Kazakhstan's First NPP Referendum
- Various Contributors
- Apr 30
- 12 min read
A death of the multi-vector policy?
by Aini Yeskhozhina and Aida Stambekova
In 2022, President Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev announced the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. This decision sent shockwaves throughout the nation, turning years of ambiguous discussions into a concrete proposal. Internal debates reignited, with active voices from both pro and anti-nuclear factions alongside concerned citizens. To address these disputes, a referendum was scheduled for October 2024 to determine the future direction of Kazakhstan's energy policy.
From fear to referendum
Kazakhstan has a long and painful history with atomic energy.
The negative sentiment surrounding atomic energy can be traced back to the Semey Polygon. Starting in 1949, the Soviets conducted nuclear weapons tests in the region. Information regarding these tests became public during the “Perestroika” period, a political reform in the late 1980s that aimed to increase government transparency. Over the span of 40 years, 476 tests were conducted, resulting in a total of 50 megatons detonated. Approximately 1,300,000 people were reported as victims of the testing, suffering from mutations, autoimmune diseases, cancers, and more. The polygon was closed in 1991.
The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 further fueled skepticism of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan. The country's only nuclear plant operated from 1973 to 1999, with efforts to close it beginning after the fall of the USSR in 1991 due to strong national opposition. At the moment, Kazakhstan is running five nuclear reactors solely for research purposes.
Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has attempted to reintroduce atomic energy into its energy sector. After unsuccessful attempts in 1999 and 2006, discussions in 2014 reached the stage of a long list of suppliers. To proceed, the Kazakh Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) was established as part of the country's priority measures to develop nuclear energy. This initiative aimed to oversee feasibility studies, design documentation, and the overall organization of nuclear power plant construction projects in the country. However, the project made little to no progress over the next ten years. After his inauguration in 2019, President Tokayev took a proactive stance on reinstating nuclear energy in Kazakhstan.
In 2022, a shortlist of suppliers was published, including EDF (France), KHNP (Korea), CNNC (China), and Rosatom (Russia). The plan is to complete construction by 2035 at a site near the village of Ulken, Lake Balkhash, with costs estimated between $10 billion and $15 billion. Additionally, the construction will be fully commercial without government involvement, with KNPP overseeing this current project, according to its CEO, Zhantikin.
In September 2023, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced a referendum on constructing the first nuclear plant in Kazakhstan. The referendum and subsequent public discussions were part of Tokayev’s promise after the Bloody January riots to involve citizens in national planning.
During public discussions on introducing nuclear power held in various cities across Kazakhstan, scientists and experts invited were predominantly pro-nuclear, with no opposing voices present as official speakers. Some major cities like Almaty and Astana saw activists appear; many were either removed or arrested. Moreover, in smaller cities and villages, most participants were government officials.
Pro-nuclear advocates' most popular argument is Kazakhstan's hold on the second-largest uranium reserves in the world without operating nuclear plants, highlighting the inconsistency of this approach given the country's resource endowment. According to information from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Kazakhstan possesses 14% of the world's uranium reserves.
Opponents of nuclear energy cited a lack of funding resources, failed international projects due to corruption, environmental hazards associated with Lake Balkhash, and most importantly, dependence on Russia. The return of Kazakhstan to nuclear power is viewed more as a political issue than an energy question.
Another undemocratic voting
The process of carrying out the referendum was accompanied by heavy pro-NPP media framing and suppression of any dissent, once again undermining all democratic participation. Intentionally one-sided public campaigns from government-controlled news outlets like “Kazinform” or “Egemen Kazakhstan” and national TV channels pushed for the implementation of NPP using fear-mongering tactics such as declaring that Kazakhstan would see an immense energy deficit in the absence of one. High-profile celebrities were brought up to help push people to vote “yes” to a question with two options only.
