Pride Ban 2025
- Lilla Felvinczi
- May 12, 2025
- 14 min read
A Guide to Hungary
On March 18th, 2025 the Hungarian Parliament passed, by 136 to 27, a piece of legislation aimed at protecting children from assemblies that promote homosexuality banning the country's annual festival of the LGBTQ+ community on its 30th anniversary. “In defense of our children” commented PM Viktor Orbán.
Such an accelerated parliamentary process for curbing a fundamental right has rarely been witnessed in Hungary. It took less than 29 hours for the bill to pass the whole system and only one afternoon for President Tamás Sulyok to sign it without hesitation.
However, for those familiar with Hungarian politics, this move was hardly unexpected.
In February 2025 Orbán held his usual annual assessment, proclaiming: “Let’s write it in the constitution that people are either male or female. Period. Moreover, I advise that the organisers of Pride not to even bother with preparations this year. It is a waste of time and money.” Unsurprisingly, the legislative amendment was tabled shortly after and quickly passed. After all, Orbán’s party holds a majority of over two-thirds in the Parliament, and it appears that, due to this majority, in its legislative action Fidesz can afford to consider the Fundamental Law non-binding from now on.
This article discusses the 15-year journey of the Hungarian government aiming to grasp how the Pride ban falls into their political agenda and main policy objectives.
The Becoming of the Orbán Regime
A historical irony: Prime Minister Orbán’s party, Fidesz, was founded in the late 1980s by a group of “liberal, radical and alternative” university students. The then-just-an-association kicked off as a counterforce on the centre-left of the political spectrum, holding disfavour against the socialist de facto one-party state. It was a close circle of college friends: young and idealistic. Compared to the prevailing perspectives, they were remarkably advanced: in 1990, when homosexuality was criminalized even in some more developed countries, they stated that it is “non-controllable through legal ways” and that “sexuality is one’s private sphere.” Fidesz was even a member of the Liberal International until 2000.
However, their liberal era did not last long: with the advent of the first Orbán government (1998-2002), the rightward shift had already become noticeable. Apart from some minor mishaps, Fidesz avoided forming a clear stance on homosexuality. Defining themselves as a conservative civic party, embracing exclusionary positions about minorities was not yet in their toolkit back then.
After losing the 2002 elections and navigating through a turbulent domestic political period, Fidesz returned to power in 2010, ushering in four consecutive Orbán-led governments.
That year, Fidesz overcame the two-thirds majority in the parliament. This armed Orbán to routinely defend his decisions by relying on “legal-traditional legitimacy”, meaning that any of his political actions were automatically legitimate and justified because the people of Hungary elected him. This statement is widely off the mark. On the one hand, as of 2013, the Orbán regime had already rewritten the election law, smoothing the process of sustaining dominance and undermining the core of free elections. Therefore, it would be an exaggeration to call Orbán liberally elected. On the other hand, Fidesz eventually returned to its core nature: a tight-knit group of loyalists with Orbán as the uncontested patriarch. The party became the tribe of the good old friends, circumscribed by trustworthy lackeys. This tribe overlaps all three branches of power and has no mercy for people who try to exit, wielding tactics from character assassination to career sabotage.
2010: Divide et Impera
A politician - when confronted with the challenge of representing the broadest range of public interest - faces a reasonable and necessary limit: that it is neither possible nor desirable to be favoured by all, as core opinions diverge. That is what Orbán sought to overcome in the 2010s. He fragmented society into pieces to minimize interaction; this way, he could communicate ambiguously on the same topic to different demographics. Take economic policy, for example. Towards the urban middle class, he delivers pro-market rhetoric, while he often promotes price caps and subsidies to appease working-class voters, distorting market operations at their core.
The question of homosexuality gained particular political heat in the 2010s. Although politicians had been using it as a mere electoral instrument for a while, it was a relatively newborn topic for Hungarian public dialogue with which the government had always been very cautious. Towards the LGBTQ+ community, Orbán was somewhat empathetic, justifying his conservative decisions with the lack of maturity of society for such changes. Yet he continued to nurture far-right ideologies. In 2011, he replaced the Constitution with the so-called Fundamental Law – which was only voted by the ruling party’s representatives - that enshrined a nation-based state, repeating catchphrases such as “work”, “home”, “order”, “nation” and “family.” It prioritises families over individuals as the main components of the nation and strictly defines marriage as the connection between a man and a woman, excluding from the very start non-heterosexual couples.
