The Shattered Peace
- Dmitriy Genchev
- 1 hour ago
- 21 min read
The collapse of the power-sharing agreement in South Sudan as symptomatic of regional destabilisation
On 28 November, 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross in South Sudan recorded nearly 1,000 weapon related wounds, being the highest number of casualties since the 2018 Revitalised Peace agreement put an end to a 5 year civil war. The conflict in South Sudan has only continued to escalate since, with fighting taking place across the country’s north east between forces loyal to the country’s President, Salva Kiir, and supporters of imprisoned former Vice-President, Riek Machar. The conflict between the two men has arguably come to define the politics of the youngest UN member state, with renewed fighting largely driven by a breakdown of the current power-sharing agreement after President Kiir’s decision to arrest Machar in March, 2025.
Yet, the collapse of the fragile peace in South Sudan is not merely a reflection of personal mistrust or animosity, but rather symptomatic of a broader governance crisis, precipitated by the ethnicisation of politics and the breakdown of shared national identity. With the civil war in Sudan becoming increasingly sectarian, and Ethiopia plagued by new ethnic militia insurgencies, South Sudan may prove to be another state that spirals into long-term conflict. For a country whose modern history has come to be dominated by conflict, the resumption of hostilities could prove to be another significant setback in its attempts to achieve sustained development.
A History of Conflict
Despite only being formally recognised as independent from Sudan in 2011, the genesis of South Sudanese nationalism can be traced back to British colonial rule. Established in 1899, Britain formally ruled Sudan together with Egypt in what was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. During this period, British colonial administrators exacerbated divisions between the north and south of the country by creating separate administrative zones. Additionally, seeking to undermine the influence of Muslim Arab traders from the north of Sudan, local colonial authorities encouraged the efforts of Christian missionaries in the area and restricted the activity of Sudanese merchants. The policies promoted by the British authorities resulted in the development of two distinct cultures, while also contributing to a lower level of economic development in South Sudan compared to its northern counterpart.
The growing divergence between the north and south led to increasing resentment in the years leading up to Sudan’s formal independence. Elites in the north of Sudan viewed South Sudan as a “backward” part of the country, justifying the exclusion of southern elites from the future government of an independent Sudan. Meanwhile, South Sudan feared being exploited; a fear reinforced by pre-colonial trauma linked to raids by northern Sudanese armies against local tribes. The British-Egyptian colonial administration decisively sided with the northern Sudanese elite, with South Sudanese representatives being excluded from independence talks held between 1953 and 1955. Therefore, South Sudanese demands for autonomy were sidelined, and their political representation in the newly created parliament limited.
In 1955, one year prior to Sudan’s formal independence from Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule, the Equatorial corp—an army unit staffed by Southern Sudanese officers and soldiers—mutinied. The mutiny was sparked by a fabricated letter which claimed to instruct Sudanese government officials to abuse the population of South Sudan, and grew into a long-term guerilla insurgency against the government of Sudan. While the South Sudanese rebels, known as the Anyanya, didn’t support outright independence from Sudan, the first Sudanese civil war proved to be an important factor in creating prolonged antagonism between the Sudanese governments and South Sudanese political leaders.
Faced with continued rebellion despite a decade of counter-insurgency efforts, the Sudanese government led by military leader Gaafar Nimeiry decided to sign the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, together with representatives of the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM). The agreement led to the end of the first Sudanese civil war, and created a self-governing “southern region” in the territory of modern-day South Sudan. However, from the outset the agreement's durability was undermined by consistent meddling from the Sudanese government in the composition of the southern region’s High Executive Council. Additionally, the integration of former rebel soldiers into the Sudanese armed forces was never fulfilled, provoking a new wave of insurgency breaking out in 1975. Finally, attempts to begin oil extraction in South Sudan were viewed suspiciously by the local population, who feared it would disrupt local rural practices without sufficient economic benefit for the south. The agreement’s final collapse occurred in 1983, after Nimeiry proclaimed Sudan a unitary state under Sharia law.