Heavily centralized distribution of information was unsurprising, as were the numerous cases of anti-protest crackdown, detentions, and fines before the referendum. A human rights activist, Bakhytzhan Toregozhina, stated that at least 46 people were detained by the police in Almaty alone, 12 of them facing official cases for “organizing mass riots.” Across 12 cities, 45 applications to hold a peaceful rally against the NPP were submitted during the weeks leading up to a referendum and all of them were rejected by local authorities.
A recent development made to the referendum legislation in Kazakhstan should be emphasized, for it has made it possible to сease any attempts to conduct public opinion polls regarding any upcoming referenda. The new law was enforced in July 2024 and it was revealed that 24 violations of this law by activists and regional newspapers were registered regarding the NPP referendum. In addition to penalties, authorities refused to permit non-state-order actors such as the International Center for Journalism called “MediaNet” to conduct social surveys. In light of this, one can hardly be blamed for not believing the government's claim that support for the NPP grew from 53.1% to 72.9% in just a few months, especially considering completely different numbers coming from independent observers and activists.
The day of the referendum saw countless violations from the authorities. Several public unions and human rights foundations reported cases of pressure and prevention from participating in counting ballots, with some observers even being forcefully removed from polling stations. Among other blatant violations of the voting process, citizens witnessed pre-stuffed ballot boxes and a video capturing a woman throwing a stack of ballots before running away.
The Central Electoral Commission announced the results of the referendum on the 8th of October, stating that 71.72% of Kazakhstanis supported the construction of an NPP. The turnout amounted to 63,66% which, according to the head of a Central Asia-focused public policy research center “PaperLab” Serik Beyssembayev, is a completely unrealistic number. Previous election campaigns in Kazakhstan have shown a stable decline in turnout rates, the only exception being the 2019 presidential elections which formalized the transition of power from the first president of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev to Tokayev and resulted in significant mobilization of the citizens.
To a lot of citizens, particularly those who were politically active, this referendum was not about the result of the voting. Rather, it was about the extent to which the government would force its already-made decision onto the population. According to official governmental results, Almaty, the country’s largest city, has seen a turnout rate of 25%. This contrasts with a report made by a League of Young Voters that has been observing elections in Kazakhstan since 1998. According to them the average turnout in 10 of Almaty’s 12 voting stations constituted 19% with 1881 people having voted against and 1163 for the NPP construction. At two remaining polling stations the League’s observers were removed after in one, an observer had noticed a violation by a group of voting students, and in the second because the observer “stepped on a wire and it turned off”. In the second case, the observer was then taken to a police station but was released shortly after due to no corpus delicti. Considering that most of the discussed electoral violations happened in remote regions and most of the independent monitoring is concentrated in big cities (notably in Almaty), the real turnout rates are proof of the government’s attempts to fake civil participation.
A shortlist of four
According to President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, preference will be given to establishing a consortium between possible four bidders, financial institutions, and plant equipment suppliers to avoid political risks and choose the best technologies.
China
Over the course of 30 years, China has built four reactors for the CHASNUPP (one more in progress) and two for the KANUPP projects in Pakistan, providing loans and investments. Similarly, China is to build its infamous Hualong One reactor as a part of the Atucha Nuclear Complex in Argentina. Among less ambitious contributions, China holds roughly one-third of the stakes in the UK’s Hinkley Point C project by financing a significant portion of the costs while not holding major decision-making or operational authority.
China’s long list of biddings and proposals to collaborate on nuclear plant constructions includes Iran, Turkey, Kenya, Egypt, Armenia, Sudan, Romania, and Kazakhstan. Some have already signed agreements and some are considering China’s participation, but everything points to China’s desire to substantially invest in the energy export market.
Kazakhstan and China have a long history of cooperation that started in 2006 with the establishment of a joint venture to develop uranium mines in Kazakhstan. In 2016, dually owned Ulba-TVS started producing fuel to power China’s nuclear plants. The compatibility of the Chinese design with Kazakhstan-produced fuel assemblies combined with a lower promised cost of construction compared to the other three competitors makes Beijing’s proposal extremely attractive.
