A State in Limbo
- Dmitriy Genchev
- 4 hours ago
- 14 min read
As Republika Srpska faces snap elections, its future remains as indeterminate as ever
Three years after electing Milorad Dodik, the citizens of Republika Srpska, one of the two constituent entities making up the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are tasked with electing a new President. The election, seemingly a mostly local affair, may have a decisive role in determining the future of Bosnia; specifically in the context of stalled out EU membership negotiations and rising ethnic polarisation.
Although the election campaign has been largely subdued, the circumstances surrounding it are far from normal. Being preceded by what has been described as the “most dangerous moment since 1995”, the year the landmark Dayton Agreements which ended the Bosnian War was signed, incumbent President Milorad Dodik openly challenged the fragile institutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Dodik ultimately backed down, the lack of consequences for his political gambit will have a deep impact on the future politics of Republika Srpska.
From Sarajevo through Dayton: A Brief History
To fully understand Republika Srpska, it is important to analyse its roots as an outgrowth of the violence which followed the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Throughout the late 1980s, encouraged by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian nationalism increased throughout the territory of Yugoslavia. Fearing Serbian hegemony, politicians in the constituent states of Yugoslavia, specifically Croatia and Slovenia, began embracing calls for greater autonomy, or even outright independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina, being inhabited by members of the Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnicities, was particularly impacted by the rise in ethnic discord. In 1990, in the first multi-party elections, the state's parliament became divided along ethnic lines with the election of ethnic Bosniak Alija Izetbegović as the first non-communist President of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Izetbegović did not openly advocate for independence, his past as a dissident and his party's role as a representative of Bosnia’s Muslim population led to distrust from the primary Serb nationalist force in Bosnia, the Serb Democratic Party.
In 1991, after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was used by the Federal Army of Yugoslavia to stage military operations against the two newly-independent states, provoking further antagonism from local Croats and Bosniaks. On the other hand, Bosnian Serb political forces increasingly affiliated with the struggle of pro-Serbian militias in Croatia, signing an association agreement in the summer of 1991.Despite local Serbian opposition, President Alija Izetbegović officially began the process of declaring independence by the autumn of 1991. This was followed by a decision to boycott the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serb nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic.
After Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence on the 1st of March, 1992, Republika Srpska broke away in protest. Armed by the Federal Yugoslav Army through the RAM Plan, and aided by their control over Serbian-majority municipalities, the breakaway republic quickly asserted its independence and occupied much of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.
The decision to separate was the proximate cause of the Bosnian War. During the war, the army of Republic Srpska led by General Ratko Mladić was responsible for a range of atrocities, including committing the Srebrenica genocide, which resulted in the death of almost 9,000 Bosniak civilians. Facing frequent violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, including attacks on United Nations designated “safe zones”, as well as increasing public awareness about the atrocities committed by the army of Republika Srpska; NATO intervened in the conflict in 1994. With high attrition and the prospect of greater NATO intervention, Republika Srpska agreed to sign the Dayton Agreements in Paris in December 1995, officially ending the Bosnian War.
Although the goal of Republika Srpska to unify with Serbia was disrupted as a result of the agreement, it became one of the two founding entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitutional framework created by the agreements enabled Republika Srpska to retain control over majority Serbian municipalities, and exercise significant autonomy within its territory. Most importantly, the Dayton Agreements codified the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines, including an explicit requirement that the collective presidency be rotated among representatives of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats; the three major ethnic groups comprising the country
While such requirements ensured pluri-ethnic representation, they also led to the formation of independent political cultures within the ethnic groups of the country, harming post-war reconciliation. This was further exacerbated by the highly devolved nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which stifled the possibility of state intervention to dispel separatist tendencies. Instead, the enforcement of the constitutional order created by the Dayton Agreements was left to an internationally-appointed High Representative, who relied on the NATO-led peacekeeping force, SFOR, in order to ensure compliance with the newly promulgated constitution. The creation of such an office did reduce the possibility of abuse by state institutions, yet it also created a necessity to maintain a permanent NATO presence within Bosnia and Herzegovina, while additionally setting the groundwork for long-term local resentment against a foreign leader. Additionally, the office of the High Representative became an obstacle to the country's EU membership as the office’s undemocratic nature contravened the basic principles of the Council of Europe, according to a Venice Commission opinion published in 2006.
Despite early hopes for reformist governance in Republika Srpska, by 2000 the Serb Democratic Party had re-asserted its control over local politics. While avoiding direct confrontation with the High Representative by supporting outwardly reformist Prime Ministers, the party stymied internal economic and political reform. Additionally, its cadres obstructed the possibility of greater federalisation within the state structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The return of the party can be considered in part due to the continued dominance of party figures within both the public and private sector. Further, the party appealed to a sense of Serbian nationalism which remained persistent within the consciousness of Bosnian Serbs, in particular in relation to the war crimes trials organised by the ICC.
Yet, facing persistent corruption and economic stagnation, the party ultimately lost power in the 2006 presidential elections, with the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, led by Milorad Dodik, emerging as the new hegemon in Republika Srpska’s politics.