Similarly to the first Sudanese civil war, the second Sudanese civil war was precipitated by a mutiny of a Southern Sudanese army unit. Shortly after the rebellion, anti-government insurgents formed the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) under the leadership of former Sudanese army officer, John Garang. Conflicts within the SPLA during the second Sudanese civil war laid the groundwork for South Sudan’s tumultuous post-independence politics, as both current President, Salva Kiir, and former first Vice-President Riek Machar were senior commanders within it.
While rebel forces had initially largely united behind the SPLA and its political wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Garang’s leadership and ideology created friction within the group. Garang, who espoused a socialist ideology inspired by pan-Africanism, opposed South Sudanese independence and instead advocated for a federalised Sudan. While this stance allowed Garang to build alliances with other anti-government insurgents outside South Sudan, it alienated former Anyanya fighters, who had increasingly come to support independence. Additionally, Garang’s authoritarian style and the perceived promotion of his own Dinka ethnic group at the expense of others, in particular the Nuer, created increasing discontent. Ultimately, this led to the formation of the explicitly pro-independence SPLA-Nasir faction, led by Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer.
The initial split of the SPLA is illustrative of a general pattern in South Sudanese politics, wherein the lack of common objectives typically leads to conflict, rather than political consolidation. Specifically, as the Sudanese military presence in South Sudan grew weaker due to internal power struggles, local differences became more exposed. As a collective national identity had not yet formed, tribal and ethnic group identity became dominant. These divisions proved to be exploitable by the Sudanese government, and arguably self-perpetuated themselves by being framed as acts of betrayal by political leaders on both sides of the divide.
Road to Independence
Machar’s decision to split from the SPLA created a permanent rift within the South Sudanese insurgency. It further contributed to the perpetuation of Nuer-Dinka ethnic conflict due to the role of the SPLA-Nasir faction in carrying out the Bor massacre in 1991. The massacre began during a raid by the SPLA-Nasir faction together with the Nuer White Army in the town of Bor, and resulted in the killing of up to 20,000 Dinka civilians. Additionally, by the mid-90s the SPLA-Nasir faction had begun to cooperate with the Sudanese army, having failed to gain international backing. The culmination of SPLA-Nasir and Sudanese cooperation came in 1997, with the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. As part of the agreement, South Sudan was given extensive autonomy. Riek Machar was appointed as head of the autonomous entity and the newly created South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). However,the agreement was not accepted by the SPLA, who clashed with the newly created SSDF.
Like previous peace initiatives, the Khartoum Peace Agreement collapsed by 1999. The failure of the agreement can be attributed to the Sudanese military’s abuse of Nuer civilians, specifically during attempts to secure South Sudanese oil fields. In 2002, Machar and Garang signed an alliance, nominally ending the feud between the two leaders.
Despite the temporary reconciliation, the events of the 1990s and early 2000s transformed what could previously be defined as an inter-national conflict, into an intra-national conflict. The trauma experienced by the Dinka community as a result of the Bor massacre led to a desire for retaliation. More importantly, the fear of renewed violence made members of all ethnic groups fear the emergence of an ethnic hegemony, creating a tendency toward the adoption of ethnic identities at the expense of a collective national identity and a desire to control state power, both as a protective and offensive tool. This effect can be observed in the increasing ethnicisation that came to define the SPLA and SSDF, which in turn came to entrench parallel national “myth-making” narratives within the two groups. Both conceptualised themselves as fighters for South Sudan, however their respective understanding of South Sudan differed irreconcilably.
In 2005, the SPLA and the Sudanese government signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with the support of the East African Community. The CPA outlined the formation of a semi-autonomous region in South Sudan, and included a number of mechanisms both for security arrangements and revenue sharing. Additionally, SPLA leader, John Garang, was appointed as the first Vice-President of Sudan. Most importantly, the agreement provided for a self-determination referendum to be held 6 years after its signing.
While a number of events, such as the death of John Garang in a helicopter crash a few weeks after the agreement's signing, threatened to derail the agreement, it managed to persist. The durability of the agreement can be understood in the context of impending independence. By 2005, a consensus had emerged in South Sudanese society in favour of separation with Sudan, meaning that any agreement which guaranteed it was widely supported. Meanwhile, the Sudanese government, exhausted by years of war, faced international pressure from neighbouring states to respect the referendum.