Mid-2010s: Fear First, Policy Later
Midway through the 2010s, Orbán managed to create a nation that is, in conservative nationalist terms, unified. Yet, it is very much socially torn apart. His ‘Hungarian country’ excludes everyone who questions the government and stigmatizes them as “not true Hungarians”.
Internally, this differentiation – both horizontal and vertical - is furtherly supported by the inclusion of far-right propaganda, generating constant popular anger and widening the existent gaps between people. Bad child behaviour? It’s the homosexuals. Economic struggles? Blame Brussels. Too many foreign voices? Migration. Declining education? Leftish brainwashing. Low birth rates? Gender theory.
It’s easy to observe how Orbán’s rhetoric increasingly revolves around pointing out common enemies for each social group. This turn in communications is a consequence of the renaissance of opposition parties in the second part of the 2010s. Having slowly realised that Fidesz is not a conservative civic party but a hegemonic regime, old and new liberalist parties, such as the Momentum Movement, MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party), or DK (Democratic Coalition), began to swiftly emerge. These mostly liberal parties formed the opposition altogether. Despite conflicting views on crucial topics, they share two things: first, they became Orbán’s next “common enemy”; second, they align on a fundamental democratic consensus, a set of values that is not a question of position.
The reborn opposition spurred Hungarian people, who saw in these parties a renewed potential for democratic action. Orbán had to reconfigure his original strategy, realising he was no longer the extreme centrist who could control a diverse and fragmented political landscape all at once. As liberal ideologies reformed in Hungary, he had to shift more to the right – but this time officially.
It is crucial to understand that this shift was not ideological. Orban simply found the toolkit of the far-right more suitable to maintain his dominance over the country. If democratic views were able to give him more power, he would likely align with Macron, not Putin or Netanyahu.
The government’s pattern became predictable: for each electoral period, they defined their key campaign narrative by handpicking a common enemy. Focusing on topics that unite his conservative base while dividing the opposition, Fidesz distracts the public from other extremely pressing issues, such as inflation, poverty or corruption.
Familia, Pedophilia, Homophobia
What is the key narrative that aligns the right and overrides everything? Child protection. And who should we protect our children from? Homosexuals.
In his political propaganda, Orbán strategically fused homosexuality and pedophilia. By planting fear and discomfort, he unified his conservative base by evoking a deep hatred towards non-heterosexuals. By now, one’s standing on homosexuality is not only an opinion but an ideological identity. To justify homophobia, Orbán draws heavily from his nationalist and traditionalist views, centered around children and family values. He claimed that “Hungarians are famous for their tolerance of homosexual guys, but there is a borderline lying at children” – even though said “borderline” appears to be quite blurry.
Following their electoral win in 2018, Orbán launched an unprecedented anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda. This campaign is not only driven by the aim of unifying his base, but the goal of distraction: making society angry enough to stop worrying about whether the government is doing its job properly and adequately representing social interest.
Orbán’s turn toward radicalisation was facilitated by the emergence of minor far-right parties like Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland). These smaller groups served the interest of Fidesz, acting as satellite parties, by spreading hatred with radical narratives. To put it simply, they did the filthy job that gained media interest, covering up major scandals, such as distorting Hungary’s pandemic data and the Pegasus Scandal - when the government turned out to be spying on journalists and opposition politicians. They sparked public uproar so that Fidesz had the opportunity to pass illiberal legislation without gaining media attention.
Gradually, the government internalized the far-right’s narrative. The anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric was acted upon by Fidesz with even concrete measures in the last few years. In 2018, the government banned gender studies at universities. In May 2020, it outlawed transgenders from changing their name and gender on official documents, ending a 20-years-old legal practice. Later that year, they constitutionally amended adoption, making it hardly possible for a single person – a homosexual - to adopt. Lastly, in June 2021, they launched the “Child Protection Act” banning LGBTQ+ content in advertising and education – even school discussions.
As the 2020s unfolded, it became evident that the government had shifted from “tolerance” to “pathologisation.” Nowadays, with the 2026 elections on the horizon, this process of radicalisation has intensified to unprecedented levels.