A Political Chameleon
Milorad Dodik has been the primary political player in Republika Srpska over the past 20 years, becoming synonymous with the region’s drift toward open secession and disregard for the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Yet, Dodik had in fact started his career as a young reformer within the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, before being elected to the country’s parliament on a moderately reformist platform. In parliament, he became a leader of anti-nationalist Bosnian-Serbs and an opponent of Republika Srpska’s President, Radovan Karadzic. While he did not explicitly oppose secession, Dodik continued to foster contacts with moderate Bosniaks and Croats throughout the Bosnian War.
In 1997, Dodik was appointed as Prime Minister of Republika Srpska by President Biljana Plavšić at the head of a reformist government. The decision provoked a constitutional crisis, as the National Assembly, under the influence of former President Radovan Karadžić, refused to agree to the appointment. Ultimately, Dodik was allowed to assume the position of Prime Minister after a NATO-led intervention, which included the occupation of state buildings in order to enable his entrance. However, his first stint in power proved to be a sobering experience: already undermined by the parliament, alongside being at odds with the anti-reformist president elected in 1998, Dodik went on to lose the 2000 presidential election against Mirko Šarović from the Serb Democratic Party.
Returning as Prime Minister on the back of the victory by Independent Social Democratic candidate, Milan Jelić, in the 2006 presidential election, Dodik’s rhetoric had shifted significantly. Instead of championing reform and reconciliation, he became the first major Bosnian Serb politician to propose the need for an independence referendum. He also openly denied the Srebrenica genocide, and promoted a historically revisionist view of the actions of Republika Srpska’s army during the Bosnian War. Evidently, Dodik’s strategy worked, as he was elected President of Republika Srpska in 2010, and has remained the dominant political player in the entity’s internal politics ever since.
In part, Dodik’s dominance can be explained by his genuine popularity. He utilised referendums in order to enhance the public perception of himself as a leader representing the popular will. Throughout his time in office, he frequently clashed with the internationally-appointed High Representative, creating a dichotomy of local resistance led by himself against a perceived “colonial ruler”. Finally, Dodik appealed to deep-seated Serbian resentments by using imagery associated with local ethnic nationalism, specifically relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s time under foreign imperial rule.
However, Dodik’s use of authoritarian and coercive methods in maintaining power can’t be ignored. He has consistently been accused of cracking down on independent media organisations and abusing his current offices in order to promote loyalists. In particular, Dodik was sanctioned by both the United States and United Kingdom for corruption in 2022. Dodik also expanded the independence of Republika Srpska’s police force, which is accused of police brutality, as exemplified by their conduct during the 2018 anti-government protests.
In 2022, despite facing a consolidated challenge by the local opposition, Dodik managed to return as President of Republika Srpska, having served as a member of the collective presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the previous 4 years. Yet, his position was seemingly fatally challenged in February, 2025, when a Bosnian court convicted him to a one-year prison sentence.
The Impossible Arrest
The conviction, along with a 6 year ban on political activity, had come as little surprise to observers of Bosnian politics. The ruling had been promulgated due to Dodik’s repeated obstinance against High Representative Christian Schmidt, considering it is a criminal offence to refuse a directive coming from the High Representative. The prosecutors office of Bosnia and Herzegovina opened criminal proceedings after Dodik refused to abrogate laws which would have withdrawn Republika Srpska from the country’s armed forces despite the laws being annulled by Christian Schmidt.
What followed, however, was an unprecedentedly aggressive attack against the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The day after the ruling, on the 28th of February, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska passed a range of laws which withdrew recognition from all non-local courts and enabled the possibility of prosecuting “all Serbs who continued to work within these state-level institutions”. Doubling down on March 14th, the parliament tentatively approved a new draft constitution which would have diminished Croat and Bosniak representation within the political system. Additionally, new laws allowing the formation of an independent army and judiciary were similarly passed
In effect, Dodik was laying the groundwork for a future declaration of independence. While it is difficult to speculate to what extent such an initiative was sincere, or rather a way to gain leverage in political negotiations, it was regardless a serious test to the durability of the Dayton system. With the peacekeeping EUFOR force being composed of only 1,100 active service members, the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were forced to contend with the threat through internal legal and political mechanisms.
On the 12th of March, with Dodik not answering his court-summons, the Prosecutors Office issued a warrant for his arrest. Similarly, the Constitutional Court was quick to strike down the separatist legislation passed by the parliament. Yet, both actions proved unenforceable. Milorad Dodik crucially retained the loyalty of the local police force, which refused to execute the arrest warrant. In fact, in April, 2025, police officers from Republika Srpska openly defied the order after an attempt to arrest Dodik during a trip to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Seeking international support, the Prosecutors Office formally appealed to Interpol in order to restrict Dodik’s international movement. However, this did little to facilitate his arrest, with Dodik openly defying the warrant by visiting Russia in April. He further found support from Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, who dispatched 3,000 special forces in March, ostensibly in order to conduct joint-training with local police forces. However, statements by members of the Hungarian government, including a leaked plan to extract Dodik to Hungary in case of an arrest attempt, indicate that the mandate of the dispatched forces may have been to protect his person instead.