Perhaps the most important question as South Sudan moved toward independence was the fate of the multitude of armed groups created during the war with Sudan. In 2006, as a sign of reconciliation, the Juba Declaration of Unity and Integration was signed between representatives of the SPLA and SSDF—the two main armed groups operating in South Sudan. Theoretically, the integration of the two armed groups would set the groundwork for a future professionalised military, composed equally of fighters from both factions. In practice, however, the merger led to intense resource competition, and was dominated by the SPLA. Thus, the SPLA assured a de facto monopoly on violence prior to formal independence, ensuring their ability to mould post-independence political institutions. Additionally, the lack of an independent military force re-ignited conflicts between militant groups, due to the lack of proper integration of non-SPLA fighters leading to the restoration of war-time militias to protect their interests.
This tendency was not helped by the failure of post-war disarmament programs. Nominally organised by the United Nations, it was primarily financed by the United States, Norway and United Kingdom, and aimed to re-intergate former fighters into society. However, war-time sympathies created favouritism toward the SPLA , primarily limiting initiatives to ethnic Dinka areas. The exclusionary nature of the initiative thus helped in perpetuating a narrative of ethnic Dinka dominance, and enabled the continued operation of other militias, whose fighters lacked the necessary skills to undertake new forms of labour.
From Independence to Civil War
On 9 July, 2011, South Sudan voted to secede from Sudan, thus becoming formally independent. Salva Kiir became the country’s first President, having been elected in 2010, while Riek Machar was appointed the country's Vice-President.
However, independence did little to abet the economic, social and political issues which plagued South Sudan. Specifically, various armed groups continued to operate independently of the new government. Additionally, economic growth proved slow as foreign investors were uninterested in the country due to the risks associated with it.
A number of these issues stemmed from unresolved disagreements with Sudan, specifically concerning border demarcation, the future of shared oil revenues and sovereignty over river systems. Sudan further supported anti-government militias in South Sudan, in order to destabilise the newly independent country.
While Salva Kiir attempted to utilise tensions with Sudan in order to encourage a sense of South Sudanese nationalism, these efforts proved ineffective. Increased militarisation, and aggressive rhetoric against Sudan ended up further alienating non-Dinka ethnic groups. With the Dinka being dominant in the military, any increase in its funding predominantly benefitted them, while recruitment drives focused primarily on Dinka-dominated areas, creating ethnic resentment. Meanwhile, attempts to leverage perceived advantages, such as the closing of South Sudanese oil fields in 2012, ended up doing greater harm to South Sudan’s already fragile economy instead.
Nepotism and corruption similarly plagued the country's economic and governmental structures. Due to the fact that the SPLM was the only cogent political force in the country, it proved to dominate newly built state institutions. Thus, party officials would often abuse their power to put relatives or people of the same tribal group in the state’s employ. This ended up building an exclusionary state: on the one hand, the providers of state services were beholden to party interests, and were incentivised to implement the will of their ‘patrons’; on the other hand, non-party members found it difficult to enter state functions, creating resentment. As the primary source of wealth—oil—was controlled by the state, this led to income stratification, which compounded the ethnic and tribal differences previously discussed.
By December 2013, Kiir’s position as President was uncertain, and Vice-President Machar openly challenged his leadership. Kiir retaliated by dismissing Vice-President Machar and the cabinet in July 2013. On December 16, a week after Machar had announced plans to depose Kiir at an upcoming SPLM meeting, Kiir claimed that he had thwarted a coup attempt by Machar and demanded his arrest. What followed was the mass killing of Machar’s suspected supporters, predominantly ethnic Nuer, in the country’s capital by forces loyal to the SPLA. Machar himself fled Juba, and called for a popular insurgency against Salva Kiir. He was supported by ethnic Nuer militias, as well as defecting units from the SPLA. Machar’s faction became known as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).
The South Sudanese civil war has primarily been conceived as a conflict between ethnic groups: specifically, the Nuer and the Dinka. However, while ethnic and tribal divisions certainly played a role in the outbreak of the civil war, defining the war in such terms risks over-simplifying it and perpetuating a neo-colonial narrative of “tribal violence” often used to ignore conflicts in the Global South. It would also be mistaken to view the conflict through the dichotomy of a rebel group resisting an authoritarian government. While the government of Salva Kiir undertook concrete measures to persecute non-Dinka ethnic groups, with the United Nations having alarmed of ongoing “preparations for a genocide” against the Nuer in 2016, the SPLM-IO was not conceived as a true alternative to Kiir’s governance model. In fact, a study conducted by Lotje de Vries and Mareike Schomerus across South Sudan in 2017 found that most interviewed civilians were not supportive of either governmental or insurgent narratives.
