The Indonesian Delivery
- Various Contributors
- Oct 1
- 9 min read
Prabowo Takes-Out Democracy
Written by Kaushik Patil and Keito Bortesi
On August 28th, amidst a clash between law enforcement and protesters in Jakarta, a police armored van fatally struck 21-year-old delivery driver Affan Kurniawan.
Led primarily by young students, the demonstration was organized in response to President Prabowo Subianto’s newly announced perks for government lawmakers. The benefits — amounting to 50 million Rp ($ 3,054 USD) in housing allowances — have bloated 580 lawmakers’ monthly incomes to 120 million Rp ($ 7,329 USD), adding to the many perks on top of the 5 million Rp ($ 305 USD) base salary. While controversial enough on its own, this legislation arrived during recent austerity measures, with cuts in welfare, education, and healthcare.
At the time of his murder, Kurniawan was not involved with the demonstration but, rather, delivering food. Videos of the incident went viral on social media, and the ensuing days exhibited an escalation in violence on both sides of the barricades. On August 29th, alleged protesters burnt down regional government offices in Makassar. Three government employees trapped in the fire died, and a motorcycle taxi driver — accused of being a police spy — was beaten to death. In the Central Java province, a pedicab driver was hit with police tear gas and killed. On August 30th, a university student was beaten to death, and the following day, a mob broke into and looted a lawmaker’s house. On the night of September 1st, riot police fired tear gas at hundreds of students who, no longer protesting, had been camping at the Pasundan University and Bandung Islamic University.
In a climate of rising living costs, rising unemployment, and increasingly apparent government negligence, Kurniawan’s death has become a symbol of injustice amid the authoritarian threat that is Prabowo’s administration.
Prabowo’s Charge against Progress
The August protests are nothing new for Prabowo. Since the dawn of his political career, he has been embroiled in controversy. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Prabowo served as a general under the dictatorship of Suharto, his father-in-law.
Hailing from the right-wing nationalist Gerindra party, Prabowo declared an early victory in February 2024 based on unofficial polling; he was inaugurated later that October. Most notably, Prabowo chose a cabinet of 48 ministers and 58 vice-ministers — the largest it has been since the 1980s. However, 17 of the 48 ministers also worked under the previous presidency of Joko Widodo, with current Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka being Jokowi’s son. Such similarities raise the concern of political stagnation in a nation that necessitates deep institutional reforms.
Even Prabowo’s new populist policies seem to fall back on themselves. Given Indonesia’s history with malnutrition, the President initially promised an expanded free-meal programme. Recently, the programme was downsized by a 22% margin. The consequences of this cut are already visible as new cases surface, notably reports of 400 children falling ill after eating free public school meals. Furthermore, Prabowo has expanded the roles of his armed forces to cover public areas, including this programme, entrenching the military in the day-to-day lives of Indonesians.
Five months into his five-year term, large student-led protests criticised his economic policies, and have been continuing ever since. While Prabowo has offered concessions by rolling back on the controversial housing allowances, he has continued deploying the military at demonstrations and expressing verbal disdain toward protesters. At his presidential palace in Jakarta, Prabowo stated, "The rights to peaceful assembly should be respected and protected. But we cannot deny that there are signs of actions outside the law, even against the law, even leaning toward treason and terrorism." With such verbal and physical responses to the recent protests, Prabowo is showing the same specks of authoritarianism that his father-in-law had painted the country with all those years ago.
Grassroots, Overseas
Other forms of grassroots activism did not originate on Indonesian soil, but rather, from across the sea. Following the death of delivery driver Affan Kurniawan, food orders poured in on apps such as Grab. However, instead of being expected to deliver from house to house, the drivers were peculiarly requested to enjoy the meals themselves. In particular, these orders came from neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia through an online movement named “#SEAblings”.
Outside of individual altruism, many Indonesian influencers banded together to compile a set of imperative structural changes. Formulated in late August 2025, the 17+8 Demands (17+8 Tuntutan Rakyat) — notably named after the Indonesian Independence Day (August 17th) — were the ultimate culmination of the August protests. After widespread public anger, over 200 civil society organisations collaborated to put forth 17 short-term demands to be met by the 5th of September and 8 long-term demands to be achieved in a year. Circulated by Indonesian influencers such as Jerome Polin, Andovi da Lopez, and Salsa Erwina, these calls for action even reached Australia, where protests were held in solidarity.
The 17+8 Demands ask for both immediate and long-term institutional and structural reform, exposing the public's distrust in the incumbent government and its institutions such as the House of Representatives (DPR). Through the aforementioned pay raises and increased allowances, it has been seen that the parliament prioritises their own luxuries over the people’s welfare. Demands mandating increased transparency in the budget, repealing pay rises for officials, and investigating unethical MPs clearly demonstrate how far the gap between the people and their government has widened.
