A Fragile Truce
- Federico Zoppini
- 7 hours ago
- 13 min read
Armenia and Azerbaijan's struggle to overcome geopolitical instability
Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his 2005 State of the Nation Address, described the fall of the USSR as “The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. Given the chronic instability that many post-soviet states have experienced since, combined with the multitude of conflicts that arose within the borders of the former USSR, Putin’s statement does not deviate much from the reality of facts. Indeed, the fall of the Soviet Union marked the end of an undoubtedly authoritarian and oppressive state, but it nonetheless left a significant power vacuum.
The turbulent relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a clear manifestation of said instability. Despite the historical enmity, after decades of conflict and months of stalled negotiations, on August 8th 2025, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration for peace and initialled an Agreement which aspires to bring long-term stability to the region, putting an end to a multi-generational conflict which has been tearing the Caucasus apart.
Surprisingly, unlike past negotiations, Russia – historically a key player in the region – was not involved in the Summit, which took place in Washington D.C. under the auspices of the USA and President Donald J. Trump. However, despite the promising direction this dialogue is taking, Azerbaijan has set some preconditions that could put the pacification process on hold.
Background of the Treaty - The history of the Nagorno-Karabakh War
Under the USSR, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated into the Azeri Soviet Socialist Republic as an Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), despite being almost exclusively inhabited by Armenians.
In 1988, as the Soviet Union started to crumble, the the Council of People's Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh voted in favour of a resolution to unite the Autonomous Oblast with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. This action sparked indignation within the Azeri administration, and tensions quickly rose. In 1991, as Armenia and Azerbaijan officially achieved independence from the USSR, the NKAO seceded from the latter, following a referendum on independence. Consequently, full-scale conflict broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By 1993, despite all odds, Armenia secured control over the former NKAO territory, along with the entirety of four Azeri districts (Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli and Zangilan) and significant parts of other three (Agdam, Fuzuli and Jabrayil). The conflict counted around 30.000 casualties, and featured widespread episodes of ethnic cleansing: around 500.000 Azeri were displaced from the occupied territories, while about 300.000 Armenians were in turn forced to leave Azerbaijani territory.
In 1994, the two countries agreed on a ceasefire brokered by the Russian Federation. This agreement, known as the Bishkek Protocol, froze the armed conflict and put an end to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, leaving the borders unchanged with respect to the 1993 occupation's frontline. The independent Republic of Artsakh, established in the former NKAO after the declaration of independence, thus extended its control to include the Armenian occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. It had very close military and economic ties to motherland Armenia, although the new State was never recognized by the international community.
Following the Bishkek Protocol, actual conflict remained overall frozen, but tensions persisted with cases of low intensity confrontations, drone attacks, artillery shillings, and armed clashes such as the ones in 2016, which caused the death of dozens of military personnel on both sides. Despite years of negotiations, under the mediation of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group – the only internationally agreed body for such activity, set up in 1992 – a peace agreement still couldn’t be reached. Attempts were made: at the 2007 OSCE ministerial conference, the Minsk Group drafted the Madrid principles. These principles wanted the return of occupied territories to Azerbaijan, interim self-governance and security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh, a corridor connecting it with Armenia, a future legally binding decision on its final status, the right of displaced people to return and international security guarantees with peacekeepers. These principles were in turn the foundation of the statement made at the 2009 L’Aquila G8 summit by the three leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, Medvedev, Obama, and Sarkozy, during which they urged Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach an agreement that would follow the proposed guidelines. Nonetheless, Armenia and Azerbaijan never managed to agree on the principles’ implementation and interpretation.
The Madrid principles eventually failed to progress, and in September 2020 conflict broke out again. Azerbaijan, bolstered by close military ties with Türkiye and Israel, launched a full-scale invasion of the Armenian occupied territories and managed to advance swiftly, thanks to its superior military equipment and drone support. Following six weeks of armed conflict, resulting in approximately 7.000 casualties, on November 9th, 2020, the two countries negotiated a ceasefire, mediated by the Russian Federation. Among other things, Azerbaijan regained control of the Armenian-occupied territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as other important parts of the former NKAO, such as the city of Shusha. Moreover, the Russian Federation deployed peace-keepers along the line of contact and the Lachin Corridor, which connected Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia proper.
However, tension remained high as Armenian and Azeri leaders disagreed on the interpretation of various points contained in the November 9th ceasefire, especially point nine, regarding the connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave, the Nakhcivan Autonomous Republic, located south-west of Armenia. Armed clashes persisted into the ceasefire, bringing suffering and loss to both sides. Azeri incursions forced the evacuation of many Armenian border villages.
Despite yet another attempt for renewed ceasefire by the Russian Federation, hostilities continued. Azerbaijan repeatedly blocked the Lachin Corridor, both indirectly, in December 2022, when government-backed eco-activists blocked access with the pretext of opposing illegal mining in the region, and directly five months after, when Azeri armed forces placed a checkpoint intended to prevent the transport of military equipment from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. These measures caused shortages and rationing in the territories under control of the Artsakh Republic. Russian peacekeeping forces failed to take action to address the situation, creating doubts concerning Russia’s role as a reliable security guarantor in the region, a trend that has grown significantly since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which shifted Moscow’s attention away from their commitments in the Southern Caucasus.