South Korea
Since the 2009 deal with UAE for the Barakah NPP, which marked South Korea’s first nuclear technology export, Korea’s only other win happened this year as it signed an agreement with the Czech Republic. The final stages of the deal should be completed in 2025, around the same time as the decision comes through in Kazakhstan.
South Korea has been attempting to expand its exports to other countries since the new Yoon presidential administration changed its focus back to nuclear cooperation and development. KNHP, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, intends to bid in Sweden and Finland, and Ghana’s first nuclear reactor project.
Russia
The frontrunner for nuclear plant construction in Kazakhstan is Russia’s Rosatom, a state-owned corporation with projects in Belarus, Iran, China, India, Egypt, Hungary, and Turkey. Operating under a “build-own-operate” (BOO) model, Rosatom fully finances projects and retains ownership and operational rights. For instance, in Turkey’s $22 billion Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, Rosatom will own and operate the plant until 2066 and supply electricity at a fixed price of $0.12 per kWh for 15 years.
For Russia, these projects are rather geopolitical tools. Following setbacks in Europe, such as the cancellation of projects in the Czech Republic and Finland due to political tensions and the war in Ukraine, Russia appears to reestablish influence in Central Asia. Rosatom has signed agreements to build plants in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and is actively lobbying in Kazakhstan. However, concerns about dependency arise. While Kazakhstan aims to reduce reliance on Russian energy with the proposed plant, a deal mirroring Turkey’s could question the very notion of energy independence.
France
France is another contender with great experience in nuclear power (70% of France’s electricity comes from nuclear energy). EDF (Électricité de France), a government-owned energy company, has built numerous reactors globally, including projects in India, across Europe, and in the UK. EDF’s ongoing £22 billion Hinkley Point C project in Britain, a collaboration with China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), showcases its ability to partner on large-scale initiatives. EDF investment in the UK project is significant, covering almost two-thirds of the costs. It is an unlikely case for Kazakhstan, as EDF would prefer to abstain from funding an overseas project directly. In the other project for Jaitapur NPP in India, the construction was financed through French financial institutions with the French and Indian governments providing sovereign guarantees. This raises questions about whether Kazakhstan would adhere to such guarantees, prompting EDF to be cautious when entering the construction.
France’s interest in Kazakhstan extends beyond reactor construction. President Tokayev’s recent visit to France included meetings with executives from EDF and Orano, a French company holding a 51% stake in Kazatomprom’s KATCO joint venture, responsible for 7% of global uranium exports. Discussions highlighted the potential for deeper cooperation, particularly in uranium exports, as France seeks alternatives following Niger’s annulment of Orano’s mining permit at Imouraren mine. While EDF’s participation in Kazakhstan’s nuclear project could strengthen ties and enhance uranium exports, logistical challenges remain.
What happens next?
The decision on the consortium, according to the Energy Ministry of Kazakhstan, can be expected in 2025. However, the procedure of negotiating an NPP construction does not end there. Forming a consortium alone usually takes 1-2 years of selecting vendors, financiers, and other stakeholders while also mediating ownership structures, terms, and deadlines. After a consortium is established, all involved parties must agree on the legal frameworks and the host country must grant regulatory approval for construction. On average, the entire process from agreement to the commission of a plant takes somewhere between 9 and 15 years. For Kazakhstan, notoriously known to drag out any big-scale project, this figure might go up to 20.
The issue of funding that might have arisen otherwise has been solved by the government’s plans to attract foreign investment and repay using the NPP-generated revenues. Financing a project that would take up to 2% of the GDP when the country is currently struggling with a deficit and substantial withdrawals from the National Fund to cover this deficit would be an unbearable challenge. This might potentially eliminate Korean and French participation in the project as both EDF and KNHP typically avoid directly funding NPP constructions abroad, relying mostly on host country contributions and foreign financing. This leaves us with China and Russia which usually offer full-package deals, from financing to construction.
