Digging For Power

As the world goes electric, Africa seizes the power beneath its feet

At dawn in Kolwezi, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a cobalt miner climbs out of a hand-dug pit with a sack of ore. He wipes red dust from his face as trucks rumble by, carrying rocks destined for faraway battery factories. This is the front line of the global electric vehicle revolution: cobalt, a metal essential for most lithium-ion batteries, is chiefly sourced here under gritty conditions. The DRC produces over 70% of the world’s cobalt and holds around half of global cobalt reserves. Yet for decades, Congolese communities saw little benefit from this geological bounty. Artisanal miners, les creuseurs, toil with basic tools, and investigators have documented hazardous child labor in these makeshift mines. As EV demand surged, so did cobalt prices, breaching $90,000 per ton in 2018 before a market crash the following year. These boom-bust cycles have whipsawed Kolwezi’s miners and the DRC’s economy, illustrating the precarity of Africa’s role in raw material supply.

Africa’s resource paradox is stark in Kolwezi. The region’s cobalt feeds high-tech supply chains for multinational companies, yet local infrastructure and livelihoods remain fragile. The vast majority of Congolese cobalt has been exported in raw or minimally processed form, often to China, which dominates global refining. Smelters in Asia reap the profits, while miners in Kolwezi earn a pittance per day. “We dig so the world can drive electric,” one miner says wryly, “but our own children walk to school on dirt roads.” This human story of extraction underpins a larger shift: African governments are increasingly determined to break the cycle of being mere raw material suppliers. From the copperbelt of Katanga to the hills of Guinea, a wave of resource nationalism is reshaping how Africa engages with global battery-mineral supply chains. In Kolwezi’s cobalt fields, that shift is still a distant promise, but it has begun to take root across the continent.

The Bikita Lithium Fields: Local Dreams and Disruptions

Hundreds of kilometers south, in Bikita, Zimbabwe, farmer Tonderai Murwiti watches a convoy of Chinese-made trucks trundle through what used to be his maize field. They are carrying equipment for a new lithium processing plant adjacent to the Bikita mine, one of Africa’s richest hard-rock lithium deposits. Until recently, lithium was an obscure mineral to most Zimbabweans; now it’s the center of a modern gold rush. “We hear it will power car batteries,” Murwiti says, standing by a pile of bricks that was once his home. He and dozens of other farming families were displaced to make way for mine expansion and on-site processing facilities. Some received compensation and the promise of jobs at the plant, but adapting to this upheaval has been difficult. As one displaced villager laments, “We can’t eat lithium, but we had to give up our land for it.”

Zimbabwe’s sudden lithium boom illustrates the double-edged nature of development. On one hand, it offers a chance to revive a struggling economy: Zimbabwe holds some of the world’s largest hard-rock lithium reserves, and global prices for lithium carbonate (used in EV batteries) skyrocketed in 2021-2022. Chinese mining giants took note: within a year, major firms like Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Sinomine, and Chengxin Lithium collectively invested over $678 million to acquire and develop Zimbabwean lithium projects. In Bikita and elsewhere, these companies are building mines and processing plants, aiming to ship battery-grade lithium compounds rather than raw ore. Crucially, such investments were catalyzed by Zimbabwe’s bold policy stance. In December 2022, the government imposed a ban on the export of unprocessed lithium, part of a bid to end rampant smuggling by artisanal miners and ensure lithium value-added happens on home soil. “No lithium-bearing ores…shall be exported from Zimbabwe,” declared Mines Minister Winston Chitando in a government notice, exempting only lithium concentrates. The message was clear: if companies want Zimbabwe’s “white gold,” they must refine it locally. 

Early outcomes of this policy are mixed. The ban swiftly curtailed the hordes of informal miners who had been digging up lithium and trucking it across borders. Formal operations, meanwhile, accelerated plans for local beneficiation, exactly what Zimbabwe’s leaders intended. In 2023, President Emmerson Mnangagwa inaugurated a pilot lithium processing facility and hinted at future tax penalties on the export of even semi-processed lithium. Such steps align with a broader vision to turn Zimbabwe into a battery manufacturing hub in the long run. But in communities like Bikita, benefits are only starting to trickle down. A few locals have found employment as truck drivers or plant workers, and infrastructure around the mine is improving. Yet environmental concerns and questions about revenue transparency persist. Civil society groups urge that new mineral revenues be invested in schools, clinics, and roads for communities bearing the brunt of mining. Murwiti, the displaced farmer, is hopeful that promises will be kept. “If our sacrifices mean a better future for our children, we can accept it,” he says. Whether that future materializes depends on how effectively Zimbabwe can manage this lithium windfall, a challenge unfolding in parallel across Africa’s resource-rich nations.