2024: New Conservative Opponent on the Grid
In February 2024, President Katalin Novák resigned after the public discovered that she granted a pardon to Endre Kónya - the deputy director of a children’s home - convicted for forcing a child to retract testimony regarding sexual abuse perpetrated by the director. Simultaneously, Judit Varga, the Minister of Justice, who had countersigned the pardon, resigned on the same day. The two most visible women of Fidesz went off the grid because of a children’s sexual abuse scandal.
What could be a worse situation for Orbán, “protector of the youth”? The rise of Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider and ex-husband of Judit Varga,is the answer to that question.
Magyar, who is considered Orbán’s greatest opponent for the 2026 elections, quickly became the government’s Achilles’ heel, as his one-man-show party, Tisza, is situated on the centre-right of the political palette - an area that was once the base for the government. Magyar appeals to any consolidated Fidesz voter discontented by the government and to liberals displeased by the opposition and willing to prioritise their desire to replace Orbán over ideologies. Magyar attacks Orbán at his most vulnerable point: moderate right-wingers. Becoming aware of the loss of moderate support, to turn the tables, the prime minister moves further right, trying to absorb the fascists while reinforcing his dominance in his original base.
The Perfect Storm: Banning Pride
After the 2024 scandals, Fidesz started to gain consciousness from the shock. The party that has ruled public discourse for 15 years was losing control. To get it back, they started a new chapter, whose first step was Orbán’s annual assessment, held in February 2025. There, to take the attention away from serious issues - inflation, corruption and so on -, he threw in very provocative words. Orbán blamed Brussels for everything, described Ukraine as a “Ukraine-named area”, called the opposition “bedbugs”, and so on. In the end the strategy worked: everyone was talking about his speech - not the issues -, and for Fidesz, it did not matter if it was negative or positive. The following step was the Pride ban.
How is this possible?
On the 18th of March, Fidesz and far-right parliamentary representatives successfully voted on a constitutional amendment and a package of other bills. The function of the amendment was to make children’s protection rights prevail over every other fundamental right except for the right to live. This provides legal foundations for the supplementary bill, which modified the right of assembly.
It is very clearly stated that any gathering that violates the section of the Child Protection Act that forbids homosexuality - even the display of it - is prohibited. Thus, organising or joining the Pride protest is unlawful, and the police can act against it. In fact, the government itself ensured that CCTV cameras will be available to officers to identify protesters. Anyone who attends Pride could face a fine up to 200,000 HUF (500 EUR).
The Pride Ban is just a piece of a larger puzzle. It is a direct violation of the right to assemble, which belongs to all Hungarians. Although this amendment seems to be aimed directly at restricting a specific demonstration - namely the Pride march -, its current standing allows for it to be easily extended to other demonstrations from here on. On a political level, for example, if any far-right lobbyist starts bringing pictures of LGBTQ+ people to a demonstration of the opposition party, the whole event would be considered illegal.
This threat to individual rights outraged the old opposition. Thousands of people protested in Budapest, the main liberal island in Hungary. On March 25th, they blocked four bridges of the capital, paralyzing the city’s traffic for hours. The demonstrations were held against the Pride ban but protested more generally also against the restriction of the right to assemble. This justice-driven outcry of the people provided a platform for the parties of the old opposition to bounce back in the political arena: members of Momentum - one of the popular liberal parties in the late 2010s – were protesting in the first rows and organised demonstrations in the days after as well. With this dynamism, they are probably aiming to reach the parliamentary threshold in 2026.
But what is the government’s objective?
Péter Magyar is trying to reach out to voters from the right and the left simultaneously, but dropping the Pride Ban in public discourse fragments the new opposition. By picking a side, he might have trouble keeping his fragile base compact: Orbán is trying to force him into this decision-making, but Magyar has yet to reply.
There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, the ban can be strategically seen as a political trap designed for him. Hence, Magyar wants to avoid exposing himself at risk of losing part of his support base due to his opinion. If he protested alongside the thousands of people in Budapest, he would probably lose a large fraction of his less ideological and more livelihood-driven, conservative rural voters. On the other hand, if he stays silent, Magyar is likely to keep his right-wing voters compact while losing a smaller part of his liberal voters who probably realize why he doesn’t want to take sides. This kind of board game raises a pivotal question: isn’t this the same strategy that Fidesz has been following for years?