In spite of the everlasting hostility, negotiation between Armenia and Azerbaijan still continued, but proved fruitless. The two countries met various times, under the watch of the EU, USA and Russia remaining unable to achieve any significant results.
On September 19th, 2023, Azeri armed forces invaded Nagorno-Karabakh, quickly gaining control of the region, leading to the capitulation and subsequent dissolution of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, still in place in territories occupied more than 30 years earlier. As a result of the Azeri takeover, it is estimated that around 100.000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh were forced to flee, fearing retaliation from Azerbaijan. This sparked strong protests in Yerevan: people accused the government of incompetence, and demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Renewed negotiations
Following such upheavals, Armenia and Azerbaijan released a joint statement on December 7th, 2023, declaring their intention to normalize relations and reach a long-lasting peace agreement. To prove their commitment, both parties initiated the release of hostages.
Bilateral negotiations soon began, despite Yerevan and Baku’s initial intention to postpone discussions on the topic of boundaries and transportation routes. Although the former issue is being resolved, the latter remains highly debated to this day.
Nonetheless, productive talks resulted in the drafting of 17 articles, initially not fully disclosed to the public, aimed at establishing diplomatic relations, recognising the territorial integrity of both countries and withdrawing territorial claims. Still, two points remained contested: first, Azerbaijan demand that Armenia withdraws the international legal claims for war crimes they had filed, second, the refusal to create third party task-forces on their shared borders. Notably, Russian peace-keepers commenced their withdrawal from the region in April 2024.
Despite fears of disagreements undermining the peace talks, on March 13th, 2025, the two countries announced the completion of the ultimate draft of a Peace Agreement. Nonetheless, the addition of new tricky caveats kept slowing down the negotiation process. While Armenia caved in on Azeri demands regarding the two above-mentioned friction points, Azerbaijan added two prerequisites. Baku demanded the dismantling of the Minsk Group within OSCE, and the modification of the preamble of Armenia’s constitution which, they argued, contained claims against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, as it references a 1990 document that set the goal of Armenia’s eventual “unification” with Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian functionaries argued that the preamble is a mere historical text without any binding effects, pointing to this precondition as a pretext to stall the peace process. Still, Armenians avoided openly questioning Azerbaijan’s demand, fearing that such an action could permanently destroy the new-born cooperation with the Azeris, as once again the frequency of border incidents increased and fear of negotiation breakdown renewed.
August 8th Washington D.C. Summit
Hopes for a permanent closing of the never-ending conflict rose again on August 8th, 2025, when a meeting between Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pahinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev was held in Washington D.C. under the watch of President Donald J. Trump. The Summit saw some pivotal documents being signed, furtherly affirmed in a Joint Declaration by all parties involved.
Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled the 17-article Peace Treaty, officially named Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Its content was made public shortly after, effectively finalizing its text, hopefully establishing it as a permanent version. Armenia and Azerbaijan acknowledge that their border coincides with the boundaries of the former Soviet Socialists Republics, as determined by the parties’ border commissions, and they recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of each other, in addition to renouncing all of their mutual territorial claims and condemning racial hatred, separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations. The two countries vowed to establish normal diplomatic relations shortly after the ratification of the agreement, and not to deploy any third-party forces along their shared border. They addressed the issues of missing people, vowing to cooperate with each other for the return of their remains. They also paved the way for economic, transit, transport, environmental, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation, reaffirming the withdrawal of all international legal claims against each other. Later on, a joint appeal to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was released, demanding the disbandment of the Minsk Process.
Furthermore, two important memorandums were signed. The first one, between the USA and Azerbaijan, aims at developing a future partnership to strengthen their ties, as they agree to work together in expanding energy investments and regional connectivity infrastructure, enhance defence and counterterrorism cooperation, promote regional economic and trade relations, further developing AI and digital infrastructure investments.
The other one, between the USA and Armenia, is composed of three separate documents. The first focuses on Armenia’s Crossroad of Peace Project, which aims to develop Armenia’s infrastructure, improving its border security and partner connections in the region, based on the principles of full sovereignty and reciprocity. The memorandum intends to do so by encouraging private investment, sharing best practices between the US Department of Homeland Security and Armenian Border and Revenue Authorities, and by strengthening Armenia’s cyber securities capabilities.
The second document focuses on establishing an AI and semiconductor innovation partnership, aimed at strengthening the industry’s presence in Armenia and deepening its ties with the one present in the USA, as well as through enhanced cooperation in academic research. The last document regards the establishment of an energy security partnership in order to expand Armenia’s energy sector, mainly with respect to nuclear energy but including renewable sources in the framework as well, facilitating the country’s transition to a competitive low-carbon emissions system.
The Washington D.C. summit was especially important as it addressed the issue of the so-called “Zangezur corridor” connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhcivan, cutting through the Syunik province of Armenia. This has long been a matter of heated discussions as Azerbaijan demanded the opening of an extraterritorial route, with a consequent challenge to Armenia’s sovereignty.