Rather, it should be understood within the framework of an elite-level struggle for control over dwindling economic resources. For both Kiir and Machar, control over state functions means the ability to maintain and expand their patronage networks, without which they could not sustain their influence. Therefore, the economic crises precipitated by the oil production strike, coupled with the increasingly exclusionary nature of Kiir’s governance, laid the foundations for a conflict between Machar and Kiir. This confrontation was confounded by years of ethnic stratification, and the traumatic legacy of the second Sudanese civil war.
Specifically, the ethnic nature of the conflict can be understood within the framing that both Kiir and Machar have provided for their actions. Both have presented themselves as “protectors” of their respective ethnic groups. President Salva Kiir in particular referenced the Bor massacre of 1991 in his national address about Machar’s alleged coup plot, thus utilising a collective war-time trauma to legitimise his own actions.
In turn, this means that traditional approaches toward conflict resolution failed to provide a path toward long-term peace. Firstly, in a system in which political survival is inherently linked to control over the state, “power-sharing” proves only to entrench existing patronage networks and make the state more dysfunctional due to increasing factional control. Secondly, any attempts to engage in a dialogue based on ideological or political considerations is unlikely to achieve results, as both parties are primarily concerned with resource-control, and don’t hold coherent ideological alignments. Finally, attempts to resolve the dispute through electoral means are similarly bound to fail, as neither party has experience with mass politics. Indeed, in a system that has come to be defined by violence, actors are unlikely to adapt, but rather to extend violent methods into the electoral campaign. More importantly, the existential stakes of an electoral loss due to its relevance for control over the state mean that elections are likely to be cancelled, or ignored by the losing side.
Historical experience has largely validated these concerns. An attempt to create a power-sharing agreement between Machar and Kiir in 2015 collapsed only a year later, leading Machar to once again flee from Juba. Under international pressure, a Revitalised Peace Agreement, which once again included power-sharing between Machar and Kiir, was signed by the two rivals in 2018. This agreement further included a commitment to hold free and fair elections. Yet, six years later, the power-sharing agreement has collapsed and the possibility of elections seems as distant as ever before.
On the precipice of another Civil War
On 4 March, 2025, the Nuer White Army, an ethnic militia in the Upper Nile province, carried out a surprise offensive against government forces in Wech Yaradiu. The assault, while ultimately pushed back after the arrival of reinforcements, resulted in the death of a senior South Sudanese commander and a helicopter belonging to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan was shot down. Although the exact relationship of the Machar-affiliated militia, the SPLA-IO, to the incident is unclear, Kiir promptly declared Machar responsible for the attack and accused him of planning a coup.
Much like in 2013, Machar was deposed from his position as first Vice-President, and a number of cabinet officials associated with him were dismissed. In September 2025, after months of de facto house arrest, Machar was formally arrested and charged with high treason. Riek Machar, and the 20 alleged co-conspirators charged alongside him, have denied any wrongdoing and condemned the trial as politically motivated.
The side-lining of Machar was followed by an instant response from the SPLA-IO, who carried out numerous attacks against the South Sudanese military in the provinces of Jonglei and Upper Nile after his deposition. The armed group further declared the Revitalised Peace Agreement “dead” in late March 2025, signalling that reconciliation in the short-term is unlikely. While splinter factions have emerged declaring loyalty to President Salva Kiir, they are unlikely to receive the necessary legitimacy to replace Machar or other SPLA-IO figures in the power-sharing agreement. Hence, the fragile peace in South Sudan was seemingly shattered, and general elections scheduled for December 2026 indefinitely postponed.
The breakdown of the Revitalised Peace Agreement may, at first, seem like the product of an accidental skirmish. However, such an explanation would discount important structural challenges that South Sudan has faced, which likely proved insurmountable for the current fragile power-sharing agreement. Specifically, South Sudan was faced with an economic crisis which increased inflationary pressure and forced a decrease in the size of the state.