It is important to consider the second possible explanation as well. What if the reasoning behind Magyar’s standoff is not strategic but truly based on belief?
One thing that changed with the becoming of Magyar’s new opposition is the dismantling of a democratic coalition. Until 2024, most consolidated minority parties shared a democratic consensus, regardless of their standing on the political palette. In 2022, for example, the old opposition formed an alliance, where a conservative politician – Péter Márki-Zay, aka MZP - won the pre-elections. One must draw a parallel between MZP and Péter Magyar: they are both conservatives trying to reach both sides of the spectrum to gain a majority. The difference is that while the rise of MZP was deeply embedded in the union of otherwise opponent parties, Magyar seemingly does not want to mix. This independence is expensive: trying to make up for that, Magyar procrastinates forming an opinion on the restriction of a fundamental right. His hesitation raises serious questions and demonstrates that the effect of former Fidesz voters’ opinions affects him more than the urgent need to brighten up a blindfolded society and represent basic democratic views. This ambiguity drew lines between the old and the new opposition. “I am not avoiding the question, he is avoiding the question,” claimed left-wing MEP Klára Dobrev. The politician of the opposition party, Democratic Coalition, argued that the most effective way to defeat Orbán would be to form a united front while maintaining distinct party identities; following the example of Donald Tusk in Poland, who won without merging all opposition forces into a single party, as Magyar proposes.
Nevertheless, Orbán’s strategy worked. Banning Pride is the perfect storm. Nobody is talking about the lack of EU funds, inflation, price caps, or the recent scandal that exposed the central bank stealing millions of euros through foundations. His faithful voters are only driven by the cost of living; hence, his only goal is to keep these topics out of the spotlight.
Beyond Borders
If there is one positive effect of the Pride Ban, the further spur for unification in the European Union would definitely be it. Already awakened by the Trump administration, Brussels holds a sharp criticism of this latest step of Orbán. These restrictions on freedom of assembly are in direct conflict with established European human rights norms. Similar legislation was previously examined by the European Court of Human Rights in the 2017 case “Bayev v Russia”, where the Court overruled those laws, banning so-called "homosexual propaganda” as discriminatory and unjustified. It is impossible not to notice the correlation between Hungary and Russia, the so-called “putinisation”.
The Court also emphasised that public policies against LGBTQ+ people are incompatible with democratic values overall and that exposing minors to concepts like diversity and equality is constructive rather than threatening for society. Moreover, in its 2023 “Macate v Lithuania” ruling, the Court affirmed that children have the right to access balanced and age-appropriate information about sexuality and sexual orientation, a right undermined by Hungary’s current legislation. At the same time, shutting down debate in parliament and leaving the public out of the decision-making process on a law that limits the right to protest and assemble, goes against the basic values of democracy as protected by the Treaty on European Union. What makes this even worse is that the law was passed during a time when public discussion was filled with propaganda targeting people who support LGBTQ+ rights.
In the meanwhile, billions of euros in EU funds remain frozen over issues including LGBTQ+ rights. But Orbán’s supporters do not recognize this: even if the investigation of the Court concludes that the law is not just, the political cost for Fidesz is less expensive than one would think. The Hungarian government has long mastered the art of procrastination and concealing the lack of EU funds from the public. Especially considering that currently, there is no effective legal mechanism to compel Hungary to reverse this piece of legislation.
Fifteen Years and Still Counting?
In the past 15 years, the Fidesz regime has evolved into such a brazen aristocracy that at this point, Orbán either secures another term in 2026 or starts browsing flight options to Dubai. Hungarian democracy is now so damaged that staying in power is not just politics anymore: it’s protection.
Therefore, the 2025 Pride Ban is not a principled stand - it’s a calculated move within a broader political agenda. It serves two strategic functions: first of all, to fracture the opposition, especially by targeting the new opposition’s conservative base. Second, to dominate public dialogue, while Fidesz struggles to keep their ship afloat - although it’s difficult to keep the system running if it is already sinking. After years of exploiting culture wars to divert attention from economic failure and corruption, Orbán’s political toolkit has grown increasingly radical. The Prime Minister has one year to go until the 2026 parliamentary elections - and the question is what comes next in a strategy that has already banned Pride.
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