Brief | On the Brink
The Explosive Implications of Ethiopia's Renewed Conflict
On September 23, 2026, the authorities of Tigray province announced the beginning of a “defensive war” against the Ethiopian government. To the international community, this declaration signalled the final breakdown of the Pretoria Agreement, which had formally ended the Tigray War in 2022. Yet, for many civilians living in Ethiopia’s north-east, the promised peace never arrived.
Although fighting between the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) had formally ceased, the humanitarian situation in Tigray remains difficult. Additionally, neither of the Pretoria Agreement’s parties—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government—engaged with the agreement in good faith. In particular, the state has carried out regular drone strikes targeting alleged military positions, while the TPLF has been accused of continuing forced conscription practices and halting its disarmament. Meanwhile, the neighbouring region of Amhara has been consumed by an anti-government insurgency since the end of the Tigray War.
With this in mind, the outbreak of renewed conflict is in itself unsurprising. In fact, the durability of the peace agreement has been unexpected, given the circumstances of its signing. Yet, as Ethiopia’s internal war escalates, the risks for the region have never been higher.
The Roots of Conflict
The factors leading up to the current conflict are complex and multi-faceted; however, briefly considering them is important to understand its nature.
Ethiopia has historically been a pluri-ethnic nation governed by a unitary state. This dynamic has fomented uprisings in the past, driven by the desire of marginalised ethnicities to achieve greater autonomy within Ethiopia or even independence. Perhaps the most concerted rebellion took place during the rule of the Derg, a Marxist-Leninist military government which came to power after the fall of the Ethiopian monarchy in 1974. The Derg, while initially tolerant of regional nationalism, eventually undertook increasingly aggressive actions against it. This contributed to the formation of a coalition of ethnic militias, known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which ultimately overthrew it in 1991. The victorious EPRDF subsequently enshrined a new constitution in 1995, based on the principle of ethnic federalism, which was meant to prevent similar outbreaks of violence.
The hope for a stable peace following the fall of the Derg was guided by the promise of equal representation and widespread autonomy for Ethiopia’s major ethnic groups. Yet, despite constitutional guarantees, this was not implemented in practice. The EPRDF coalition, which maintained an authoritarian system of government, was dominated by the TPLF. Thus, resentment increasingly developed among other ethnic groups against perceived Tigrayan supremacy. This antagonism eventually culminated in the election of Oromo politician Abiy Ahmed as leader of the EPRDF and Ethiopian Prime Minister in 2018.
Ahmed promised radical reforms and a move to de-ethnicise Ethiopian politics, with his most radical decision being the merger of the constituent parties of the EPRDF into a single political party called the Prosperity Party. The TPLF actively refused the merger and obstructed Ahmed’s policies. Continuing to govern the region of Tigray, this turned the party from a political nuisance to a significant threat to Ahmed’s premiership.
In 2020, the rivalry between the TPLF and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed turned deadly, after Tigray conducted regional elections despite state-imposed restrictions and refused to recognise the incumbent government. With a build-up of forces from both sides, the Tigrayans carried out an initial offensive in November 2020, which was followed by government advances deep into the Tigray region. In their actions, the Ethiopian state was supported by irregular militias, particularly from the Amhara province, as well as regional rival Eritrea. On the other side, the TPLF allied itself with other ethnic militias supportive of greater federalism.
Despite their lack of conventional military superiority, the hastily formed Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF) achieved unexpected success against the Ethiopian army, even threatening Addis Ababa in late 2021. The Ethiopian state responded to the Tigrayan forces through active counter-insurgency measures, as well as an economic blockade of the region. Although these measures caused serious humanitarian harm and international condemnation, they effectively exhausted the TDF. By 2022, both belligerents were interested in a ceasefire.
A Precarious Peace
The Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022, created initial hopes of a permanent settlement. The TPLF began to remove its heavy weaponry and didn’t oppose the appointed interim administration. Meanwhile, Ethiopia allowed humanitarian aid into Tigray.
By 2023, however, the agreement's fragility was exposed. Clauses related to the prosecution of war crimes, in particular those committed by irregular militias and Eritrean troops, were unimplemented. Additionally, the economic re-integration of Tigray grew increasingly slow. The lack of progress on both topics acted as a pretext for the TPLF to slow disarmament, with compliance ending entirely after a coup was carried out in 2025 that de facto returned their political control. In April 2026, the TPLF formally renounced the Pretoria Agreement and restored the pre-2020 regional government.
The TPLF weren’t the only dissatisfied party. The Amharan militias that participated in the fighting were frustrated with the government's demand for their withdrawal from western Tigray. The area had been a longstanding aspiration for Amharan nationalists, meaning the decision was viewed as a betrayal. Consequently, they rebelled against the government, calling themselves the Fano. The insurgency has only grown in size and scale since its outbreak in 2022, with a decision taken in January 2026 to operate under a united leadership.
Eritrea, meanwhile, entered the war hoping to permanently defeat their historical enemies, the TPLF. The Pretoria Agreement was thus viewed as overly lenient. Furthermore, bilateral relations with Ethiopia deteriorated due to Ahmed’s ambitions of Red Sea access. This, in particular, has led to an unexpected reconciliation between Eritrea and the TPLF.
The Same Conflict?
Despite significant similarities, it would be wrong to view the current fighting as a replay of the previous war. For one, the conflict will not be waged predominantly in the Tigray region. Although military actions have so far mainly involved the TDF and ENDF, recent developments are indicative of a broadening conflict.
On 20 September, 7 anti-government militias announced the formation of a coalition called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Alliance for Survival (known in Tigrinya as Tsimdo) with the intention of overthrowing the current government. The alliance, which includes historical enemies such as the TPLF, Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), may look to replicate the prior success of the EPRDF. Lacking conventional capabilities, it is likely to rely on insurgency tactics, with reports circulating of Fano efforts to obstruct Ethiopian army logistics.
The involvement of international actors similarly makes the current escalation increasingly unpredictable. Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt have been accused by Ethiopian government figures of actively supporting the anti-government coalition. Officials in the border province of Afar have even suggested direct Eritrean involvement in current fighting.
While these claims remain contested, they reflect the isolated Ethiopian position in the Greater Horn of Africa. Both Sudan and Egypt have expressed opposition to Ahmed’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project on the Nile river. Additionally, Ethiopia has been accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war. Thus, both states could benefit from Ahmed’s removal. Domestically, Tigrayan forces may attempt to take advantage of Ethiopia’s isolation, as early offensive patterns indicate an attempt to obstruct Red Sea supply from Djibouti. However, Ethiopia is not itself without allies. It can rely on supplies from the UAE, as well as historical relationships with Kenya and the unrecognised state of Somaliland.
The expansion of the conflict in both geographic scope and international involvement creates significant escalation risks. Potential cross-border fighting with Eritrea or Sudan, in particular, could lead to a broader regional war. The humanitarian implications of a regional conflict would be disastrous. The Tigray War, despite being geographically limited, was one of this century’s deadliest conflicts with substantial reports of war crimes and human rights abuses. Expanded fighting will likely replicate this unfortunate pattern, potentially leading to unprecedented civilian displacement.
To the international community, the threat from current escalation is not limited to humanitarian concern. With global supply chains already threatened after recent Houthi actions jeopardised travel through the strategic Bab El-Mandeb straits, a conflict in the Greater Horn would only act to increase Red Sea insecurity. Therefore, averting the expansion of the crisis is critical to both regional and global powers, although achieving a durable peace between the parties may prove impossible. Ultimately, the promise of peace remains distant for the population in the Greater Horn of Africa.
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