The economic crisis was caused by the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in 2023, which halted the ability of South Sudan to export oil due to fighting near the main oil pipeline connecting South Sudanese oil fields with Sudanese ports. As oil exports account for 90% of South Sudan’s government revenue, their decrease caused shockwaves through all state institutions. The effects were further exacerbated by years of endemic corruption, which meant that most infrastructure projects financed by means of foreign aid were never completed or proved to be of insufficient quality. Additionally, oil revenues in the preceding years were often funnelled into patronage networks, with a report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan estimating that 2.2 billion US dollars had been lost in this way.
The scale of corruption—a systemic problem within a governance model based on patronage and ethnicity-based politics—thus undermined investments in more productive assets and left South Sudan more exposed to the economic shock caused by the disruption to oil exports. Furthermore, due to the economic importance of the state as a source of job creation, and an enabler for political leaders to maintain influence, the following reduction in state size provoked confrontations between intra-state factions patronized by different leaders.
This was further exacerbated by the hyper-inflation experienced concurrently to other economic disruptions. In 2020, the country experienced an annual inflation rate of 300%. While South Sudan’s inflation rate has since decreased, it remains high. The causes of hyper-inflation are primarily related to both the reliance of South Sudan on oil exports as well as the persistent public deficit maintained by the government. Both have contributed to the weakness of the South Sudanese Pound, thus making imports more expensive and contributing to consistent inflationary pressure. The process of hyper-inflation is further influenced by the decrease in foreign aid directed to South Sudan, due to both mistrust of the incumbent government and recent foreign policy decisions taken by the United States.
Beyond the negative impacts of inflation upon citizens’ purchasing power, thus intensifying the already devastating humanitarian crisis, hyper-inflation critically destabilised the South Sudanese political system. In a system based on patronage networks and militia loyalty, when money becomes devalued their maintenance becomes reliant on the provision of non-monetary resources. Specifically, local militia leaders become incentivised to offer their soldiers land or cattle as a guarantor of loyalty, which frequently occurs at the expense of local civilians. Coupled with the previously discussed ethnicisation of militias, local commanders have in particular utilised long-standing territorial disputes between ethnic groups as a justification to carry out raids meant to secure resources. Therefore, the conflict undertakes an increasingly ethnicised nature, with national leaders forced to intervene in order to preserve their own legitimacy as representatives of the ethnic group.
This pattern is clearly observed in the prelude to the current hostilities, wherein cattle raids by forces loyal to the government were a substantial factor in the eventual decision of the Nuer White army to escalate.
Another important factor of note is the reported decline of President Salva Kiir’s health. In the past years, Kiir’s appearances in public have been noted as more infirm. For example, an incident of President Salva Kiir allegedly having an episode of urinary incontinence during a foreign visit went viral on social media in 2023. Although the President’s office has denied rumours about the President’s health, at 74 it is likely that Salva Kiir’s age may influence his decision making. In particular, as an older leader Kiir may be more wary of the possibility of a replacement by a younger rival. This has been highlighted in Salva Kiir’s recent behaviour, with Kiir deposing long-time ally Benjamin Bol Mel from his position as second Vice-President. The politician and businessman has long been speculated as Kiir’s protege and most likely successor.Thus, by removing him, Kiir is potentially attempting to inject ambiguity into the political system, entrenching his own role.
A Wave of Destruction
In a report published by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan on 27 February, the inquiry's findings found that South Sudan was moving toward a state of “full-scale war”. Arguably, however, many parts of the country, in particular the provinces of Jonglei and Upper Nile Province, were already experiencing one. With frequent aerial strikes, artillery activity and armed groups operations, it is difficult to deny that the civil war dreaded by international institutions has already begun.
Throughout 2025, the SPLA-IO and allied militias carried out a range of minor offensives in Upper Nile and Jonglei provinces. The offensives, and mobilisation of SPLA-IO forces, was framed as primarily undertaken to defend the local population. By December, rebel units had captured a number of government outposts, creating the risk of the insurgency expanding.