The improbability of Korea and France’s involvement is also likely determined by a possible reluctance to enter a consortium with Russia. Rosatom’s subsidiaries have been subjected to multiple sanctions from the USA with the most recent tightenings implemented in October. The EU, while not sanctioning Rosatom because of Hunganry’s opposition due to its cooperation with the company, might rethink this decision if the war in Ukraine does not cease in the near future.
The choice appears to favor Russia and China, both of which provide the necessary funding. However, the question of whether the two can collaborate effectively in partnership is a key concern. While Russia relies on some Chinese technologies for its projects in Hungary and Turkey (due to sanctions), Rosatom’s “build-own-operate” model is unlikely to align with CNNC’s preference for direct involvement in construction, particularly for Kazakhstan’s projects.
What is clear is that both partnerships present unfavorable prospects, politically and economically. Currently, Kazakhstan seems to lean more toward Russia for several reasons.
Looking at past infrastructure projects between China and Kazakhstan, China typically provides low-interest loans and takes full control of construction, primarily using Chinese contractors and labor. While some Kazakh professionals might be involved, their participation is minimal. This approach resembles the problematic Light Rail Transit (LRT) project under the Belt and Road Initiative, which is still incomplete and faces significant challenges. LRT was undermined by corruption on Kazakhstan’s end, jeopardizing Chinese funding, and might mitigate China’s future willingness to cooperate.
According to Kazakhstan’s Minister of Economy, the country plans to repay loans through nuclear plant revenues and foreign investment, avoiding the use of national reserves. However, this claim is questionable, as Kazakhstan regularly depletes its reserves to cover growing deficits and debts. Given Kazakhstan’s increasing debt to China, Beijing might be cautious about committing to a large-scale nuclear project.
Russia, on the other hand, is actively consolidating its influence in Central Asia. Russia’s deep involvement in Kazakhstan’s energy sectors also provides strong leverage, should Kazakhstan attempt to pivot toward the West. A potential example of such leverage is Russia’s previous halt of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which accounts for 1% of global crude oil, 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, and a significant portion of the national budget.
What would constructing the plant with Rosatom mean for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy? Since the war in Ukraine began, Kazakhstan has pledged to comply with EU and US sanctions against Russia. Although some violations have occurred, leading to secondary sanctions on certain Kazakh companies, the country has generally maintained a cooperative stance. To avoid upsetting the West, Rosatom might need to import technology from China, as it does for the Turkish plant. However, complications could arise if Rosatom itself faces further sanctions in the future.
While China has continued trading with Russia and supplying dual-use products over the past two years, Chinese nuclear companies might reconsider their ties with Russia to avoid jeopardizing their more lucrative European projects. This leads to Rosatom relying on technology from its sanctioned subsidiaries. Should Kazakhstan proceed with Rosatom, the project could strain relations with Europe and the US, potentially resulting in more secondary sanctions.
Finally, the feasibility of Russia building the plant is questionable. With the war in Ukraine draining Russia’s budget and Europe cutting ties with Russian energy, Kazakhstan’s pursuit of energy independence is not in Moscow’s interest. If financing shortages arise, attracting foreign direct investment could prove difficult, forcing Kazakhstan to dip into its already depleted national reserves. The project would undoubtedly stretch for years and the initial deadline of 2035 feels like a fantasy.
Ultimately, the decision, to be made by President Tokayev and dictated largely by geopolitics, might be the most important in Kazakhstan’s development as a sovereign nation. While mimicking democracy, the referendum posed a crucial question about the country’s relationship with an overwhelming neighboring power. The Czech Republic, which disengaged from Russia by abandoning Russian nuclear fuel and eliminating Rosatom from the NPP tender, could be a point reference for Kazakhstan’s future international policy. Whether Kazakhstan makes a move to build a standalone future or plays it safe not to become another “special military operation” zone, this choice will shape the country’s trajectory for decades to come.
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