According to the documents set forth, the opening and management of such a corridor, to be named “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), would involve cooperation with the USA, which has gained exclusive right to develop the area for 99 years, and potentially private American companies, while remaining under the sovereign jurisdiction of Armenia. Although some points remain unsettled, such as who would manage custom checks, this agreement remains a remarkable achievement towards the normalization of Armenian-Azeri relations.
The peace talks, however, did not address the status of the around 100.000 ethnic Armenians that were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and who will, most likely, never be able to return to their homes, as Yerevan has not effectively pressed Baku on the matter, out of fear of stalling peace talks.
Nonetheless, on October 2nd, 2025, during a meeting in Copenhagen, Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev renewed their pledge to promote peace and normalization of relationships.
The final signing and ratification of the peace treaty hasn’t occurred yet, as Azerbaijan’s two demands haven’t been fully met. While the OSCE has agreed to disband the Minsk group structures, Armenia has not yet modified its constitution.
Prime Minister Pashinyan has already been talking about a potential modification of Armenia’s constitution since his election of 2018, and the Armenian Ministry of Justice is developing a draft which would reportedly also modify the Presidential powers and the electoral system, and is set to be ready by the 2026 parliamentary elections, although many consider this date unrealistic as the drafting is still at its initial phases. Prime Minister Pashinyan has already depicted the new draft as the potential basis for a Fourth Armenian Republic, and the beginning of a truly modern, connected, and developed country: a “Real Armenia” as he described it, in contrast to the “Historical Armenia” which, according to his words, looks only to the past and to its lost lands – such as the Ararat mountain in Türkiye, still considered a lost national identity symbol – and not to the future.
Despite giving it the reputation of a statement and pledge to modernity, such change would be seen as an official surrender to Azerbaijan, potentially weakening the position of the Civil Contract party, of which Pashinyan is head, as already noticeable in the March 2025 local elections. Moreover, opposition parties could exploit such weakness to deepen Moscow’s interference in Armenian politics.
The amendment would need to be approved by a majority vote in a popular referendum with a turnout of at least 25% of the electorate, to be held either in 2026 or 2027. Reaching the threshold will be a challenge, as the constitutional rewrite is unpopular among Armenians, who see it as further concessions and an imposition from Baku, and the opposition could attempt boycotting the referendum, making it null.
A failure in getting the amendment passed could undermine years of peace negotiations. It could potentially reignite radical tendencies within the Azeri government, as many, including president Aliyev, have in the past referred to Armenia as merely “Western Azerbaijan”, sparking fears of greater expansionists ambitions. This could moreover compromise Armenia’s already precarious relationships with its neighbours, especially Türkiye, that has conditioned the normalization of relationships to the signing and ratification of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, its long-term ally, leaving Armenia again isolated in the international scene. However, in this scenario, Baku should be careful as well. An excessively inflexible position on the matter could bolster nationalism within Armenia and undermine Azerbaijan’s aspiration of becoming a major trade and transit hub between Europe and Asia through the Middle Corridor, something which has long been limited by Armenia’s closed borders. Consequently, finding a middle ground could be the ideal way.
International Reactions
Reactions from the international community to the peace agreements have been varied, with many praising the deal, while others have adopted a more careful stance or outright condemned it.
Countries closer to the USA and NATO, such as Türkiye, have described the accord as a very beneficial development that will boost exports of energy and other resources through the South Caucasus. The EU has on its part praised the deal, viewing it as an important step for the normalization of relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the overall economic and social development of the region.
Russia has, on one hand, mildly welcomed the deal as a step forward to promote trade and stability in the area but has warned that Western involvement could repeat the “unfortunate experience” of other conflict resolutions led by the USA and its allies in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Kremlin argued that a long-lasting peace should be developed by countries in the region, without any outside interference.
Iran, a historical enemy of the USA-led Western world, has condemned the TRIPP project, and has vowed to block the initiative, depicted as a “viper” between Iran and Russia, perceiving it as a direct violation to Iranian interests in the region. Similarly to Russia, the foreign ministry of Iran, while welcoming the peace deal in itself, has expressed concerns regarding foreign interventions in the region.
Conclusion
The Washington Summit of August 2025 marks an important step in the history of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, as, for the first time since the dissolution of the USSR, both nations genuinely appear committed to reconciliation. Yet, the road ahead remains uncertain as Azerbaijan’s preconditions risk delaying, or even making entirely impossible, the ratification of the peace treaty, and reigniting nationalist sentiment on both sides. Russia’s exclusion and the growing Western presence in the South Caucasus signal a profound geopolitical realignment that could either consolidate peace or sow new rivalries in a region long shaped by external influence.
The long-term sustainability of the peace also depends on the willingness of both societies to move beyond mutual mistrust and historical grievances. If implemented with sincerity and supported by balanced international engagement, the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations could transform the Caucasus from a war torn region, into a bridge between Europe and Asia. However, if old animosities prevail, this hope may once again dissolve.
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