Resource Nationalism Rising: From Harare to Windhoek

Zimbabwe is not alone. Its lithium export ban marked the beginning of a trend in Southern Africa. In mid-2023, Namibia announced it too will ban exports of unprocessed critical minerals including lithium, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare earths.. “There is no way we can industrialise without processing our minerals,” Namibia’s Mines and Energy Minister Tom Alweendo asserted, encapsulating the policy’s intent. Approved by Namibia’s cabinet, the ban allows only small quantities of raw ore to leave (for example, for testing or special exceptions) and is backed by the national Chamber of Mines. Namibia, known more for its diamonds and uranium, has significant lithium and rare earth deposits of its own. As the world shifts to clean energy technologies, Namibian leaders see an opportunity to capture more value domestically rather than simply export bulk ore. The timing was no coincidence: lithium prices had hit record highs in 2022, and global investors were scrambling for new sources. A research firm projected Namibia’s nascent lithium industry could be worth nearly N$14 billion (about US$800 million) by 2025. By instituting the ban, officials signaled to foreign firms that future profits lie in local joint ventures and processing facilities, not shipping out rocks.

Regional cooperation began to take shape as well. In 2022, neighboring DRC and Zambia, respectively the world’s top cobalt producer and Africa’s second-largest copper producer, signed an agreement to create a joint battery supply chain initiative. With facilitation by the African Export-Import Bank, the two countries planned to develop industrial parks for manufacturing precursor battery components (like cathodes), leveraging their cobalt and copper deposits. This partnership was a precursor to broader alliances forming across the continent. Resource nationalism, once associated mainly with oil states, had arrived in the battery minerals sector. Throughout 2023 and 2024, African mining ministers met in forums from Cape Town’s Mining Indaba to Kigali, exchanging notes on policies and negotiating leverage. Conversations that began with “we want a fair share” were evolving into “let’s present a united front.” 

African leaders increasingly framed control over minerals as both an economic and a sovereignty issue. The African Mining Vision (an African Union policy framework adopted in 2009) was frequently cited; it calls for resource-based industrialization and “strategic management” of extractives for broad-based development. By 2024, this vision was being updated to reflect the urgency of the energy transition. Critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite were placed front-and-center in the AU’s agenda. At a continental meeting, one delegate quipped that “cobalt is the new oil”, a strategic asset Africa must leverage on its own terms. Such thinking set the stage for a landmark gathering in 2025 that would cement Africa’s evolving role in the battery supply chain.

The Nairobi Summit: Forging a United Front

Scheduled for June 2025, the inaugural summit of the Critical Minerals Africa Group (CMAG) is set to convene senior officials from across the continent at Nairobi’s Kenyatta International Convention Centre. Organisers predict an atmosphere electric with possibility—tempered by a fair measure of trepidation, because no pan‑African bloc has ever gathered solely to coordinate policy on mineral resources. If all goes to plan, heads of state, cabinet ministers, and African Union representatives will file into the grand hall under the flags of more than a dozen nations rich in lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, manganese and rare earth elements.

In pre‑summit briefings, Kenyan President William Ruto, the host, has trailed a message that sets a defiant tone: “Africa will no longer export poverty and import wealth. We will mine and refine our resources for the benefit of our people.”That sentiment echoes why CMAG exists at all. Zimbabwe’s and Namibia’s export bans on unprocessed lithium in 2022‑23 jolted peers into thinking collective action might succeed where isolated policies falter. The AU formally endorsed a continent‑wide critical‑minerals alliance in early 2024; preparatory meetings in Addis Ababa and Lusaka hammered out draft statutes. By April 2025 key producers, the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mali and Morocco, had all signalled their intent to sign the CMAG charter. Commentators already dub the emerging bloc an “OPEC for EV minerals,” though its architects insist the goal is coordination, not cartel‑style price fixing.

