Brief | The 194th Member-State?

How Israel’s recognition creates new opportunities and obstacles in Somaliland’s quest for international recognition

In an understated ceremony within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, Israel became the first United Nations member to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence. The decision, taken almost thirty-five years after Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, gives new hope for momentum to the unrecognized state's bid for international recognition. Yet, Israel’s decision may similarly present new challenges, as Somaliland attempts to navigate the complex politics of the Red Sea region.

The flag of the unrecognised state, Somaliland, flying above the city of Hargeisa - Credits: Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images

The separation of Somaliland from Somalia has its roots in the colonial division of the Horn of Africa. Specifically, the development of the two diverged significantly in the late 19th century, when the territory of Somaliland became a British colony, while the rest of Somalia would eventually be colonised by Italy. This led to the development of two distinct cultures, including significantly different administrative, economic, and political systems. These differences were further exacerbated by pre-colonial clan divisions, with the territory of Somaliland being historically dominated by the Isaaq clan. Yet, when the unification of the British colony of Somaliland with the newly-independent Somali Republic was proposed, it was generally supported by local politicians.

The delegation of Somaliland signing a constitutional settlement with British representatives before unification with the Somali Republic in 1960 - Credits: Somtribune/WikimediaCommons

However, enthusiasm about unification with Somalia proved to be short-lived. Throughout the 1960s, political and military figures from Somaliland felt alienated by the central government in Mogadishu, which was dominated by figures from the country's south. Despite early hopes for potential reform by military leader Mohammed Siad Barre, who came to power following a coup in 1969, the population of Somaliland quickly grew disillusioned with his rule. This was mostly driven by the favourable position that Barre’s own clan, Darod, had acquired within the governance of Somalia, at the expense of other clans such as the Isaaq. The Somalian government’s relationship with the Isaaq clan further deteriorated in the aftermath of Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War. Somali refugees from Ethiopia were primarily settled in Somaliland, where they often received priority in the distribution of foreign aid by the Barre government. Additionally, paramilitary forces organised during the war engaged in violence against the Isaaq clan, with the tacit endorsement of Somali government officials.

Portrait of Somalian Dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, in 1970 - Credits: Government of Somalia/Wikimedia Commons

Discontent among the Isaaq clan eventually contributed to the outbreak of an armed insurgency in Somaliland during the 1980s, led by the anti-Barre Somali National Movement. Barre’s government responded with a campaign of indiscriminate violence, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. The organised massacres of members of the Isaaq clan, in particular, are classified as a genocide by the international community. Yet, with the Barre regime collapsing in 1990, the SNM successfully took power in Somaliland. Subsequently, having refused to recognise the new authorities in Mogadishu, the SNM declared Somaliland an independent state in 1991.

SNM-organised training camp in Ethiopia during the anti-Bare insurgency in Somaliland - Credits: Boobe Yuusuf/Wikimedia Commons

Despite early governance crises, primarily caused by clan disagreements and the legacy of armed rebellion against the Barre regime, Somaliland promulgated a democratic constitution in 2002. Since then, it has been praised for organising free and fair elections, with the peaceful transfer of power between governing and opposition parties. Additionally, the breakaway entity has largely avoided the cycle of civil war and insurgency, which has plagued the rest of Somalia. Somaliland has been identified as an oasis of stability and democracy in the region. Yet, the lack of international recognition has stifled its economic development.

Somaliland independence monument in Hargeisa, the unrecognised state’s capital - Credits: Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

Somaliland has attempted to utilise its strategic location in the Red Sea to attract international attention. Substantial investments have been offered by UAE-affiliated banks to develop the port of Berbera, helping circumvent the entity's international isolation. Furthermore, Somaliland has looked to strengthen its ties with Ethiopia, a historical rival of Somalia. The pinnacle of Ethiopian-Somaliland cooperation came in January 2024, when Somaliland reportedly granted a 50-year lease to Ethiopia over the port of Berbera in exchange for Ethiopian recognition as part of a mutual memorandum of understanding. Yet, the subsequent non-implementation of the agreement after Somali-Ethiopian talks has demonstrated the dangers of reliance on Ethiopia for gaining international recognition. Namely, Ethiopia’s regional isolation due to the irredentist foreign policy of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government makes seeking support from other regional forces difficult. Additionally, Ethiopia’s precarious internal politics make it more subject to international pressure and hence less likely to execute signed agreements.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi exchanging the Memorandum of Understanding after its signing - Credits: Office of the President of Somaliland/ Wikimedia Commons

