuo Saito, bringing this temporary unity to an end.
As plans fell through for Tamaki’s nomination, the LDP was able to find a new coalition partner in its stead, the centre-right Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), leading to Takaichi’s official appointment on the 21st of October. The hectic assembly of this new coalition birthed a different kind of relationship; not one of collaboration, but one akin to captivity. A senior Ishin member firmly stated, “If they [the LDP] fail to keep their promises, we’ll simply dissolve the coalition”. In some aspects, this does not ring any alarms; the two parties are certainly more aligned when it comes to topics of national security and immigration. Both are particularly in favor of expanding Japan’s military power through a restructuring of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), an endeavor that ex-coalition partner Komeito was hesitant on fast tracking.
However, conditions outside of this shared sphere appear difficult to pass, most notably a proposal to reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives by a 10%, or 50 proportional representation seats. The motive for this drastic measure remains unclear; Isshin leader Hirofumi Yoshimura has described this “self-sacrificing reform” as necessary to achieve bolder reforms. Yet, the only parties that seem to be “sacrificed” are not the “self” but rather the “others”.
Smaller parties, such as the Communist Party and Komeito, have been vocal about how the cut only serves to amplify those already well-represented. Smaller parties would find it even harder to get elected into the fewer number of seats available, especially if the cuts are largely enacted on seats of proportional representation. Beyond holding the LDP hostage with a list of conditions, Ishin risks alienating external parties, a dangerous move in an age that requires substantial compromise from a shaky LDP.
Takaichi’s First Policy Speech - Long-Term Plans and Close Feuds
“The temporary tax rate is not getting abolished fast enough!”
This was one of many comments made by opposition hecklers during Takaichi’s first policy speech on the 24th of October. Such comments did little to sway public opinion, creating perceived disorganization in opposition parties and even painting Takaichi as the more sensible governing figure.
Takaichi laid out a strong economic path ahead, bearing certain resemblances to her mentor’s Abenomics. However, coalition compromises and parliamentary disputes already point to underlying frictions in the Diet, risking the viability of long-term strategies.
Japan’s fight against inflation was framed throughout her speech as a “top priority”. Whether it be by raising incomes or boosting business profits, she argues that tax revenue could be increased without necessitating a raise in tax rates. This small discrepancy was likely emphasized to justify her plans for public spending and welfare policies, which appear extensive; on top of previously announced stimulus packages, she outlined the design of a new system “combining income tax deductions and cash benefits for households”, specifically raising the income tax exemption threshold from 1.03 million yen to 1.6 million yen this year.
Takaichi’s expansionary populist measures, reminiscent of “Abenomics”, may clash with the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) restrictive strategy. Though the BoJ has kept the interest rate at a steady 0.5%, this is the highest it has been in 17 years, and BoJ members have consistently expressed plans of increasing it. Takaichi’s welfare checks risk forming inflationary pressures, undoing the BoJ’s slow brawl.
For those members of the Diet who view her fiscal expansion as hasty, Takaichi reassured them that she seeks to remain in office for a long time, opposing the recent trend of transitory Japanese PMs. Outlining a sustainability plan, she said, “If the increase in outstanding debt is slower than economic growth, financial sustainability will be secured,” focusing on reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio as opposed to targeting an immediate primary balance surplus.
Takaichi did not abstain from strong language, particularly when proposing to fast-track military ambitions. She promised to raise Japan’s defense spending to 2% of GDP by March 2026 — a year earlier than the previously set April 2027. Any credit for this acceleration may be due to the LDP’s new pro-defense coalition partner, Ishin. In fact, Ishin’s influence permeated the speech, resurfacing again when Takaichi mentioned the idea of making Osaka — Ishin’s city of origin — the “secondary capital” outside of Tokyo. Justified as a “backup” during crises, this idea is directly adapted from Ishin’s long-proposed Osaka Metropolis Plan.
Later, she briefly specified the government attitude towards immigration, a common talking point throughout her career. During her campaign, she had controversially claimed that foreigners were abusing and kicking deer in Nara. When a reporter asked her how she was able to verify such claims, she said, “I confirmed it in my own way” — despite Nara’s prefectural government denying that such incidents ever occurred. Despite her ultraconservative rhetoric outside of office, she maintained a balanced view within the walls of parliament. She acknowledged how foreign workers are necessary to fill gaps left by Japan’s growing elderly population and birth rates, and that those who “follow the rules” would be welcome inside Japan’s borders.
Overall, Takaichi did not abstain from outlining bold long-term policies, despite possible difficulty in passing major legislation. Seeking to drive this final point home to her parliamentary peers and foes, she concluded by stating, “Without political stability, we cannot pursue robust economic measures or effective diplomatic and security policies”.