According to a leaked concept note, CMAG’s charter will focus on sharing geological data, adopting common rules for local content and environmental practice, and presenting a unified front in negotiations with investors and buyers. As DRC President Félix Tshisekedi remarked during a March roadshow, “We have been price‑takers for too long. Together, we can negotiate better deals with those who need our resources.”

If consensus holds, one headline deliverable could be a framework for harmonised royalty rates and tax incentives, including a continent‑wide floor on royalties for unprocessed ore to deter “race‑to‑the‑bottom” concessions. Drafts also outline joint‑venture models that would let multiple states pool capital for refining and battery‑precursor plants, pilots under discussion pair Zambia’s copper with DRC cobalt in a shared border facility financed by the African Development Bank. “If we each try to race to the bottom, we all lose. By uniting, we have bargaining power,” Rwanda’s mining minister told reporters after an April technical meeting.

Perhaps the most striking, and definitely the most controversial, item on the provisional agenda is a proposal for an African mineral‑backed digital currency. An AU task‑force envisions a pan‑African unit of account, underwritten by a basket of critical‑mineral reserves and gold, to reduce reliance on external currencies and smooth commodity‑price volatility. Under the draft, countries that lodge a portion of their cobalt, lithium or graphite reserves with a common fund would receive digital tokens, effectively a commodity‑backed stablecoin, for trade or borrowing. Champions, including Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa, hail the idea as “visionary,” arguing it could convert resource wealth into monetary power. Skeptics raise thorny questions about governance, sovereignty and transparency: Who controls the backing reserves? How are audits verified?

Whether the currency proposal advances or is shelved for further study, its very presence on the docket signals how boldly African capitals are reimagining their economic future. What was once unthinkable, an Africa that is neither price‑taker nor dollar‑dependent, is now a live negotiating position. All eyes are on Nairobi, the decisions forged there could reshape everything from battery supply chains to global finance.

Skepticism and Support

Africa’s assertiveness on critical minerals has not gone unnoticed by the global powers that depend on those minerals. In fact, it coincides with a moment of intense scrutiny and jockeying in global supply chains for the green economy. The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), enacted in 2023, explicitly aims to bolster Europe’s access to key minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earths. The CRMA set targets for Europe to mine at least 10% of its own consumption of critical raw materials domestically and to source no more than 65% of any key material from a single foreign country by 2030. It also emphasized building partnerships with resource-rich countries, especially in Africa, to ensure “mutual benefit” in raw material trade. European policymakers, wary of China’s dominance in battery supply chains, generally view Africa’s rise in mineral processing as aligned with their goals, so long as Europe can secure a share of the output. In fact, the EU has actively courted African nations with offers of investment and technology transfer. Namibia’s agreement with the EU in late 2022 to develop and supply rare earth elements is one example. The following year, the EU signed memoranda of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to support sustainable battery supply chains, dovetailing with those countries’ own ambitions to move up the value chain. European Commission officials attended the 2025 Nairobi CMAG summit as observers and reportedly expressed support for Africa’s value-add initiatives, an implicit nod that a more industrialized Africa could be a reliable supplier to Europe’s clean tech sector. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, during a visit to Namibia, even remarked that African processing “will not only create greater local prosperity… [but] ensure that we [Europe] have more than just one supplier in the future”. 

If Europe’s response has been to engage and support (while securing offtake rights), the United States has taken a somewhat different tack. The U.S., also heavily dependent on imports for many battery minerals, has pursued a strategy focused on domestic production and protectionism. In 2024, citing national security, the U.S. Department of Commerce launched Section 232 investigations into imports of certain EV battery materials, notably large volumes of Chinese graphite anodes, to determine if tariffs or quotas should be imposed. Section 232, a Cold War-era trade tool, had been previously used on steel and aluminum; its extension to battery minerals signaled how strategic these materials have become in Washington’s eyes. Though aimed primarily at China, such measures carry global implications. African nations, which could become alternative suppliers of refined battery minerals, are watching closely. Some worry that U.S. protectionism might eventually extend to them if, for example, African-processed graphite or manganese is seen as undercutting U.S. producers. Others see an opportunity: if Chinese shipments are curtailed, Africa could fill the gap. American officials have been more cautious than Europeans in openly supporting Africa’s resource nationalism, perhaps concerned about a new cartel or about Chinese influence – Chinese companies are heavily invested in African mining, after all. Nonetheless, the U.S. has provided funding through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for mining projects in countries like Cameroon and Malawi, and it launched the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) with allies to invest in diverse sources of critical minerals. Africa features in those plans, even if U.S.-Africa engagements on this front lack the fanfare of the EU’s. As one U.S. official put it, “we applaud seeing more value added in Africa, it can reduce the chokehold of dominant players – but we want to make sure the supply stays open and fair”