While some of the 17+8 demands clarify the need for institutional integrity, others also focus on increasing economic justice by ensuring a living wage and preventing mass layoffs. This comes at a pressing time, since H1 of 2025 showed a 32.1% increase in terminations when compared to the same period in 2024, with most of it being centred in Java. These demands echo how the government’s legitimacy rests on both the ethics of its representatives and the welfare of the very people they represent.
Additionally, requests targeted towards the police and the armed forces exemplify how the government is slowly creeping towards overturning the democratic transition begun in 1998 that aimed to phase out Suharto’s military influence in the government. The involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in crowd control, under the guise of maintaining order, only intensified the public unrest. Left unchecked, militarised governance would only increase the number of human rights violations in the state.
Although Prabowo and the DPR have made concessions on the perks provided to officials and announced a revaluation of the allowances, these actions are seen as purely cosmetic by the proponents of the 17+8 demands. No accountability is to be seen from the leadership in the police or military forces, all while both arrests and acts of violence against protesters continue to rise. The Ministry of Finance has completely disregarded the protests and fuelled dissent. These actions show an apparent resistance to major structural change, which causes disbelief in the possibility of the 8 long-term demands (including a revised tax structure, deep police reform, and continued military withdrawal) being fulfilled.
Eliminating Enemies, Accruing Allies
In a move that feigned progress for the 17+8 Demands, Prabowo dismissed the Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Budi Gunawan, under the pretense of his inability to handle the August protests. It stands clear that this was, in actuality, a move to weaken his opposition, as Gunawan is a close associate of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Outside of Prabowo’s coalition, PDI-P stands to be the only true opposition party. In Gunawan’s place, retired general Djamari Chaniago was appointed, another rusty cog from Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Kopassus, the elite unit he led three decades ago, was implicated in the kidnapping and torture of alleged political opponents.
Another notable reshuffle was the firing of the Presidential Communications Office (PCO) head Hasan Nasbi, an ally of former president Jokowi. Replaced by Angga Raka Prabowo (no relation), the role had its name changed to Government Communications Office (GCO), potentially as a move to ease the public burden on Prabowo’s name. In what is now a pattern, Angga — who retains his other role in the cabinet as deputy minister — is a Gerindra member and was a key campaigner in Prabowo’s election last year.
Thinking ahead, Prabowo already aims to secure his presidency again in the 2029 election by establishing a “permanent” coalition. Expanding from the original coalition, the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM+) would comprise 14 parties, with the PDI-P being the only party in parliament outside of it. All member parties are in favor, aside from the NasDem party, which remains “non-committal”. This would leave PDI-P and NasDem as the only possible opposition for the foreseeable future. Considering these two parties’ history of disagreement, as well as a combined parliamentary presence of 30%, there is little hope of resistance against Prabowo’s growing grasp at unchallenged power.
It may come as no surprise, then, that both the Prabowo administration and parliament dissolved the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) on September 25th. Rather than being distributed across multiple agencies, all state-owned assets will be funneled to a single sovereign fund: Danantara. Absorbing the previous ministry’s functions, Danantara will be headed by CEO Rosan Roeslani, one of the biggest campaigners for Prabowo in last year’s elections and coincidentally — or perhaps not — currently the Minister of Investment and Downstream Industry. Roeslani’s dual role as both regulate and regulator poses major risks of corruption, which is no doubt an asset in Prabowo’s growing centralised oligarchy.
Prabowo’s overall response to the people’s demands is, in reality, not a response at all. As he purges his enemies out of cabinet and elevates his allies into it; as he seizes public assets and hands them off to private-sector associates; Prabowo continues to shed his sheepskin. It is only a matter of time until his authoritarianism is at full display, revealing his true wolf hide underneath.
A Polite? Democracy?
Following the death of Kurniawan, National Police chief General Listyo Sigit issued an apology and promptly arrested the seven officers involved. Those steps, while necessary, are insufficient without structural reform of policing and crowd control. Meanwhile, the cost-of-living crisis continues to bite as officials fight to protect their perks, widening the legitimacy gap. Progress will require commitment to demilitarisation and opening formal dialogue with student groups and labour unions, core pillars of the 17+8 demands.
Back in his inaugural address, Prabowo mentioned “democracy” 13 times. He cast himself as speaking for the Indonesian people, stating that what they need is a “polite democracy… unique to Indonesia… one that refrains from violence”. Yet as the ordinary Indonesian is crushed under the cost of living, government officials cushion their salaries. As the working-class turns to neighbouring countries for survival, Prabowo continues to consolidate his power. Without the necessary democratic checks and balances, Prabowo will continue to govern in ways that are authoritarian in all but name.
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