Friends and Foes Away from Home
Weeks into her appointment, Takaichi catapulted herself into meetings with key partners to Japan: the United States and China. Such meetings were largely positive first steps, yet domestic support from parliamentary members remained a mixed bag.
On the 28th of October, Takaichi welcomed President Trump to Tokyo in what became a show of praise, from both sides. This does not come as a surprise; even before this meeting, their shared friendship with Abe — a mentor to Takaichi and a golfing partner to Trump — as well as their hawkish stance on China, were quick to accelerate the two’s diplomatic relationship. “I am convinced that I can take the Japan-U.S. alliance to new heights with President Trump,” remarked Takaichi.
The two signed a cooperative deal to “secure and supply rare earths and other critical minerals”, a move that was certainly made to shift Japanese — and especially U.S. — dependence away from China’s control over such exports. A bilateral deal as part of Trump’s lowered tariffs on automobiles was also reemphasized: Takaichi stressed Japan’s commitment to $550 billion investments in key U.S. industries, such as semiconductors and critical minerals.
While the summit was viewed as a success, having set a strong foundation for future US-Japan relations, domestic criticisms were still abound. Takaichi’s expressed willingness to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize was criticized by the CDP’s Noda, noting it as “flattery diplomacy to the extreme”. He went a step further in a later parliamentary session by calling out Trump’s plans to resume U.S. nuclear testing, remarking a certain hypocrisy in Takaichi’s nomination of Trump given this revelation. It seems that despite everything, the biggest hurdle for Takaichi remains in the domestic court, where opposition parties’ approval makes or breaks her reputation and her limited time in office.
Unlike the warmth shown with Trump, the October 31st meeting between Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping was notably different in tone, .. Regardless, she eased her traditionally aggressive stance on China, with both leaders stressing that the two countries maintain a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”
In the later APEC Summit in Busan, Takaichi shockingly dropped her moderate mask. She approached Xi off the stage, stating that “there are clear differences” of opinion between Japan and China. According to the NHK, she went on to list various issues concerning the CCP, including but not limited to violations of international law in the South China Sea, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the detention of Japanese citizens in China, and North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens.
On domestic soil, Takaichi doubled down; during a parliamentary session, she remarked that in the case of a Taiwan contingency, the Japanese SDF would join the U.S. military in a forceful response. A few days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Lin Jian, communicated China’s “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition” to Takaichi’s statements. Beyond diplomatic tensions, the situation risks escalating to concrete retaliations; according to reports by NHK and Kyodo, China may reimpose a ban on Japanese seafood imports that was recently lifted just a month ago. The ban was first instated in August 2023 following claims of “radioactive water” from the 2011 Fukushima disaster.
While there may be many economic reasons for the import ban’s return, it is clear that Takaichi’s aggression played an unfortunate role. Mao Ning, another spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, mentioned that Takaichi’s “wrong remarks” caused a “strong public outrage in China”, warning that “under the current circumstances, even if Japanese seafood was exported to China, there would be no market”.
Domestically, consensus within Takaichi’s cabinet remains aligned with her stances. After LDP rival-turned-ally Koizumi was appointed as Takaichi’s Defense Minister, he flew to Malaysia and met with the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. Koizumi stated, “I'm seriously concerned about intensifying military operations conducted in various forms in the East China Sea and the Pacific region”. With this, Koizumi continues to back Takaichi’s anti-China stance, legitimizing domestic allyship — at least, within their shared party.
Looking to the Future - 31 Days
At the time of this piece’s publication, Takaichi will have spent 31 days in office.
Before these 31 days, the LDP witnessed an assassination, restructured through a corruption scandal, and failed to enact anti-inflationary measures. During these 31 days, Takaichi had to deal with a demanding coalition partner, parliamentary heckles, and overseas dialogue. And after these 31 days, Takaichi may last a day, a year, or a decade.
In a month, along with all the months that preceded it, Takaichi demonstrated a plethora of contradictions: she flaunted her conservatism for right-leaning voters, yet must moderate her statements to appease more centrist members of the Diet. She shows great aggression towards China, yet must roll back if she desires stability in foreign affairs. She plans to employ many populist policies akin to Abenomics, yet the modern-day landscape calls for deflationary measures.
Despite these divides, collaboration is not wholly extinct. Key issues such as the gasoline tax — mentioned by hecklers during Takaichi’s policy speech — seem now to be reaching some strides, with both the LDP and opposition parties agreeing to completely remove the rate of 25.10 yen (0.14 Euros) per liter.
Striking a balance within herself is difficult enough. What is crucial now for Takaichi is her ability to reach compromises without compromising her own long-term ambitions.
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