China, the elephant in the room, has reacted in its own way, mostly by doubling down on its investments and quietly leveraging its entrenched position. Chinese companies were quick to comply with local processing requirements in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, often because they have the capital and technology to do so. In some cases, this gives them an edge over Western competitors who might be slower to adapt. Beijing has not officially opposed Africa’s new policies; in fact, it often presents itself as a development partner. But behind closed doors, Chinese buyers have naturally pushed for long-term supply contracts to lock in access to African minerals, especially as new regulations emerge. Notably, in mid-2024 China imposed export controls on certain critical minerals of its own (gallium and germanium, used in semiconductors) in a tit-for-tat with the West. This move reminded African leaders that China, too, understands the power of controlling key resources. For Africa, balancing relations with all major powers, EU, U.S., China, and others like Japan or India, is the diplomatic tightrope ahead. The 2025 Nairobi summit will see delegations from Europe, North America, and Asia all vying for face time with African ministers, each keen to secure their slice of the continent’s resource future.

Navigating the Boom-Bust Cycle

Underpinning these diplomatic and strategic maneuvers is the volatile economics of the minerals themselves. The tale of the past decade in battery materials is one of extreme peaks and troughs. Perhaps no mineral illustrates this better than lithium. Once a niche commodity, lithium saw an extraordinary price spike as EV demand took off. From 2018 through late 2021, lithium prices rose gradually; then they went into overdrive. The figure below shows the rollercoaster: a meteoric rise in 2022 (lithium carbonate prices quadrupled within a year, reaching over $70,000 per ton) followed by a sharp crash in 2023 as new supplies came online and demand temporarily slowed.. Cobalt experienced its own wild swings, surging to over $80,000/ton in early 2022 amid supply fears, then halving within a year as battery makers shifted toward lower-cobalt technologies. These swings pose a serious challenge for African countries trying to plan long-term. It’s tricky to invest billions in refineries or new mines if the commodity price might collapse by the time the project is finished.

For African governments, these market gyrations have validated the push for value addition, as refined products tend to command more stable premiums than raw ores,  but they have also introduced caution. During the lithium price crash of 2023, for example, there were murmurs in Harare and Windhoek questioning whether costly new processing plants would still be profitable. Some politicians feared that if prices stayed low, companies might lobby to overturn the export bans. Thus far, the policies have held firm, in part because most analysts project robust medium- to long-term demand for battery minerals as the world’s EV and energy storage adoption grows. Indeed, by 2025 lithium prices were rebounding modestly and cobalt was finding a new floor as EV sales continued to set records. Still, market volatility underscores the importance of shrewd management. African countries are exploring mechanisms to stabilize revenues, one reason the idea of a mineral-backed currency or a commodity stabilization fund is so appealing. Another approach is diversification: not relying on a single mineral. For instance, Mozambique, which has large graphite deposits, is also developing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector; if graphite prices dip, perhaps LNG can buffer the economy, and vice versa.

International financial institutions have a role to play here as well. The IMF and World Bank, historically proponents of free trade in commodities, have cautiously praised African nations’ recent moves for local beneficiation, but with caveats. They urge that these policies be implemented transparently and in a market-friendly way. There is also an emphasis on avoiding over-reliance on commodity exports altogether by investing revenues into broader economic development. In practical terms, this means using the boom times (when mineral prices are high) to build sovereign wealth funds or stabilization funds that can support budgets when prices fall. Botswana famously did this with diamonds; now countries like the DRC and Zambia are considering similar models for cobalt and copper. It’s a delicate balance: push for more control and value from minerals, but don’t become so beholden to them that a price crash brings disaster.