On January 27, 2026, the South Sudanese government announced a new offensive operation, codenamed “Operation Enduring Peace”, aimed at ending the rebel presence in Jonglei province. The offensive claimed initial success, with the army declaring the SPLA-IO “defeated” in Jonglei province on the 3rd of February. However, continued clashes between the SPLA-IO and government forces have persisted, and intensified in scope according to United Nations experts. Additionally, the experience of previous conflicts in South Sudan is indicative that insurgencies can survive even without control over urban areas.
Unlike the previous civil war, the current conflict is likely to be more decentralised. With Riek Machar jailed, and President Salva Kiir increasingly reliant on loyalist militias, the role of individual commanders will grow. The following is likely to contribute to the lower professionalism of the forces involved in the conflict, which often leads to an increased number of war crimes. This tendency can be observed in the current hostilities, with the commander of the Agwelek militia, Johnson Oluny, issuing orders to “spare no one” during recent offensive actions. While the statement was condemned by other senior military figures, the lack of further consequences is likely an indicator that the South Sudanese government would be unable to prevent such orders or punish their perpetrators.
The new wave of conflict has further contributed to the worsening of the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. Since the outbreak of hostilities in March, 2025, at least 540,000 people have been displaced, adding to a total of 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees and 1.9 million citizens internally displaced. The conflict is also likely to damage healthcare, education and social welfare institutions, in a country in which at least 80% of the population are classified as living below the national poverty line. The outlook for South Sudan’s economic development thus remains bleak.
The outbreak of a civil war in South Sudan is further likely to involve the entrance of regional powers. Both factions involved in the current Sudanese war, in particular, are already reportedly involved in supporting their allies in South Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), for example, have built a close relationship with incumbent President Salva Kiir, who has provided them with indirect military support. The Sudanese armed forces, on the other hand, have been reported as a provider of aid for the SPLA-IO in their current insurgency. If the current insurgency continues to escalate, more direct Sudanese involvement is likely, potentially transforming the conflict into a proxy war between Sudanese actors.
An escalation of the SPLA-IO rebellion is further likely to lead to the involvement of other neighbouring states. Uganda has historically been a strong supporter of Kiir’s government, having sent forces to support him during the South Sudanese civil war. As such, it is unlikely that in the case of escalation Uganda would allow the current government to be endangered, especially considering the limited deployments already authorised by the Ugandan government. Meanwhile, Kenya is likely to play the role of a mediator between the government and rebel forces. Overall, the spill-over from a potential South Sudanese conflict is likely to fundamentally impact the entire region, especially at a time of increased global instability.
Toward a Durable Peace
The tragedy of South Sudan’s persistent conflicts is accentuated by years of underdevelopment, yet the factors behind it are not unique to South Sudan itself. In fact, recent events in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia have been illustrative of the importance that sectarian differences continue to undermine a unified national identity and what inter-elite competition for state power can lead to. As South Sudan slips into war, it is important to contextualise it within a system of stressed kleptocratic governance models, tested by increased economic and political uncertainty. In all the cases mentioned, however, no significant political force with the ability to leverage military power has fundamentally looked to alter the nature of existing state institutions or the economic structures that underpin them. As previously discussed, as long as the nature of the state and economic relations remains unchanged, peace can only be achieved in the strict sense of the word (meaning, the cessation of active violence). However, socio-economic conflict is likely to persist and re-emerge when the system is tested either by internal or external shocks.
While it is difficult to single out a solution for the governance crisis experienced by South Sudan, a fundamental re-evaluation of the current political and economic model remains necessary. In particular, incentivising economic activity outside of the state can help create alternatives to existing patronage networks, thus lessening political dependence. Additionally, increasing government transparency and directing financing within the state budget toward education and healthcare are important in decreasing the level of corruption. However, that requires the emergence of an active civil society and mass political parties, which remain unlikely without a greater consolidation of the South Sudanese national identity. In this regard, both centralising the education system and promoting the growth of urban settlements can be contributors toward economic development, as well as national unity. Finally, the consolidation of the state’s monopoly of violence is perhaps the most pressing task in accomplishing a durable peace. Simultaneously, it is also the most difficult to achieve. A potential avenue can be the creation of veteran support programs to promote disarmament, and the creation of ethnically-mixed army units to counter the creation of ethnicised factions within the armed forces.
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