The recognition of Somaliland by Israel has brought fresh wind to the country's stalled bid for UN membership. The decision led to celebrations across Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa, as well as hope for further recognition, particularly from the United States. In statements shortly after the document was signed, both Somaliland President Abdirahman Abdullahi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised the agreement as being part of the Abraham Accords. Such a formulation was likely designed to appeal to President Trump, who has long championed the Abraham Accords as his flagship policy for normalising relations between Israel and the Arab states. The agreement of mutual recognition further enshrined areas of cooperation between the two countries, including healthcare, agriculture, and the economy, while notably excluding military cooperation between the two states.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signing documents of mutual recognition with Somaliland, while on a call with the unrecognised country's President - Credits: Amos Ben Gershom/GPO

However, Israel’s recognition has thus far been accompanied by international condemnation and a further deepening of Somaliland’s isolation. The recognition was dismissed by the African Union, along with other international organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and the European Union. Most importantly, the United States confirmed that it didn’t intend to recognise Somaliland and reaffirmed support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Although a formal condemnation was not offered, the US rejection is a likely indicator that the Israeli decision was taken independently and that US recognition remains predominantly aspirational.

Celebrations in the capital of Somaliland, Hargeisa, after the country's recognition by Israel - Credits: Farhan Aleli/AFP

The unanimous rejection of Israel’s action outside of Africa is demonstrative of the increased role that the African Union plays in shaping the foreign perception of African politics. Specifically, both the United States and the European Union have increasingly deferred to the AU as a primary legal arbiter in the continent’s affairs. Undermining the authority of the AU is perceived as dangerously destabilising by most foreign actors, thus limiting the possibilities for Somaliland to find international recognition outside Africa.

The African Union, for its part, seems unlikely to provide a potential pathway for Somaliland’s formal recognition. For one, the body has been generally reluctant to authorise territorial changes, only recognising the independence of two new states since its inception in 2002. It is especially unlikely to do so in the Horn of Africa, where territorial disputes and ethnic separatism have been a source of frequent conflicts and political crises. In fact, the swiftness of the African Union’s condemnation of Israel’s action is indicative that this position is shared across a majority of its members.

Further, Somaliland’s cooperation with Israel is unlikely to improve its standing among African states. Despite the formal exclusion of military cooperation, the decision to recognise Somaliland is likely at least in part motivated by Israeli intentions to limit Iranian influence in the Red Sea. With the Yemen-based Houthis already promising military retaliation in the case of active Israeli deployment, the Somaliland-Israeli partnership will likely be viewed as a carrier of future disturbances to an already volatile region. Additionally, speculation about Somaliland’s potential role in the displacement of the population of Gaza is likely another source of African states' reluctance to engage with Somaliland. Although Somaliland has denied that such plans exist, Israel’s support for Somaliland is bound to raise concerns about the possibility of such a program. These concerns will make most African states additionally cautious when engaging with potential recognition, as such an action could imply complicity or approval of displacement plans or Israel’s policies towards Palestine more broadly.

Ultimately, Somaliland’s future remains frozen by increased global and regional geopolitical polarisation. With the increasingly unilateral nature of nation-state actions, it has become exceptionally difficult for Somaliland to build broad support for its international recognition. The recent recognition of the country by Israel is indicative of this dilemma: while bringing undeniable short-term economic and political benefits, the action is likely to exclude the possibility of recognition from a range of other states. The most obvious escape from Somaliland’s current predicament remains re-engaging with Somalia in order to settle bilateral controversies. However, with the Somali government’s power weakened by years of civil war, and the prevalence of irredentist rhetoric on both sides, the possibility of an agreement is unlikely. Thus, Somaliland is likely to continue its search for supporters through the construction of informal bilateral ties, with the hope of eventually leveraging them into international recognition.

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