The nascent Critical Minerals Africa Group may help its members coordinate such strategies. In Nairobi, members discussed sharing best practices on hedging and commodity-backed loans. There was talk of negotiating as a bloc with major battery makers or automotive companies, possibly securing long-term supply contracts that include floor prices to protect against crashes. Some in the industry have floated the idea of an OPEC-like output coordination to manage prices. However, many African officials are wary of overt cartel behavior; they prefer market interventions through value addition rather than quotas. After all, outright withholding of supply could backfire if it accelerates substitution or recycling efforts by tech firms. More useful, perhaps, is investing in downstream industries that can absorb these minerals domestically. If Africa could establish its own battery manufacturing plants, say in South Africa or Egypt, then a drop in raw mineral prices might be offset by cheaper input costs for those local industries. This vertical integration is a long game, but it’s no longer a fantasy: already a pilot lithium-ion battery assembly plant has been set up in Congo-Brazzaville (with Chinese technical support), and consortiums are studying the feasibility of larger battery factories in Egypt and Morocco.

Toward a New Equilibrium: Promise and Peril

As 2025 unfolds, Africa’s evolving role in global battery-mineral supply chains stands at a crossroads of promise and peril. The narrative that began in places like Kolwezi and Bikita, of everyday Africans grappling with the impacts of a global resource boom—now extends to diplomatic halls and corporate boardrooms worldwide. The human stories remain central. The cobalt miner in Kolwezi wonders if initiatives like CMAG will translate into better working conditions and a fair income for him. The farmer-turned-truck-driver in Bikita hopes that Zimbabwe’s lithium export ban will ultimately fund new schools for his children. These individuals have shouldered the costs of the EV revolution; the question is whether they will share meaningfully in its gains.

On the policy front, Africa’s leaders have demonstrated unprecedented unity and agency. By asserting processing mandates and forming alliances, they have altered the terms of engagement with powerful international players. The balance of power is subtly shifting: instead of passively supplying raw materials at prices set in London or Beijing, African nations are negotiating deals on their own soil, with added leverage from their control over value-added products. This could lead to a more equitable global supply chain, one in which investment and profits are more evenly distributed. A glimpse of this future can be seen in Namibia’s burgeoning lithium sector: by 2030, if projections hold, Namibia may supply refined lithium to both Asian and European battery plants, earning a larger slice of the profits than if it exported ore. Similarly, Zimbabwe could move from exporting rocks to exporting battery-grade lithium chemicals, capturing up to five times more value per ton.

However, the road ahead is fraught with challenges. Building and sustaining local refining capacity requires not just bold mandates but also massive investments, skilled workforce development, stable electricity (a notorious bottleneck in South Africa and DRC), and consistent regulatory environments. Corruption and governance concerns linger – observers warn that without strong institutions, resource nationalist policies could merely create new avenues for rent-seeking by elites, doing little for ordinary citizens. Environmentalists note that building battery factories or chemical plants carries pollution risks; Africa must avoid simply moving dangerous processing from foreign shores to its own without proper safeguards. There’s also the risk of geopolitical fallout. If Africa’s strategies significantly raise costs for end-users, there could be pressure or backlash from import-dependent nations. Trade tensions could flare if, say, export restrictions tighten too much. The fine line between fair value and protectionism will need careful treading.

For now, a cautious optimism prevails among Africa’s policymakers and partners. As preparations advance for the inaugural CMAG summit, the mood among member states emphasizes sustainable development and partnership over confrontation. Early communiqués and consultations, like those held in Nairobi in April 2025, have signaled a desire to welcome investment and knowledge transfer from international allies, applauded the EU’s early engagement, and invited other regions to pursue “balanced, fair agreements” with African producers. These dialogues have also underscored Africa’s commitment to supporting the global clean energy transition, a signal that the goal is not to hoard minerals or weaponize supply, but to ensure that resource wealth genuinely benefits the continent that holds it. When the summit convenes, its final declaration may well echo an old African proverb: “If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.” In the context of battery minerals, Africa is making clear it no longer wishes to go it alone at the bottom of the value chain. As Nairobi’s groundwork gives way to more formal coordination, one can sense a new chapter taking shape. The real test will lie in what follows: turning diplomatic communiqués into mines, refineries, factories, and shared prosperity. In Kolwezi, the sun sets as our cobalt miner returns home, tired but hopeful that change is coming. In Bikita, the newly built plant flickers to life, its lights cutting through the dusk, a symbol of a nation intent on a different future. These are early days in Africa’s battery‑mineral revolution, but the narrative is unmistakably shifting. The world’s clean energy future runs through African soil, and increasingly, Africa intends to chart that course on its own terms.

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