On the other hand, the response from the European Union, United Kingdom and the United States, actors who traditionally played a significant role in maintaining the Dayton system, remained largely passive. While they condemned Dodik’s actions, such condemnations were inefficient without concrete sanctions. Despite measures taken by individual states, including Germany and Austria, which imposed travel bans on Dodik, other sanctions-mechanisms remained unavailable. In part, this was due to an inability to reach a consensus on common EU-level sanctions, with a number of countries including Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia expressing reservations or open opposition to sanctions. Additionally, the lack of media attention toward the developing crisis within foreign media outlets reduced pressure on national governments to take action.
The lack of a coordinated position from the EU has stifled the agency of the EUFOR peacekeeping force. As a result, it remained a largely passive observer, limiting its statements to a promise “not to intervene” in the potential arrest of Dodik. The passivity of EUFOR in the face of a developing crisis undermined the promise of external intervention which had guided post-Dayton Bosnian politics. Specifically, separatist and anti-European forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are likely to feel emboldened without the possibility of international interference, further destabilising the increasingly polarised relationship between the entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In August, 2025, Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina officially announced Milorad Dodik ineligible for the position of President of Republika Srpska, and scheduled new elections for the 23d of November. Initially, Dodik’s response seemed as intransigent as ever, promising that his party would boycott the upcoming elections, and that a referendum will be held in October about the ruling. Yet, by September he had unexpectedly changed his position, announcing that the Alliance of Independent Social-Democrats would contest the upcoming elections. Dodik’s decision, followed by his resignation as President on the 24th of October and the annulment of the majority of the laws that had been passed in the tumultuous spring months of 2025 put an end to the developing crisis.
The reasons for Dodik’s sudden retreat remain unclear. Some local analysts have suggested that the move was likely driven by declining public approval for his actions, necessitating a renewal in the political leadership of the country. Another potential explanation that has been suggested is that Dodik remains hopeful of an eventual overturning of the sentence against him, paving the way for an eventual re-entrance into the politics of Republika Srpska. Yet, such an explanation seems unlikely in the face of subsequent developments, specifically the confirmation of the sentence against him by the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in November. Additionally, Dodik’s advanced age and increasing health problems have been identified as being behind his retirement.
Perhaps the most convincing explanation for Dodik’s decision to withdraw is that it was incentivised through negotiations with the United States. While the presence of such negotiations remains speculative, political analyst Tanja Topić from the Friedrich Ebert institute has pointed out the decision to resign may have been motivated by hopes of sanctions relief. A theory that has subsequently been supported by US foreign policy activity in the region, specifically including the removal of Milorad Dodik from US sanctions lists on the 30th of October.
Regardless of the reasoning behind Dodik’s sudden decision to resign, the implications of the crisis created around his arrest have severely damaged the institutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, they have exposed the inability of the central government to impose court-rulings within its jurisdiction- a vital requirement for the rule-of-law. Additionally, they created the precedent for a de facto separation of Republika Srpska, one which can be exploited by future local politicians. In that sense, the upcoming elections may prove to be a significant test for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united country.
A New Beginning?
Much like the elections three years ago, the forthcoming snap elections have developed into a two-horse race between the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and the candidate of the united opposition. While other candidates are also present, the lack of a second round means that none of them can gain significant traction.
The Independent Social Democrats and their allies nominated former minister of interior of Republika Srpska, Siniša Karan, who ran on a platform of support for Milorad Dodik’s style of politics and continued obstinance against the national authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case of Karan’s victory it is likely that Dodik, as the leader of the Independent Social Democrats, will retain influence over Republika Srpska’s future governance. Additionally, it is likely that Republika Srpska will continue to obstruct reforms aimed towards greater federalisation and European integration.
Formally nominated by the Serb Democratic Party, but receiving support from a range of smaller opposition parties, professor Branko Blanuša has been regarded as the most likely challenger to Karan. Running on a platform that mostly tackles local issues, Karan has called for greater anti-corruption reforms and a renewal of the political elite within the entity. Despite its history, the Serb Democratic Party has been perceived as the more pro-European force within the politics of Republika Srpska, although the prospect of EU membership or reconciliation with the other constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained a secondary topic within the party's presidential campaign. Overall, in the case of victory, it is likely that the incoming administration will be more favourable towards the national authorities in Sarajevo.
However, regardless of the outcome of the elections, it is unlikely that the new President of Republika Srpska will authorise any policies that significantly change the balance of power created by the Dayton system. Specifically, reforms aimed at increasing the power of the authorities in Sarajevo are likely to be universally opposed by any administration in Republika Srpska. Additionally, Dodik’s Independent Social Democrats will continue to control the parliament of Republika Srpska, as well as the Serb representative within the collective presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving them opportunities to obstruct reform.
Overall, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a state in limbo, being pulled in different directions by internal political forces. With a lack of progress on judicial or economic reform, it remains unlikely that the nation will enter either the European Union or NATO within the next decade. In fact, the exposed institutional fragility during the arrest warrant crisis is likely to create new cycles of political polarisation between the two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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